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J e s s i c a  A .  C l a r k e   
 
Against Immutability 
abstract.  Courts often hold that antidiscrimination law protects “immutable” characteris-
tics, like sex and race. In a series of recent cases, gay rights advocates have persuaded courts to 
expand the concept of immutability to include not just those traits an individual cannot change, 
but also those considered too important for anyone to be asked to change. Sexual orientation and 
religion are paradigmatic examples. This Article critically examines this new concept of immuta-
bility, asking whether it is fundamentally different from the old one and how it might apply to 
characteristics on the borders of employment discrimination law’s protection, such as obesity, 
pregnancy, and criminal records. It argues that the new immutability does not avoid the old ver-
sion’s troublesome judgments about which traits are morally blameworthy and introduces new 
difficulties by requiring problematic judgments about which traits are important. Ultimately, 
immutability considerations of both the old and new varieties distract from the aim of employ-
ment discrimination law: targeting unreasonable and systemic forms of bias. 
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introduction 
Why is it illegal to discriminate on the basis of certain traits, like race or 
sex, but not others, like experience or beauty? One answer that has been of-
fered in the context of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is that 
certain human traits are immutable, meaning they were not chosen. This con-
cept has long endured the scholarly criticism that it is “both over- and underin-
clusive.”1 For example, it is permissible to discriminate on the basis of intelli-
gence, which some say is innate, but not religion, which some say can be 
changed. In response to the argument that sexual orientation might be changed 
and is therefore undeserving of protection, gay rights advocates have persuad-
ed many courts, perhaps even the Supreme Court, to adopt a different under-
standing of immutable characteristics.2 Many courts now ask “not whether a 
characteristic is strictly unchangeable, but whether the characteristic is a core 
trait or condition that one cannot or should not be required to abandon.”3 Or, 
 
1. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case 
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 504 (1998). 
2. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court observed that “[o]nly in more recent years have 
psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of 
human sexuality and immutable.” 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (emphasis added) (citing Brief 
for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7-17, 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1004713 [hereinafter APA Brief]). The APA 
Brief did not argue that sexual orientation is never chosen, nor did it argue that sexual orien-
tation cannot be changed. Rather, it argued that “[m]ost gay men and lesbians do not expe-
rience their sexual orientation as a voluntary choice,” and treatments aimed at changing sex-
ual orientation “are unlikely to succeed.” Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8-9, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 
WL 1004713 [hereinafter APA Brief]. The brief explained that sexual orientation “defines the 
universe of persons with whom one is likely to find the satisfying and fulfilling relationships 
that, for many individuals, comprise an essential component of personal identity.” Id. at 10. 
The Court did not clarify precisely what it meant by the term “immutable,” nor did it state 
what role the immutability of sexual orientation might have played in its holding that the 
Constitution requires states to license and recognize same-sex marriages. 
3. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer 
v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. Many feder-
al courts have adopted this new definition of immutability. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 
464 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have recognized that ‘[s]exual orientation and sexual identity 
are immutable; they are so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be re-
quired to abandon them.’” (quoting Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th 
Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 
2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006))); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(describing the immutability inquiry as looking for “some immutable or at least tenacious 
characteristic . . . (biological, such as skin color, or a deep psychological commitment, as re-
ligious belief often is . . . )”); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2014) 
(holding that sexual orientation is “so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should 
 
 against immutability 
5 
 
as another judge put it, “‘immutability’ may describe those traits that are so 
central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government to pe-
nalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that change 
might be physically.”4 
The success of the revised version of immutability in the courts has given 
new life to a concept once thought dead and led scholars to apply the insight to 
other identities or traits that are not currently protected by antidiscrimination 
law.5 Scholars have been optimistic about the so-called “new immutability”6 
 
not be required to abandon [it]” (quoting Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093)); Love v. 
Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (“As to immutability, the relevant in-
quiry is not whether a person could, in fact, change a characteristic, but rather whether the 
characteristic is so integral to a person’s identity that it would be inappropriate to require 
her to change it to avoid discrimination.”); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1013 
(W.D. Wis. 2014) (“[R]egardless whether sexual orientation is ‘immutable,’ it is ‘funda-
mental to a person’s identity,’ which is sufficient to meet this factor.” (citation omitted)); 
De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d sub nom. De Leon v. Ab-
bott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[S]exual orientation is so fundamental to a person’s 
identity that one ought not be forced to choose between one’s sexual orientation and one’s 
rights as an individual—even if one could make a choice.”); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 
2d 939, 960 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“Even if sexual orientation were not immutable, sexual ori-
entation is an integral part of personal identity.”); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[A] person’s sexual orientation is so fundamen-
tal to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon it.”). 
The Supreme Courts of California, Connecticut, Iowa, and New Mexico have also 
adopted this new definition for purposes of holding that sexual orientation is a suspect clas-
sification under their respective state constitutions. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 
(Cal. 2008) (“Because a person’s sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one’s identity, 
it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation 
in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 
407, 426 (Conn. 2008) (“[G]ay persons, because they are characterized by a ‘central, defin-
ing [trait] of personhood, which may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant 
damage to the individual’s sense of self,’ are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable 
characteristic.” (citation omitted) (quoting Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992))); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
862, 886-89 (Iowa 2009) (“[W]e agree with those courts that have held the immutability 
‘prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when . . . the identifying trait is so cen-
tral to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for 
refusing to change [it].’” (quoting Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438)); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 
865, 884 (N.M. 2013) (“This [immutability] requirement cannot mean that the individual 
must be completely unable to change the characteristic. Instead, the question is whether the 
characteristic is so integral to the individual’s identity that, even if he or she could change it, 
would it be inappropriate to require him or her to do so in order to avoid discrimination?” 
(citations omitted)). 
4. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1988) (Norris, J., concurring). 
5. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1531-37 (2011) (arguing that the new immutability re-
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for its potential to expand those aspects of identity covered by antidiscrimina-
tion law.7  
This Article offers the first sustained challenge to the new immutability.8 
Despite the extensive attention the theory has received in judicial opinions and 
 
quires protection against discrimination based on appearance, parental status, marital sta-
tus, and political affiliation); Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A 
Challenge for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 31 (2003) (lauding the new 
immutability for its potential to expand protection to transgender identity); cf. Ann E. 
Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1482-83 (2011) (discuss-
ing polyamory in terms of whether it is “integral to an individual’s personal identity”). 
6. “New” is somewhat of a misnomer, as the theory now being advanced in many same-sex 
marriage cases was identified by legal scholars as early as 1981. See infra note 111 and accom-
panying text. Although the theory is not of recent vintage, its rise to popularity in equal pro-
tection case law is a recent phenomenon. 
7. See, e.g., Tiffany C. Graham, The Shifting Doctrinal Face of Immutability, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 169, 173 (2011) (approving of the new immutability for “mov[ing] toward an autono-
my-based model . . . that is premised on a respect for human dignity, which protects critical 
constitutive aspects of personhood, and which allows courts to offer heightened scrutiny 
protection to groups whose public identities are often not obvious”); Zachary A. Kramer, 
The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 949 (2014) (arguing that “[m]aybe we need a 
softer definition of immutability” to address discrimination on the basis of sex, transgender 
status, sexual orientation, and religion); Joseph Landau, “Soft Immutability” and “Imputed 
Gay Identity”: Recent Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237, 263 (2005) (arguing that “the soft immutability standard[] sug-
gests great promise, and serves as a lodestar for LGBT litigants in other statutory and con-
stitutional contexts”); Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 
1505 (2009) (applauding the new immutability, as formulated by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, for “provid[ing] a means of graceful exit from the immutability morass in which 
equal protection analysis has become mired”); cf. Michael A. Helfand, The Usual Suspect 
Classifications: Criminals, Aliens and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 
11 (2009) (arguing in favor of the new immutability for purposes of asylum law, while en-
dorsing variants of the old for purposes of equal protection and Title VII); Anthony R. En-
riquez, Note, Assuming Responsibility for Who You Are: The Right To Choose “Immutable” 
Identity Characteristics, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 373, 373 (2013) (arguing that the new immutability 
“resolves inconsistencies in traditional equal protection jurisprudence caused by a biological 
immutability standard and . . . harmonizes recent lower court opinions discussing race- and 
gender-related equal protection in an era of increased multiracial, intersex, and transgender 
visibility”). 
8. Although scholars have not critically considered the latest wave of cases on the new immu-
tability, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, Janet Halley was an early critic of the doc-
trine, referring to it as “personhood” immutability and arguing that it essentialized sexual 
orientation identity. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique 
of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 519-21 (1994). This Article builds on 
Halley’s points, see infra Part II.B, and identifies additional normative and strategic objec-
tions to the theory.  
While “academic critiques of the immutability doctrine fill volumes,” those critiques are 
primarily directed at the old version of immutability, which protected only traits a person 
could not change. See Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Dis-
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legal scholarship,9 no work has critically considered its broader implications for 
the development of antidiscrimination law. The evolution of immutability has 
important implications for antidiscrimination doctrine, as well as debates 
among the public, legislatures, and employers over whether to prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of various traits and identities. To assess the theory’s 
potential and limits, this Article examines how arguments based in the revised 
version of immutability might play out with respect to characteristics on the 
borders of employment discrimination law’s protection. It concludes that, 
while the new immutability has had success in constitutional litigation for 
LGBT rights, it is a questionable strategy for reconceptualizing the broader 
project of equality law. As a normative matter, the new immutability obscures 
critical questions about why some characteristics ought to be treated equally, 
offering only the empty assertion that they are fundamental to personhood. 
Rather than replacing the old theory of immutability, which entails problemat-
ic moral judgments about individual responsibility, the new version reinvigor-
ates the ideology behind the old. As a strategic matter, the new immutability 
may backfire for groups advocating that new forms of bias be prohibited, be-
cause it creates line-drawing problems and justifies only limited forms of pro-
tection.  
This Article is concerned with the migration of the new immutability from 
equal protection cases to new contexts, particularly the various statutes prohib-
 
crimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1418-19 (2014) (defending the old immutability). 
These critiques generally did not assess the revised version of immutability advanced in re-
cent same-sex marriage cases. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. But see Edward Stein, 
Immutability and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 597, 633-35 (2014) (critiquing the old immutability and arguing that the new version 
is also problematic because it “is just not immutability in the standard sense of the term”). 
Moreover, prior work has been directed at advancing protection for “mutable traits com-
monly associated with race or sex,” such as “racially identified hairstyles.” See Ford, supra, at 
1418. This Article looks at other frontiers of antidiscrimination protection that have generat-
ed recent legal controversies: weight, pregnancy, and criminal records. 
A few scholars who applaud the new immutability have noted its limitations. See, e.g., 
Landau, supra note 7, at 263 (recognizing that “[s]ome scholars might object that a soft im-
mutability standard fails to adequately protect performative characteristics and that the only 
way to truly protect all transgender individuals is to jettison immutability altogether”); En-
riquez, supra note 7, at 399 n.110 (noting there is a need for caution “when relying on such 
potentially subjective criteria as a court’s conception of what is or is not fundamental to an 
individual’s sense of self”).  
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 377 tbl.1 (2014) 
(providing a “[d]escriptive [m]odel” listing eight criteria commonly associated with antidis-
crimination protection, including, as the first factor, “[i]dentity beyond the individual’s 
control or thought too deeply rooted to ask people to alter”). 
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iting employment discrimination.10 While this Article suggests reasons to be 
skeptical of the new immutability in general, its intervention is not focused on 
equal protection doctrine or the same-sex marriage cases. Instead, it focuses on 
employment discrimination, not only because of the economic importance and 
profound social significance of the workplace,11 but also because employment 
discrimination law has shown remarkable willingness to extend legal protec-
tions to new traits.12  
As the role of immutability in the Supreme Court’s equal protection juris-
prudence has diminished, the concept has continued to have a strong influence 
and enduring explanatory force in employment discrimination law.13 While 
immutability is but one among many factors in equal protection doctrine,14 it 
often plays a determinative role in employment discrimination disputes. Courts 
use the old concept of immutability to limit the reach of employment discrimi-
nation statutes, narrowly construing what counts as discrimination based on 
 
10. As a general matter, concepts from equal protection contexts tend to migrate to the em-
ployment discrimination arena. See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2000) (discussing the importance of “the workplace” as “a uniquely im-
portant site within a diverse democratic society that aspires to achieve integration and equal-
ity among the citizens but that recognizes limitations on the proper scope of regulation”); 
Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (2000) (“[T]he prospect of who 
we become as a society, and as individuals, is shaped profoundly by the laws that create and 
control the institutions that govern our experiences as workers.”). 
12. Federal employment discrimination law protects a wide array of traits from discrimination. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a) (2012) (certain immigration statuses); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012) 
(union affiliation); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (age); 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2012) (military ser-
vice); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (pregnancy); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (race, color, 
religion, sex, and national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2012) (genetic information); 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (disability). State and local laws often cover even more traits. See, 
e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2012) (personal appearance, familial status, family responsibili-
ties, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, and place of residence or busi-
ness); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (West 2015) (smokers); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291 
(McKinney 2015) (sexual orientation and marital status). By contrast, the Supreme Court 
has long been reticent to extend any level of heightened scrutiny to classes other than illegit-
imacy, race, alienage, national origin, and gender, turning its focus instead to whether legis-
lation is “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).  
13. See Sandi Farrell, Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the Ideology of Volunta-
rism in Title VII Jurisprudence, 92 KY. L.J. 483, 515 (2004) (explaining that, although the Su-
preme Court may be “retiring the immutability criterion” in equal protection cases, “[i]t is 
clear . . . from reading Title VII decisions . . . that the notion of immutability remains a per-
suasive ideological framework for many courts in the employment discrimination context”).  
14. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
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characteristics such as race, sex, and disability.15 The old immutability’s perva-
sive influence on employment discrimination law suggests that the new version 
might have obvious applications there as well.16 This Article considers how the 
new immutability might play out in controversies over whether the law forbids 
employment discrimination based on obesity,17 pregnancy,18 and criminal rec-
ords.19 Despite plausible statutory arguments for covering these types of dis-
crimination, courts often refuse to extend protection.20  
In these contexts, the old immutability’s argument that these traits were 
chosen lies at the heart of courts’ refusals to extend familiar forms of antidis-
crimination protection.21 The old immutability assumed that certain traits, like 
race and sex, were not blameworthy on account of being “accidents of birth.”22 
The corollary is that traits for which an individual is accountable, in some 
sense, are appropriate bases for discrimination.23 This reasoning may be prem-
 
15. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.  
16. See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1537 (“Immutability is the common thread that runs through 
the fabric of the employment discrimination statutes.”). Courts have on occasion employed 
a test that resembles the new version of immutability in interpreting employment discrimi-
nation statutes. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
17. See, e.g., Sibilla v. Follett Corp., No. CV 10–1457(AKT), 2012 WL 1077655, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that, despite recent revisions to the Americans with Disabilities Act 
to make it easier for a plaintiff to prove she is “disabled,” obesity is not a disability unless the 
plaintiff can prove her obesity was the result of a physiological disorder). 
18. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354-55 (2015) (addressing 
whether an employer must accommodate pregnancy-related disabilities if it accommodates a 
subset of other, non-pregnancy related impairments). 
19. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, 
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER 
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC ARREST  
AND CONVICTION RECORDS GUIDANCE], http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest 
_conviction.pdf [http://perma.cc/557L-N5L7] (advising that the use of arrest and conviction 
records to screen out job applicants may be illegal discrimination). 
20. With respect to obesity, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 forbids an employer 
from discriminating against someone regarded as having a physical impairment that is not 
transitory and minor. See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text. The Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978 requires employers to accommodate pregnant workers to the same 
extent that they do nonpregnant workers who are similarly unable to work. See infra note 
344 and accompanying text. Blanket exclusions of job applicants with criminal records may 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids employment practices that 
have a disparate impact on a minority group. See infra notes 425-431 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 300-311, 339-382, 446-449 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text. 
23. To be sure, immutability may not be a necessary factor in equal protection law. See infra text 
accompanying note 55. But for immutability to have any force as a factor, it must in the very 
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ised on the moral intuition that discrimination against those who are blame-
worthy is fair. Or it may rest on the unstated assumption that the law should 
create incentives for good (or efficient) behavior by allowing discrimination on 
the basis of certain bad (or costly) choices. For instance, discrimination based 
on weight often goes unredressed by the law because obesity is commonly 
thought to be a mutable trait that may be prevented or ameliorated through 
adjustments to lifestyle and diet.24 Judges may refuse to require that employers 
accommodate pregnancy because they believe that women who make private 
reproductive choices ought to bear the costs.25 Employment discrimination on 
the basis of criminal records is thought to be fair as a collateral consequence of 
conviction.26 The judgments underlying these views are often harsh, intrusive, 
and stigmatizing. Yet these moral and economic judgments lie below the sur-
face of policy and legal doctrine and are rarely interrogated or theorized. Is 
obesity more morally blameworthy than heart disease, which is protected from 
discrimination despite having behavioral components? Should pregnant wom-
en alone bear the costs of pregnancy? Should those with criminal records be 
shunned from all employment opportunities?27  
The new immutability is no better than the old on these questions. It fails 
to provide a theoretically satisfying basis for understanding which characteris-
tics deserve protection and invites normatively problematic judgments that are 
at odds with the purposes of antidiscrimination law. While the old immutabil-
ity assumed that certain traits might be blameworthy because they were cho-
sen, the new immutability’s appeal to “personal identity” masks underlying 
moral assessments about which traits, while entailing some degree of choice, 
ought not be blameworthy.28 These estimations may be unfair and irrelevant to 
employment. But by softening the edges of immutability theory to render it 
more appealing, the new immutability shields problematic judgments from 
 
least be true that we think discrimination is more likely to be legitimate to the extent that an 
individual bears more responsibility for a trait. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
24. See, e.g., Jane Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 209, 211 (2010) (positing that “one of 
the reasons obesity is not considered a disability is because we blame the obese person for 
being fat. We see fat people as responsible for their physical condition and, therefore, as-
sume that their obesity is voluntary.”). 
25. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex 
Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 417-18 (2011). 
26. See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Em-
ployment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 932 (2014). 
27. The EEOC has not taken the position that employers may never consider applicants’ crimi-
nal histories; rather, it has advised that blanket exclusions of applicants with criminal rec-
ords may violate Title VII if not justified by a business necessity. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 427-431. 
28. See infra Part II.A. 
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scrutiny. Moreover, the new immutability’s focus on valued traits leaves out 
many stigmatized identities—identities that might have the strongest claims to 
protection precisely because judgments based on them are superficial and per-
petuate systemic subordination.29 For example, many people would dispute 
that weight is a central part of identity, and most people would prefer to 
change their weight if they could.30 (And many would dispute that even sexual-
ity, sex, and race are, or ought to be, central to personhood.31) Even worse, to 
argue a trait is fundamental to personality is to bolster the argument that it 
cannot change.32 The suggestion that criminal records are central to personality 
would lend support to employer beliefs that automatic exclusion of all those 
with criminal records will help avoid workplace crime.33 In this way, the new 
immutability reinforces stereotypes of the sort that antidiscrimination law is 
intended to disrupt.  
Nor does the new immutability clear a path toward legal protection for new 
characteristics. The new immutability protects traits that are fundamental to a 
person’s identity.34 But defining what makes a trait fundamental is not easy, 
giving rise to judicial anxiety that protecting new identities might lead down a 
slippery slope to protecting all variations in personality.35 For example, judicial 
opinions on whether obesity is a protected disability demonstrate that courts 
are likely to resist extending protection for weight if the question is framed as a 
right to personality, because, these courts reason, every aspect of an individu-
al’s appearance might be said to be central to personality.36 Additionally, the 
protection offered by the new immutability may be sparse. The new immuta-
bility draws on the ideas of liberty and privacy, but protections for liberty and 
privacy are often limited to rights against state interference, rather than the full 
set of antidiscrimination remedies.37 Finally, the new immutability invites in-
tractable conflicts among groups asserting that certain choices are fundamental 
to their identities, such as between women seeking insurance coverage for con-
traception and employers whose religious beliefs do not countenance non-
procreative sex.38 
 
29. See infra Part II.B. 
30. See infra notes 322-325 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 202-208, 214 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra Part II.C. 
33. See infra notes 433, 458-460 and accompanying text. 
34. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
35. See infra Part II.D. 
36. See infra notes 332-335 and accompanying text. 
37. See infra Part II.E. 
38. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014); infra Part II.F.  
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While the new immutability may have been a useful doctrinal workaround 
for courts seeking to expand equal protection to sexual orientation, it is not a 
fruitful way to reimagine the law of equality in every context. Asking whether a 
characteristic is immutable, in either the new or old sense, focuses attention on 
the victims of discrimination and their blameworthy or costly choices, rather 
than the systemic effects of biases that are not required for the workplace to 
function. Immutability is a poor fit for employment discrimination law because 
it measures a person in the abstract, not that person’s qualifications for a par-
ticular job.39 It also fails to call attention to how certain biases, when com-
pounded, can result in caste-like social structures, leading to wholesale disad-
vantages or constrained opportunities based on identity.40  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the revised theory of 
immutability, discussing its origins in equal protection jurisprudence, its evo-
lution in recent gay rights cases, and its emergence in employment discrimina-
tion law. Part II raises several normative and tactical objections to the revised 
immutability. It argues that even when revised, immutability is a harsh and in-
trusive moral theory. The new immutability’s protections for “personhood” ex-
clude the most stigmatized, and its underlying premises reinforce stereotypes. 
Practically, the new immutability fails to give courts a principled basis for dis-
tinguishing between those traits that deserve protection and those that do not. 
It cannot justify transformative interventions into discriminatory social practic-
es, and it invites conflicting equality claims. Part III applies these objections to 
current controversies in employment discrimination law. It discusses how the 
old immutability limits the law’s reach in the weight, pregnancy, and ex-
offender discrimination contexts, and how the new immutability also fails to 
capture the wrong of these forms of discrimination. Part IV analyzes two alter-
natives to immutability arguments in the employment discrimination sphere: 
specifically, universal approaches that seek to enhance fairness for all workers, 
and targeted approaches that address systemic and superficial barriers to op-
portunity. It argues for targeted, incremental expansion of employment dis-
crimination law, along with explicit scrutiny of the moral judgments behind 
immutability arguments of any stripe. 
 
39. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (“Far from disparaging job qualifica-
tions as such, [by enacting Title VII] Congress has made such qualifications the controlling 
factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has 
commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in 
the abstract.”). 
40. See infra Part IV.B. 
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i .  the revised theory of immutability  
This Part discusses the original reasoning behind the immutability factor in 
equal protection doctrine, describes objections to that theory, and explains how 
the immutability factor has been transformed by lower courts in gay rights cas-
es. This Article’s primary intervention, however, is not aimed at equal protec-
tion doctrine. Rather, this Article aims to demonstrate problems with the theo-
ry of immutability as a general test of what traits ought to be protected against 
discrimination, by looking at its applications in a specific context: employment 
discrimination law. It examines the equal protection cases to excavate the justi-
fications for the assumption that immutable traits deserve protection, to con-
nect those arguments to moral theories about egalitarianism, and to critique 
those arguments as applied to specific controversies in employment discrimina-
tion law. While this analysis may also suggest directions for constitutional law, 
this Article leaves those questions for another day. This Part will describe the 
revised immutability and how it attempts to address the principal objections to 
the old. 
A. Two Concepts of Immutability 
1. Protection from Chance 
This Part will discuss the “old” concept of immutability as chance, luck, or 
an “accident of birth,” as that idea arose in the Supreme Court’s equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. Other scholarly treatments of this subject have examined 
immutable traits defined as those characteristics that cannot be changed.41 This 
account examines another definition of immutable traits: characteristics for 
which an individual is not responsible. It will then connect that concept of im-
mutability with the moral theories of egalitarianism that might support it, an 
exercise that reveals a number of objections to the old immutability. This Part 
will discuss those objections and conclude by describing the demise of the old 
immutability in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
To begin, the Supreme Court has mentioned immutability as one of several 
factors that might be relevant to the question of whether a legislative classifica-
 
41. See Ford, supra note 8, at 1418-19; cf. Y oshino, supra note 1, at 487 (criticizing the immutabil-
ity factor for “subtly encouraging groups . . . to assimilate by changing or hiding their defin-
ing characteristic”). 
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tion based on a particular trait deserves heightened scrutiny by the courts.42 For 
instance, the Court has referred to immutability alongside “visibility”—
whether a group “exhibit[s] obvious . . . or distinguishing characteristics that 
define [it] as a discrete group.”43 The Court has considered other independent 
factors as well, including whether the class has “experienced a ‘history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment,’”44 whether it has “been subjected to unique disa-
bilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of [its] 
abilities,”45 and whether it is “in need of extraordinary protection from the ma-
joritarian political process.”46  
The Supreme Court has referred to immutable traits simply as those that 
their “possessors are powerless to escape or set aside.”47 But the concept of 
immutability is deeply rooted in notions of individual responsibility, referring 
not just to traits that cannot be changed, but also traits that were never cho-
sen.48 The term “immutable characteristic” first appears in the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in Frontiero v. Richardson, a case striking 
down policies that discriminated on the basis of sex by providing more benefits 
to the wives of male military servicemembers than to the husbands of female 
servicemembers.49 A plurality of the Court reasoned: 
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special dis-
abilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex 
 
42. The Court has analyzed legislative classifications based on three levels of scrutiny: rational 
basis, intermediate, and strict, ratcheting up its scrutiny of the state’s motives as the sus-
pectness of the classification increases. See Y oshino, supra note 1, at 487-89. 
43. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).  
44. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).  
45. Id.  
46. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
47. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“[R]ace, like gender and illegitimacy, is an immutable charac-
teristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside.” (citation omitted)); cf. 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (holding that conscientious objectors 
lacked an “immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth” (quoting 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion))).  
48. A trait may be impossible to change and yet chosen by an individual, such as criminal rec-
ords. See Helfand, supra note 7, at 5-8 (discussing the confusion over three different defini-
tions of immutable characteristics: traits that have not been chosen, traits that cannot be 
changed, and traits that no one should have to change). 
49. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678-79. 
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would seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal bur-
dens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .”50 
To support this conclusion, the Frontiero plurality cited Weber v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co., a case with facts that starkly illustrate the unfairness of accidents 
of birth.51 In Weber, death benefits under a workers’ compensation scheme had 
been denied to a deceased man’s children because those children were “illegit-
imate.”52 The Court held: 
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s con-
demnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But 
visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and un-
just. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contra-
ry to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear 
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obvious-
ly, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate 
child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the par-
ent.53 
Immutability is therefore not confined to biological traits; as this legitimacy 
example demonstrates, social categories too may be assigned at birth.54  
To be sure, the Court has not held that immutability is necessary55 or suffi-
cient56 to turn a classification suspect. But even when the Court has refused to 
 
50. Id. at 686 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). Immutability 
alone was not sufficient. The plurality opinion goes on to say: “[W]hat differentiates sex 
from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the 
recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to abil-
ity to perform or contribute to society.” Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Weber, 406 U.S. at 165. 
53. Id. at 175. 
54. Cf. Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1381 (1999) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court understands race as “the product of social and political institutions” 
and that this “nonbiological understanding of race compels the conclusion that the immuta-
bility standard is not grounded in understandings of biological variation”). 
55. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1977) (treating alienage as a suspect classification, 
even though alienage may sometimes be changed through naturalization). 
56. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) (refusing to treat 
the “class of the mentally retarded” as “quasi-suspect,” on the ground that there is no “prin-
cipled way” to distinguish this group from others with “immutable disabilities”); Mass. Bd. 
of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (denying suspect-class status to age, a trait 
generally thought to be outside an individual’s control, in holding that a statute setting a 
mandatory retirement age of fifty for police officers survived rational basis review).  
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hold that a group with an immutable characteristic is a “suspect class,” it has 
been solicitous in its application of rational basis review toward the rights of 
those deemed innocent.57 In Plyler v. Doe, the Court struck down a Texas stat-
ute excluding undocumented immigrant children from public education.58 
While the Court acknowledged that “undocumented status” is not “an abso-
lutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed un-
lawful, action,” it nevertheless concluded that the law in question “imposes its 
discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children 
can have little control.”59 This type of unfairness “suggests the kind of ‘class or 
caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”60 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court confronted a Texas city’s 
ordinance denying a permit for the operation of “a group home for the mental-
ly retarded.”61 The Court held that the group did not have suspect class status, 
but went on to quote John Hart Ely: “Surely one has to feel sorry for a person 
disabled by something he or she can’t do anything about . . . .”62 The Court 
struck down the ordinance.63 
Immutable characteristics, defined as “accidents of birth,” are suspect to the 
Court because they bear no relationship to individual responsibility.64 As a 
practical matter, the law is unlikely to deter private conduct by discriminating 
on the basis of accidents of birth because their bearers did not choose, or may 
be powerless to change, these immutable traits.65 The term “accident,” then, is 
 
57. The Supreme Court has occasionally deviated from the ordinary standard of rational basis 
review to apply what scholars have called “rational basis ‘with bite.’” See Kenji Yoshino, 
Why the Court Can Strike Down Marriage Restrictions Under Rational-Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 331-35 (2013) (contrasting cases that apply the ordinary standard 
of rational basis review with those said to apply rational basis “with bite”). 
58. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
59. Id. at 220. 
60. Id. at 216 n.14. 
61. 473 U.S. at 435. The term “the mentally retarded” was used by the Supreme Court and re-
flected common usage at the time. 
62. Id. at 442 n.10 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 150 (1980) (alteration in original)). I note that Ely was a critic of the immutability 
factor. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 150 
(1980). 
63. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
64. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972). 
65. Id. at 175. 
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used in the moral sense, as the opposite of a matter for which one is accounta-
ble.66 
This moral concept has powerful intuitive appeal. It is linked to notions of 
childhood innocence, eliciting empathy for those who were blameless in their 
misfortunes and evoking disdain for those who obtained their privilege with-
out merit. The phrase “accident of birth” has a long philosophical pedigree, 
and was an important theme in the writing of John Stuart Mill on sex and race 
equality in the nineteenth century.67 Mill wrote: 
If it be said that . . . virtue is itself the greatest good and vice the great-
est evil, then these at least ought to be dispensed to all according to 
what they have done to deserve them; instead of which, every kind of 
moral depravity is entailed upon multitudes by the fatality of birth; 
through the fault of their parents, of society, or of uncontrollable cir-
cumstances, certainly through no fault of their own.68 
More recent philosophical work has developed this intuition—that individ-
uals should not be responsible for chance occurrences—into a theory of dis-
tributive justice called “luck egalitarianism.”69 An extreme version of this theo-
ry would justify widespread redistribution.70 A more limited version 
undergirds the notion of immutability operative in equal protection doctrine—
that the Constitution calls for scrutiny of government classifications that bur-
den those whose fault is only in their stars.71  
 
66. It is not used in the ontological sense of being the opposite of an essential characteristic. Cf. 
Herbert Spiegelberg, ‘Accident of Birth’: A Non-Utilitarian Motif in Mill’s Philosophy, 22 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 475, 476 (1961) (discussing John Stuart Mill’s use of the concept). 
67. See id. at 476-80. The phrase also appears in nineteenth-century literature. William Make-
peace Thackeray’s novel Vanity Fair tells the story of young William Dobbin, who was the 
victim of schoolyard taunting related to his father’s lower-class occupation as a grocer. WIL-
LIAM MAKEPEACE THACKERAY, VANITY FAIR 54 (John Carey ed., Penguin Classics 2003) 
(1848). But after Dobbin bested the school bully in a fight, “[i]t was voted low to sneer at 
Dobbin about this accident of birth.” Id. 
68. JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION 36 (Prometheus Books 1998) (1874). 
69. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 289 (1999) (coin-
ing the term “luck egalitarianism”).  
70. JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 37, 49-50 (2014) 
(arguing that luck egalitarianism would require policies that make everyone’s developmental 
opportunities equal at every stage of life, including policies to redistribute the advantages 
certain children receive from having parents with more resources). 
71. The allusion is to William Shakespeare. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS 
CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, at 41 (William Rosen & Barbara Rosen eds., Signet 1963) (1599) (“The 
fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars / But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”). Apart 
from egalitarian ideals, the immutability factor has been justified on political process 
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Luck egalitarianism is subject to a number of criticisms that might also be 
applied to the use of immutability as a criterion for antidiscrimination protec-
tion. These include problems distinguishing between chance and choice, as 
well as the theory’s harshness, its intrusiveness, and its stigmatizing effects. 
Problems Distinguishing Between Chance and Choice. First, critics argue that 
luck egalitarianism rests on a thin notion of choice, as distinguished from 
chance. Luck egalitarians struggle to draw a principled line between merit and 
luck: talents, aptitudes, and even the motivation to work hard may be just as 
much accidents of birth as race or sex.72 One need not believe free will is an il-
lusion to agree that what may seem a free choice from a privileged perspective 
may seem predetermined by socioeconomic circumstances from a disadvan-
taged one. What appears merit may be luck, as privileged families transmit 
myriad advantages to their children.73 And the “irresponsible” choices on 
which luck egalitarians would rest moral responsibility may not, upon closer 
examination, turn out to be “informed, voluntary, uncoerced, and deliberated 
upon.”74 Moreover, there are good reasons to question impulses to assign indi-
vidual agency for certain traits but not others. Social science research demon-
strates spontaneous “blame validation” effects in which observers tend to over-
ascribe volition and causation to individuals they have already implicitly judged 
as morally culpable.75  
 
grounds. See Yoshino, supra note 1, at 506-07. The political process argument is that immu-
table groups require special protection from the judiciary against disfavor by other branches 
of government, because immutable groups cannot change their stripes to achieve political 
influence. See id. at 507-08. I do not analyze political process theories here because this Arti-
cle aims to intervene in debates about which forms of employment discrimination deserve 
scrutiny by legislatures, employers, and courts interpreting statutes, not the question of 
when judicial intervention in the political process is warranted. 
72. See FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 59. 
73. See id. at 48-55. 
74. I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 274 (2013); see also Samuel 
Scheffler, What Is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 18 (2003) (“[I]n any ordinary 
sense of ‘voluntary,’ people’s voluntary choices are routinely influenced by unchosen fea-
tures of their personalities, temperaments, and the social contexts in which they find them-
selves.”). 
75. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
556, 558 (2000) (discussing “blame validation” effects); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Con-
tent of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Op-
portunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1204 (1995) (summarizing research on biases in causal at-
tribution); Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe, The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment, 24 MIND & 
LANGUAGE 586, 589 (2009) (concluding that “people’s moral judgments are somehow influ-
encing their intuitions as to whether or not an agent acts intentionally” (citations omitted)). 
More troublingly, psychologists have described a “tendency to blame victims for their mis-
fortunes,” as when participants in a study blamed a student they observed receiving electric 
shocks. Alicke, supra, at 566 (discussing Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, The Ob-
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Harshness. A second criticism is that luck egalitarianism is harsh. On a pure 
version of the theory, an uninsured driver who is at fault for an accident should 
not be granted emergency medical assistance.76 If the driver survives and is dis-
abled, society has no obligation to accommodate her disability.77 The theory 
distinguishes between “the deserving and the undeserving disadvantaged,” and 
abandons the latter, even if her circumstances are catastrophic.78 It is not con-
cerned with providing second chances, opportunities to correct mistakes, or 
paths to redemption. 
It is no answer to these criticisms to say that some traits, like intelligence, 
are often relevant to legitimate purposes while others, like race, are usually not. 
As Ely put it: “At that point there’s not much left of the immutability theory, is 
there?”79 Equal protection jurisprudence generally asks the question of a trait’s 
relationship to a governmental objective only after deciding the extent to which 
the classification is suspect and deserving of special scrutiny.80 Likewise, em-
ployment discrimination law generally asks whether a trait was related to the 
job, but this inquiry is only necessary if the plaintiff has shown that the em-
ployer discriminated on some prohibited basis.81 The relevance of the trait to a 
particular purpose does all the work in the analysis, and immutability has no 
 
server’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”: Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 203 (1966)). Alicke explains, “Victim blame serves, at least symbolically, to restore 
a sense of justice, whereas ascribing harm to impersonal environmental forces sustains the 
belief that bad things can happen randomly to blameless people.” Id. at 566 (citing Camille 
B. Wortman, Causal Attributions and Personal Control, in 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION 
THEORY 23 (John H. Harvey et al. eds., 1976)). 
76. Anderson, supra note 69, at 295. 
77. See id. at 296. Luck egalitarians might qualify their arguments, admitting, for example, that 
“some outcomes are so awful that no one deserves to suffer them, not even the imprudent.” 
Id. at 301. But this argument is not supported by the theory behind luck egalitarianism; it 
must be supported by some other moral theory. See id. 
78. Id. at 311. 
79. ELY, supra note 62, at 150.  
80. See Yoshino, supra note 1, at 487 (“Under current equal protection doctrine, the question of 
whether a classification deserves heightened scrutiny precedes the question of whether the 
legislation is sufficiently related to its objective.”). But see supra note 45 and accompanying 
text (discussing how a history of inaccurate stereotypes regarding a group’s abilities is a fac-
tor in favor of suspect class status). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of [a protected trait other than 
race] in those certain instances where [that trait] is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business . . . .”); id. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (providing that an employer is liable for a policy that creates a disparate im-
pact on the basis of a protected trait if the plaintiff demonstrates the disparate impact and 
the employer fails to demonstrate “that the challenged practice is job related for the position 
in question and consistent with business necessity”). 
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bearing, unless we imagine that irrelevant traits are more suspect when they 
are immutable, and less suspect when they are mutable. But to endorse the idea 
that the state might discriminate on the basis of irrelevant traits just because 
they are mutable is to justify all forms of “state-sponsored cultural conformity 
and assimilationism.”82 Thus, immutability arguments allow those in power to 
require stifling conformity to conventional norms. 
Intrusiveness. This observation points to a third objection to luck egalitari-
anism: intrusiveness. Luck egalitarianism requires “moralizing judgments of 
individual choices” that “interfere[] with citizens’ privacy and liberty.”83 “[I]n 
order to lay a claim to some important benefit, people are forced to obey other 
people’s judgments of what uses they should have made of their opportunities  
. . . .”84 This intrusiveness objection resonates with the concerns of scholars 
critical of immutability as a forward-looking concept (as inability to change), 
rather than a backward-looking one (as lack of responsibility). Kenji Yoshino 
has argued that the immutability factor reflects an “assimilationist bias,” allow-
ing government policies to create incentives for those who can “change or con-
ceal their defining trait” to conform to mainstream expectations.85 According to 
Yoshino, one problem with the immutability factor is that it transforms the 
“descriptive claim that a group can assimilate . . . into the prescriptive claim 
that it should assimilate without much intervening investigation by the courts 
into the legitimacy of the legislation.”86 For instance, “Jews generally can 
change or conceal their religion, while blacks generally cannot change or con-
ceal their race. This surely does not make anti-Semitic legislation more legiti-
mate than racist legislation.”87 This example demonstrates how immutability 
arguments deflect attention from questions about the extent to which religious 
coercion is a legitimate pursuit for governments or employers. Likewise, im-
mutability arguments focused on past responsibility deflect attention from 
questions about whether those in power have legitmate reasons for imposing 
moralizing judgments on citizens or employees. 
Stigma. A fourth criticism responds to the argument that law might appro-
priately disincentivize or deter mutable, but not immutable, traits. Whether 
discrimination is an effective means of incentivizing behavior is an empirical 
 
82. Halley, supra note 8, at 508-09. 
83. Anderson, supra note 69, at 310 (emphasis omitted). 
84. Id. 
85. Yoshino, supra note 1, at 490. 
86. Id. at 506. 
87. Id. at 505. 
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question, but it is rarely examined as such.88 Discrimination may be intended 
to change behavior by shaming individuals possessing a certain trait.89 Wheth-
er shaming is generally effective in shaping behavior, as an empirical matter, is 
disputed and depends on context.90 In discrimination contexts, there are rea-
sons to doubt whether adverse treatment of those with mutable traits would be 
effective in shaping behavior. Rather than giving people incentives to take per-
sonal responsibility, an immutability requirement may instead put people to 
the disempowering task of proving they were victims of circumstances beyond 
their control.91 For example, an individual staking a claim to disability benefits 
must tell a story of misfortune that convinces adjudicators it is impossible for 
her to work through no fault of her own. And in the process, she must disclaim 
whatever abilities, competences, and hopes of returning to work she might 
have.92 Additionally, an immutability requirement stigmatizes some traits for 
which an individual certainly bears some responsibility, leading those individ-
uals to dissemble about their status, conceal the trait, or avoid seeking needed 
assistance.93  
Apart from these utilitarian considerations, many egalitarians oppose 
shaming practices as being “characteristic of hierarchical relationships.”94 
Shaming penalties have historically been employed to reaffirm class relation-
 
88. The question is more often examined as an expressive or moral one. Consider Weber, which 
held it was “ineffectual” to penalize illegitimate children for their parents’ sins. Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). Weber cites no evidence in support of this 
proposition, and common experience suggests many potential parents would just as likely 
be deterred by the threat of harm to their children as by the threat of harm to themselves. 
Likely, the court did not investigate this empirical question, because whatever the outcome, 
it was “unjust” for the law to express its “condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the 
bonds of marriage . . . on the head of an infant.” Id.  
89. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 287-
96 (2004) (discussing how discrimination often imposes shame).  
90. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 754 
(1998) (“The most one can say for now is that shaming penalties can deter some offenders 
some of the time, even if they don’t deter optimally.” (footnotes omitted)); Dan M. Kahan, 
What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2089 (2006) (discussing 
controversy over his empirical claim that in criminal law contexts, “shame would, or at least 
might, work”). 
91. Anderson, supra note 69, at 311. 
92. See, e.g., Spencer Rand, Creating My Client’s Image: Is Case Theory Value Neutral in Public 
Benefits Cases?, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 69, 77 (2008) (“In Supplemental Security Income 
(‘SSI’) and Social Security Disability cases, clients must testify to their own failings and 
their lack of hope of ever overcoming those failings to show that they are not just trying to 
beat the system.”). 
93. See Cohen, supra note 74, at 274. 
94. Kahan, supra note 90, at 2086-88.  
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ships and reinforce the shamed person’s subordinate status.95 Martha Nuss-
baum has distinguished shame, which is about actors, from guilt, which is 
about acts, arguing that “whereas shame focuses on defect or imperfection, and 
thus on some aspect of the very being of the person who feels it, guilt focuses 
on an action (or a wish to act), but need not extend to the entirety of the  
agent . . . .”96 While the criminal law may appropriately determine guilt and 
assign punishment, shaming is a form of “mob justice” in which the public 
punishes offenders in ways that are “not the impartial, deliberative, neutral jus-
tice that a liberal-democratic society typically prizes.”97 Stigmatizing practices 
go beyond expressing disapproval of a particular act or behavior to impose a 
“spoiled identity” on their targets.98 One feature of stigma is that people “tend 
to impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the original one.”99 
Thus, “[t]he harm of stigma is that a single perceived characteristic is seen as 
‘disqualifying’ the whole person, excluding him or her from membership in the 
community that calls itself the ‘normals.’”100 As a result of this exclusion, em-
pathy for the stigmatized group breaks down.101 Those targeted by shaming 
practices often internalize stigma, coming to believe themselves to be defi-
cient.102 Antidiscrimination law has long been concerned with practices that as-
sign stigmatized identities to individuals based on certain traits or behaviors, 
and then shame and disparage those individuals as less deserving of equal re-
spect or consideration.103  
 
95. See id. (discussing how corporal punishment, as a “shaming” penalty, was historically a way 
“that sovereigns disciplined subjects, masters disciplined slaves, parents disciplined chil-
dren, and husbands disciplined wives,” with members of upper classes often exempt). 
96. NUSSBAUM, supra note 89, at 207. 
97. Id. at 233-34 (discussing James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 
107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998)). 
98. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2-3 
(1963) (arguing that a stigmatized person is “reduced in our minds from a whole and usual 
person to a tainted, discounted one”). 
99. Id. at 5. 
100. Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orienta-
tion, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 286 (1995). 
101. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 249 (1983). 
102. GOFFMAN, supra note 98, at 7 (“Shame becomes a central possibility, arising from the indi-
vidual’s perception of one of his own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one 
he can readily see himself as not possessing.”). 
103. See, e.g., 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 128-29 (2014) 
(reading the distinctive wrong of school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education to be in-
stitutionalized humiliation); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 89, at 174-76 (arguing that “law 
should protect the equal dignity of all citizens, both by devising ways in which those already 
stigmatized as different can enjoy lives of greater dignity and by refusing to make law a 
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In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of courts confronted the question of 
whether sexual orientation classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Most upheld these classifications based, at least in part, on the logic that homo-
sexuality was “behavioral” rather than immutable.104 During this time, the con-
cept of immutability was under attack by scholars and judges.105 The courts, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court, began citing academic criticisms of immu-
tability106 and omitting it as an express consideration in equal protection analy-
sis.107 Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases 
have seldom mentioned immutability.108 A notable exception is the brief refer-
ence to sexual orientation’s immutability in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme 
Court’s landmark 2015 same-sex marriage opinion.109 
2. Protection for Choice 
Despite the Supreme Court’s move away from immutability in the decades 
prior to Obergefell, that concept enjoyed a substantial resurgence in the equal 
protection jurisprudence of lower federal and state courts.110 These courts re-
formulated the immutability factor in same-sex marriage cases. This Part will 
describe those cases and discuss how this new concept of immutability at-
tempts to respond to the objections to the old. 
It is important to note that the new immutability is “new” only in the sense 
that its rise to prominence is recent. As early as 1981, Douglas Laycock argued 
 
partner to the social infliction of shame”); Deborah Hellman, Equal Protection in the Key of 
Respect, 123 YALE L.J. 3036, 3046-47 (2014) (arguing that discrimination is wrong when it is 
an exercise of power that “demeans” a person or people by “express[ing]” that they “are less 
worthy of equal concern or respect”). 
104. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 
1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
105. See Halley, supra note 8, at 509-10; Yoshino, supra note 1, at 490-91, 490 n.14. 
106. See Yoshino, supra note 1, at 490 & n.15; supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
107. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. 
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 24-28 (1973). 
108. But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004) (plurality opinion) (describing 
“[p]olitical affiliation” as mutable); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 83 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (citing precedent holding that sex classifications require heightened scrutiny be-
cause sex is an immutable attribute). 
109. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Obergefell rested on the interaction of due process 
and equal protection principles; it did not hold that sexual orientation classifications are 
generally suspect and it did not specify the role that sexual orientation’s immutability 
played, if any, in its analysis. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015).  
110. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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that “some characteristics should be treated as immutable because of funda-
mental interests in not changing them,” such as sex and religion.111 The new 
immutability began gaining jurisprudential traction in 1989, when Judge Wil-
liam Norris advanced the theory in his concurring opinion in Watkins v. U.S. 
Army, a Ninth Circuit case challenging the military’s refusal to re-enlist a sol-
dier because he was gay.112 A similar definition of immutability developed con-
currently in asylum law.113 This Article follows recent scholarship in referring 
to this definition as the “new immutability,”114 although it has also been 
termed “personhood”115 or “soft immutability.”116 
Judge Norris’s opinion resisted the simplistic distinction between chance 
and choice. It demonstrated how traits thought to be products of chance may 
be subject to control, and how traits thought to be products of choice may be 
experienced as inevitable. The opinion rejected an understanding of “immuta-
bility in the sense that members of the class must be physically unable to 
change or mask the trait defining their class.”117 While acknowledging that 
“[i]t may be that some heterosexuals and homosexuals can change their sexual 
orientation through extensive therapy, neurosurgery or shock treatment,” 
Judge Norris concluded this did not make sexual orientation “mutable.”118 As 
examples of how traits considered immutable might be changed, the opinion 
pointed to sex change through surgery, naturalization of aliens, legitimation of 
children, and racial passing.119 Changing such traits is not impossible, but it 
 
111. Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REV. 
343, 383 (1981) (reviewing ELY, supra note 62) (arguing that although they might be 
changed, sex is a matter of personal autonomy and religion a matter of free exercise). 
112. 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring). In Watkins, the majori-
ty held that the Army was equitably estopped from denying reenlistment to Perry Watkins, 
because Watkins had always been candid about his sexuality and the Army had allowed him 
to reenlist in the past. Id. at 709-11 (majority opinion). Although the majority did not reach 
the issue, Judge Norris would have held that sexual orientation was a suspect classification. 
Id. at 728 (Norris, J., concurring).  
113. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). Immutability plays an important role 
in asylum law, as an express criterion for determining what characteristics qualify as “mem-
bership in a particular social group.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
114. Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality, 49 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 415, 473 (2012); Emens, supra note 9, at 377 & n.440; Schmeiser, supra note 7, 
at 1495. This Article uses the term “revised immutability” to refer to the synthesis of the old 
and new concepts into a test that prohibits discrimination on either basis. See infra Part I.B. 
115. See Halley, supra note 8, at 519; Yoshino, supra note 1, at 493-94. 
116. See Landau, supra note 7; Stein, supra note 8, at 633. 
117. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring). 
118. Id.  
119. Id.  
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“would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a 
traumatic change of identity.”120 In support, the opinion cited research from 
disciplines such as psychiatry.121 To drive home the point that some aspects of 
identity, while not “strictly immutable,” might be “effectively immutable,” the 
opinion asked “whether heterosexuals feel capable of changing their sexual ori-
entation.”122 As another court explained, such traits “may be altered only at the 
expense of significant damage to the individual’s sense of self.”123  
But ultimately, neither scientific proof of the difficulty of change nor the 
trauma of conversion efforts is what makes a trait immutable.124 Judge Norris 
explained that immutable traits are 
those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be ab-
horrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change 
them, regardless of how easy that change might be physically. Racial 
discrimination, for example, would not suddenly become constitutional 
if medical science developed an easy, cheap, and painless method of 
changing one’s skin pigment.125 
This analogy to racial discrimination only works if the reader believes, like 
Judge Norris, that the various sexual orientations are all on equal moral foot-
ing, just like racial categories are. Judge Norris’s opinion acknowledges that in 
determining which traits to protect, constitutional law must distinguish be-
tween fair and unfair bases for discrimination: “After all, discrimination exists 
against some groups because the animus is warranted—no one could seriously 
 
120. Id.  
121. Id.; see also Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (relying on psy-
chological, psychiatric, social, and behavioral sciences in an asylum case as to the fixed na-
ture of sexual orientation and trauma caused by conversion efforts), overruled on other 
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006). 
122. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring). 
123. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992). 
124. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring). Not every court would agree with this 
statement. Some opinions suggest that the difficulty of change is dispositive. See infra notes 
168-170 and accompanying text. 
125. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring). This example came from Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1073 
n.52 (1980). The opinion also quoted a Harvard Law Review Note arguing “that the ability to 
change a trait is not as important as whether the trait is a ‘determinative feature of person-
ality.’” Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring) (quoting Note, The Constitutional 
Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 
1303 (1985)). 
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argue that burglars form a suspect class.”126 The opinion is not clear on why 
discrimination based on sexual orientation was unfair, unlike discrimination 
against burglars, but it likely rested on Judge Norris’s conclusion that sexual 
orientation status did not necessarily entail any sort of illegal conduct.127 To be 
sure, Bowers v. Hardwick, a 1986 Supreme Court decision upholding a state 
statute criminalizing homosexual sex, was still good law at the time Judge Nor-
ris was writing.128 Thus, the new immutability had a narrow reach: invalidat-
ing a military rule that defined sexual orientation as a “status,” but not any 
rules prohibiting same-sex sodomy, marriage, or other “conduct.”129 
The new immutability is inflected with ideas about privacy and liberty, by 
contrast to the intrusiveness of the old theory. It finds inspiration in Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers, which drew on cases protecting the right to pri-
vacy to argue that “[w]e protect those rights . . . because they form so central a 
part of an individual’s life” and are “significant” ways “that individuals define 
themselves.”130 Lawrence v. Texas overruled Bowers in 2003.131 In light of Law-
rence, the Connecticut Supreme Court expanded the theory of the new immu-
tability in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health.132 Kerrigan holds that sexu-
al orientation is immutable because the Constitution protects the right of 
“homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct” as an “integral 
part of human freedom.”133 Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that “[s]exual 
intimacy is ‘a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to . . . the 
development of human personality . . . .’”134 In this formulation, immutability 
has mutated into an argument about choice—“a person’s fundamental right to 
self-determination.”135 Cases on the new immutability hold that, if a trait is not 
 
126. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724 (Norris, J., concurring). 
127. See id. at 716-17. 
128. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
129. See Halley, supra note 8, at 520 (explaining why “personhood arguments do not establish a 
rationale for delegitimating popular decisions to sanction [i.e., punish] voluntary conduct”).  
130. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun anchored this ob-
jection to anti-sodomy statutes in the right to privacy alone, not any considerations related 
to immutability. Id.  
131. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
132. 957 A.2d 407, 436-39 (Conn. 2008).  
133. Id. at 438 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77). 
134. Id. at 437 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)). 
135. Id. at 438. 
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innocent in the sense of being an accident of birth, it must be innocent in the 
sense of being an “integral part of human freedom.”136  
Obergefell reflects this new understanding of immutability, although that 
case did not explicitly define immutability, nor did it specify the role immuta-
bility might have played in its analysis.137 In Obergefell, the U.S. Supreme Court 
cited a brief by amici, led by the American Psychological Association (APA), in 
support of the claim that “psychiatrists and others” have recognized that sexual 
orientation is “immutable.”138 The APA Brief did not argue that sexual orienta-
tion is never chosen or impossible to change.139 Instead, it explained that sexual 
orientation “defines the universe of persons with whom one is likely to find the 
satisfying and fulfilling relationships that, for many individuals, comprise an 
essential component of personal identity.”140  
For the old immutability, a normative conclusion flows from a descriptive 
premise: because an individual never chose or cannot change a trait, that trait 
should not be the basis for discrimination. The new immutability substitutes a 
normative judgment for that descriptive premise: a certain trait should not be 
the basis for discrimination because it is a normatively acceptable, protected 
exercise of individual liberty or expression of personality. 
B. The Synthesis 
Courts describe the immutability test as a synthesis of the old and new 
formulations: a trait “that either is beyond the power of an individual to 
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought 
not be required to be changed.”141 On this theory, those traits that should be 
protected by antidiscrimination law include those that are immutable in both 
the old and new senses. This Article refers to this synthesis as the revised im-
mutability. Its analysis is directed at the revised immutability as a normative 
theory of what traits should be covered by antidiscrimination law. 
 
136. Id. 
137. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015). 
138. Id. (citing APA Brief, supra note 2, at 7-17). 
139. The APA Brief did not even use the word “immutable.” It argued instead that sexual orien-
tation “[i]s [g]enerally [n]ot chosen, and [i]s [h]ighly [r]esistant to [c]hange,” APA Brief, 
supra note 2, at 7, citing the results of one survey showing “only 5% of gay men and 16% of 
lesbians reported feeling they had ‘a fair amount’ or ‘a great deal’ of choice about their sexu-
al orientation,” id. at 8, and discussing the scientific consensus that “sexual orientation 
change efforts are unlikely to succeed and can be harmful,” id. at 9. 
140. Id. at 10. 
141. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (emphasis added) (defining immutability 
for asylum law generally).  
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The revised theory makes immutability more palatable to those who ob-
jected to the old version. The old immutability was subject to the criticisms 
that it rested on a thin delineation between chance and choice, and that it was 
harsh, intrusive, and stigmatizing.142 By integrating the new immutability, the 
revised theory might be understood as abandoning the fraught distinction be-
tween chance and choice. It refocuses the doctrine to consider the costs of 
change for an individual’s sense of self. The revised theory is not as harsh as 
the old version, in that it expands protection beyond those deemed blameless 
for possessing disfavored traits to include those who have made protected 
choices to adopt particular traits. It addresses the intrusiveness objection by 
shielding a private sphere of liberty for the formation of personality, in which 
government intervention is prohibited. And it counters stigma by allowing 
those claiming discrimination to do so without disavowing their own agency 
and pride in determining the content of their characters. The synthesis of the 
old and new versions of immutability protects both those whose misfortunes 
result from accidents of birth and those who seek freedom from discrimination 
to define their own personalities. 
C. Potential for Migration 
The revised immutability has the potential to carry over from opinions on 
equal protection doctrine to broader normative debates regarding what traits 
should be protected against discrimination. Such a migration could impact ju-
dicial decisions, public arguments, and legislative actions in areas like employ-
ment discrimination law. 
My argument is not that there is a direct doctrinal pathway through which 
immutability considerations must move from equal protection to employment 
discrimination law. Employment discrimination law differs from equal protec-
tion doctrine in many important ways. While the Equal Protection Clause con-
strains public entities and actors,143 employment discrimination law constrains 
many public and private employers.144 Although courts define which classifica-
tions are suspect for purposes of equal protection, legislatures specify suspect 
classifications for purposes of employment discrimination law.145 The array of 
 
142. See supra notes 72-103 and accompanying text. 
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (applying a 
similar equal protection guarantee to the federal government). 
144. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (defining “employers” for purposes of employment 
discrimination law).  
145. Employment discrimination statutes might have a broader reach than the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection because they are enacted by Congress, and the Court may be 
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traits protected by statute is far broader than that of those protected by the 
Constitution.146 Additionally, employers themselves are also important sources 
of discrimination rules and norms.147 
Despite these differences, the concept of immutability from the equal pro-
tection context plays a role in employment discrimination law in ways both di-
rect and indirect.148 Even though the term “immutability” does not appear in 
any employment discrimination statute, courts have borrowed immutability 
concepts to answer definitional questions about the scope of statutory prohibi-
tions on discrimination.149 For example, courts have held that employer poli-
 
less concerned that it is overstepping its role when it carries out specific congressional com-
mands. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding that Title VII’s prohibi-
tion on disparate impact discrimination does not apply to the equal protection clause be-
cause “extension of the rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of 
statute . . . should await legislative prescription”).  
146. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (contrasting the wide variety of traits protected by 
employment discrimination law with the Supreme Court’s limited heightened scrutiny ju-
risprudence). 
147. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 
AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1589 (2001) (discussing “the rise of diversity rhetoric in U.S. management” 
and its impact on law). 
148. One area of Title VII law where the new immutability has been directly adopted is what 
some courts call the “sex-plus” theory of discrimination, which “allows plaintiffs to bring a 
Title VII claim for sex discrimination if they can demonstrate that the defendant discrimi-
nated against a subclass of women (or men) based on either (1) an immutable characteristic 
or (2) the exercise of a fundamental right.” Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994) (holding plaintiff could make out a case of sex discrimination under Title VII by 
demonstrating that her employer discriminated against older women). This particular doc-
trinal formulation grew out of the context of employer grooming policies that allowed 
women, but not men, to wear their hair long, policies courts saw not as impinging on equal 
opportunity, but as an employer’s prerogative. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g 
Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). Thus, some courts cabined the sex-plus 
theory to characteristics deemed immutable or fundamental, such as parenthood. See, e.g., 
id. at 1089 (discussing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971), in which 
the Supreme Court held that discrimination against mothers of pre-school-age children, but 
not fathers of pre-school-age children, violated Title VII). I note that Phillips did not find 
analysis of old or new immutability to be necessary to its holding. 
149. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Un-
der Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 771 (1987) (discussing the role of immutability ar-
guments in Title VII cases allowing employers to forbid the use of the Spanish language at 
work, require that men have short hair, and mandate that women alter their appearances); 
Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision 
To Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 323 (1997) (arguing that immutability considera-
tions resulted in interpretations of Title VII that fail to adequately prohibit discrimination 
based on language, dress, grooming, or religious practices); Farrell, supra note 13, at 491-99 
(discussing how arguments about workers’ voluntary preferences affect Title VII cases on 
how to explain statistical disparities with respect to female and minority workers, cases re-
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cies that allow women, but not men, to wear their hair long do not discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex because hair length is not an immutable trait.150 Immu-
tability’s endurance may be a result of the concept’s intuitive appeal. Or it may 
be due to the “gravitational pull” that constitutional principles often exert on 
statutory interpretation.151 Some cases suggest that the Court is inclined to in-
terpret equal protection doctrine and employment discrimination statutes in a 
unified manner,152 a practice likely to impact lower court decisions. This “doc-
trinal migration” may be subtle as well as formal, reflected in how rules operate 
if not in their specific dictates.153 
Outside the courts, immutability-related ideas influence debates among 
legislators, scholars, employers, and members of the public regarding which 
 
quiring that sexual harassment be “unwelcome,” and cases refusing to extend protection to 
appearance-based discrimination, transgender identity, and sexual orientation); Helfand, 
supra note 7, at 30-34 (discussing the role of immutability arguments in canonical Title VII 
cases); Roberto J. Gonzalez, Note, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Dis-
parate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2217-27 (2003) (discussing how immutability 
arguments prevent courts from recognizing cultural rights in Title VII cases). 
150. See, e.g., Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092. I discuss examples of how immutability serves to 
limit employment discrimination law in the contexts of weight, pregnancy, and criminal 
records in Part III. 
151. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1013 (1989); see also Bertrall L. Ross II, Against Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1203, 1206 (2011) (discussing the practice of “constitutional mainstreaming” in which 
“the Court interprets an ambiguous statute in unforeseen contexts to accord with the evolv-
ing values that it has emphasized in its decisions interpreting the Constitution but in a 
manner that conflicts with the values reflected in subsequent legislative enactments”); cf. 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional 
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990) (arguing that “‘constitu-
tional’ norms provide the background context that informs our interpretation of statutes 
and other sub-constitutional texts”). 
152. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Limiting Equality: The Divergence and Convergence of Title VII and 
Equal Protection, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 97, 104-05 (2014) (discussing how the Supreme 
Court imported concepts from equal protection law to interpret Title VII in Ricci v. DeSte-
fano, 557 U.S. 557, 582-84 (2009) and Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976)); 
Stephen M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 201, 204-05 (2014) (discussing how 
the Supreme Court has favored “convergence” in interpretation of the equal protection 
clause and employment discrimination statutes in the context of race discrimination).  
153. Harris, supra note 152, at 124-43 (discussing the subtle impact of equal protection principles 
on Title VII, and vice versa, in the contexts of disparate impact law and affirmative action, 
despite textual differences). Harris argues that transference seems particularly likely when 
constitutional standards weaken antidiscrimination protections for historically disadvan-
taged groups. Id. at 98. This argument suggests that new ideas of immutability might be 
more likely to spread insofar as they limit, rather than extend, protection. 
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traits should be prohibited bases for discrimination.154 Identity-based social 
movements seeking legal redress frequently articulate their aspirations in “con-
stitutional terms” and are influenced by the “rhetoric, strategies, and norms” of 
constitutional law.155 This Article is concerned with the persuasive power of the 
revised immutability as a principle to explain what traits should be protected 
by equality law broadly, and by employment discrimination law specifically.156 
In analyzing the prospects for the addition of new groups to antidiscrimination 
legislation, Elizabeth Emens has offered a descriptive model that includes the 
revised immutability as its first criterion.157 Sharona Hoffman goes further, ar-
guing that the revised immutability both does and should provide a unifying 
principle for determining which traits employment discrimination law pro-
tects.158 For example, while race, color, sex, age, national origin, genetics, and 
many disabilities are commonly considered accidents of birth,159 religion, sexu-
al orientation, transgender identity, marital status, parental status, cigarette 
smoking, and political affiliation might be considered crucial to an individual’s 
right to self-definition.160 Many argue that certain characteristics associated 
 
154. Consider the remarks of Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) in support of the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA): “We do not determine our own DNA. We are born with it. 
We cannot allow discrimination on the basis of such a fundamental aspect of life and one in 
which we had no choice.” 154 CONG. REC. S3372 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Levin); see also Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Infor-
mation Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 478 (2010) (discussing examples of ar-
guments from immutability in the legislative debate over GINA). 
155. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 419, 422-23 (2001) (describing a dialectical dynamic between constitutional law 
and social movements seeking tolerance or acceptance of a despised identity). 
156. See supra notes 5, 7 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
158. Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1537-44. 
159. Some might contest whether these characteristics are invariably or even predominantly acci-
dents of birth. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Against Nature, in NOMOS LII: EVOLUTION AND 
MORALITY 293, 309-12, 320-21 (James E. Fleming & Sanford Levinson eds., 2012) (describ-
ing conflicting views on the immutability of age, for example, that it is quintessentially im-
mutable; that it is capable of reversal through exercise, diet, or plastic surgery; that it is 
“meaningless” or notional; and that it is a process too individualized to be susceptible to any 
generalization). 
160. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to assess whether these categories are immutable 
in the old sense, the new one, or neither, I note these questions are subject to much disa-
greement. Like sexual orientation, whether transgender identity fits under the old immuta-
bility rubric is vigorously disputed. See, e.g., Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the 
Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 18 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (dis-
cussing how transgender rights advocates often argue that “gender identity and often even 
expressions of gender identity” are “unchangeable, set from an early age”). Religion too may 
be considered ascribed at birth. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Has-
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with the old immutability (for example, race) may include traits that are im-
mutable in the new sense (for example, an African American woman who 
wears her hair in cornrows), and therefore deserve protection too.161 
i i .  objections to the revised immutability  
Despite its advantages over the old immutability, there are reasons to object 
to the revised immutability’s suitability as a unified theory of protected traits. 
This Part will sketch out those objections. It draws empirical support from re-
cent gay rights controversies.162 I explore these objections with an eye toward 
how the revised immutability might function as a normative theory of em-
ployment discrimination law.163 
Some of these concerns are normative: first, that the revised immutability 
masks questionable moral judgments about the blameworthiness of traits and 
 
tings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 726 n.5 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing discrimination against an individual because she was born into a particular religion 
or due to her ancestors’ religion). Marital status is generally conceptualized as a choice, with 
exceptions when marriage is forced, prohibited, or not feasible. See Trina Jones, Single and 
Childfree! Reassessing Parental and Marital Status Discrimination, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1253, 1319 
(2014) (observing that discrimination against the single and childless “seems to violate” the 
test of the new immutability). While parental status might, on occasion, be accidental, it is 
rarely thought to be a matter for which the parent is not responsible. Compare id. at 1317 
(“[T]he decision not to parent is in most cases, excepting infertility, a matter over which an 
individual has some control given advances in contraception methods over the last forty 
years.”), with Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, Law, and Culture, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 457, 483-84 (2013) (discussing unwanted pregnancies).  
161. See Gonzalez, supra note 149, at 2196-99 (discussing scholarly responses to Rogers v. Am. 
Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
162. Many of these controversies pertain to whether gay rights issues should be framed as ques-
tions of equal protection (sex or sexual orientation discrimination) or substantive due pro-
cess (privacy, liberty, autonomy, or other fundamental rights). This Article does not take a 
position on which frame might be more appropriate in the abstract. Rather, it is concerned 
with unique drawbacks to the way the revised immutability imports concepts from substan-
tive due process law into the definition of protected identities for antidiscrimination purpos-
es. See supra text accompanying notes 130-136 (discussing how the new immutability em-
ploys privacy, freedom, and autonomy norms in its definition of protected identities). Some 
of the objections discussed here may also apply to substantive due process arguments in 
general and not just those that rely on protected identities. Whether substantive due process 
arguments alone might still be worth pursuing depends on context and is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
163. Space limitations prevent exploration of how the revised immutability might apply across 
the many domains of equality law, including equal protection, asylum, education, housing, 
and public accommodations. However, the employment discrimination examples discussed 
in this Article suggest reasons to be critical of applications of the revised immutability to 
these contexts. 
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reinvigorates the old theory of immutability; second, that it inserts a highly 
disputable notion of “personhood” into the doctrine that omits many traits that 
are stigmatized or irrelevant to any government or employer purpose; and 
third, that it reinforces stereotypes about the identities it protects. 
Other interrelated concerns are strategic: first, that the revised immutabil-
ity is unlikely to succeed with courts or legislatures because of the difficulty of 
drawing a principled line between those characteristics that are essential to per-
sonhood and those that are not; second, that even if it does succeed, rights 
based on the new immutability alone will be more limited than other antidis-
crimination rights because they will be perceived as negative liberties against 
state or employer interference, rather than positive demands for equal access; 
and third, that groups concerned with maintaining traditional social norms 
may argue their convictions are just as “immutable,” requiring compromises 
that would not be palatable in other contexts, like race discrimination. 
After this Part describes the theoretical and empirical bases for these objec-
tions, Part III will discuss how these critiques might specifically apply in con-
troversies over protection for traits currently at the borders of employment dis-
crimination law: obesity, pregnancy, and criminal records. 
A. Masking Moralizing Judgments 
As discussed, the old immutability often rests on untenable, harsh, intru-
sive, and stigmatizing judgments about the traits for which individuals should 
receive blame.164 These judgments are often not just moral, but moralizing: 
that is, based on superficial assumptions or made without consideration of 
their broader implications.165 Cases revising the theory of immutability have 
not abandoned the core idea of immutability as blamelessness, or the moraliz-
ing judgments inextricable from the concept. Rather, these cases have buried 
immutability under a notion of personhood that protects certain choices al-
ready deemed morally acceptable from discrimination. Thus, the revised theory 
merely mitigates and obscures the untenability, harshness, intrusiveness, and 
stigma objections to the old.166 Moreover, the new immutability fails to explain 
why certain characteristics ought to be protected while others should not. Par-
 
164. See supra notes 72–103 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing psychological research on how implicit 
judgments drive attributions of blame); supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing 
the confusion of empirical, expressive, and moral arguments by those who imagine discrim-
ination could be a means of incentivizing behavior); supra note 97 and accompanying text 
(analogizing shaming practices to mob justice in which the public punishes transgressors 
without due process).  
166. See supra text accompanying notes 76–103. 
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tial corrections to the theory of immutability run the risk of masking the moral 
judgments that are its necessary prerequisites, and making a flawed concept 
more palatable. 
The revised immutability may become a Trojan horse: an appealing con-
ceptual package that allows the harsh, intrusive, and stigmatizing judgments 
that corrupted the old immutability to sneak back into doctrine. As an initial 
matter, not all courts that revise the immutability factor understand the gra-
vamen of an immutable trait to be its importance for an individual’s self-
determination.167 Rather, some have merely softened the definition—from 
“unchanging” to “difficult to change.”168 In Baskin v. Bogan, for example, the 
Seventh Circuit reformulated the immutability factor to mean, if not un-
changeable traits, then “at least tenacious” characteristics, including attributes 
that are “biological, such as skin color, or a deep psychological commitment, as 
religious belief often is.”169 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court has made the 
definition of immutability a question of “degree”: “[t]he degree to which an 
individual controls, or cannot avoid, the acquisition of the defining trait, and 
the relative ease or difficulty with which a trait can be changed.”170 This “diffi-
cult to change” standard acknowledges the trouble with the old immutability’s 
vexed notion of choice. It recognizes that certain psychological commitments 
may be just as difficult to overcome as, for example, skin color. This standard is 
somewhat less harsh, intrusive, and stigmatizing than the old, in that it does 
not require individuals to make Herculean (or Sisyphean) efforts to change 
their personalities.  
But the “difficult to change” definition of immutability remains firmly 
rooted in notions of “individual responsibility,” requiring the same moralizing 
judgments as the old immutability.171 The Seventh Circuit distinguished “tena-
 
167. But see supra notes 124-136 and accompanying text (discussing cases identifying the key fea-
ture of a newly immutable trait as related to individual privacy, autonomy, or liberty inter-
ests in defining the self). 
168. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2014). Obergefell is not clear on wheth-
er the Supreme Court considers sexual orientation to be immutable because it is usually not 
experienced as a choice, because it is difficult to change, because it is fundamental to person-
ality, or for some combination of these reasons. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
169. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 655.  
170. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 
653 A.2d 307, 346 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., dissenting)). The Iowa Supreme Court adopted a 
definition of immutability as both a trait that is “highly resistant to change,” and one that 
“forms a significant part of a person’s identity.” Id. (citing Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008)). 
171. See id. at 892 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion), 
for the proposition that the purpose of the immutability requirement is to tie legal burdens 
to “individual responsibility”). 
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cious” traits from “characteristics that are easy for a person to change, such as 
the length of his or her fingernails.”172 The Iowa Supreme Court spelled out the 
reasoning: the relative difficulty of change “may separate truly victimized indi-
viduals from those who have invited discrimination by changing themselves so 
as to be identified with the group.”173 These courts did not stray far from the 
original theory of immutability; they simply “transpos[ed] the site of immuta-
bility from the body to the personality.”174 This rule requires harsh, intrusive, 
and stigmatizing judgments about who is “truly” victimized, based on whether 
a victim might have been able to change, hide, or downplay a disfavored char-
acteristic.175 The “difficult to change” definition may not prohibit, for example, 
discrimination against a woman for dressing in ways associated with masculin-
ity.176 This interpretation of the immutability factor may, in effect, be no dif-
ferent than the old version. Indeed, after softening the definition of immutabil-
ity, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless found that sexual orientation met the test 
of the old immutability as a characteristic that is “probably . . . in-born.”177 
Courts following the Seventh Circuit and running with this logic may simply 
apply the old immutability.178 
By contrast to this “difficult to change” standard, other courts have defined 
the new immutability to emphasize that self-determination with respect to per-
sonality is a fundamental liberty, and the state ought not discriminate among 
choices individuals make within that sphere.179 Yet this definition is disingenu-
ous, obscuring moral judgments about what types of variation in personality 
society should tolerate. Many aspects of “personality”—like risk taking, aggres-
sion, addiction, and impulse control—generate behaviors society regulates, 
 
172. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 655.  
173. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893. 
174. Halley, supra note 8, at 519. 
175. Cf. Schmeiser, supra note 7, at 1517 (arguing that this aspect of the Varnum decision is “un-
fortunate and unnecessary”). 
176. Or it may require that she demonstrate she has a condition, such as “gender identity disor-
der,” and that to dress in ways associated with femininity would violate her deep psycholog-
ical commitments to masculine identity. See, e.g., Currah, supra note 160, at 8-11. 
177. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 657 (holding–based on survey data, evidence from psychotherapy, and 
various genetic, neuroendocrine, and evolutionary theories–that “there is little doubt that 
sexual orientation, the ground of the discrimination, is an immutable (and probably an in-
nate, in the sense of in-born) characteristic rather than a choice”).  
178. See Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 939 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (following 
Baskin in holding that sexual orientation is immutable in that there is virtually no choice as 
to the characteristic). 
179. See supra notes 124-136 and accompanying text. 
 the yale law journal 	   125 :2   20 15  
36 
 
particularly at the workplace. The concept of personality alone does not identi-
fy the appropriate limits of discrimination. 
Sexual orientation provides an example. It is doubtful whether arguments 
from immutability, old or new, ultimately persuade courts to apply heightened 
scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications.180 As Michael Boucai has noted, 
courts that accept arguments about mutability also tend to accept other dubi-
ous rationales for denying protection.181 The argument that sexual orientation 
is important to personality does not rebut claims that social policy should dis-
courage same-sex sexual behavior or encourage those few on the fence to 
choose heterosexuality.182  
Thus, in Obergefell, the Court summarized evolving views on sexual orien-
tation with the statement that “sexual orientation is both a normal expression of 
human sexuality and immutable.”183 The normative point is essential. An in-
termediate step in the new immutability’s argument is that there is no princi-
pled basis for treating certain gay relationships differently than straight ones, 
since they are both “normal.”184 “Normal” here does not simply mean com-
monplace; it means the opposite of pathological.185 Implicit is the idea that pri-
vate, consensual, adult sexuality—whether gay or straight—is not harmful, 
shameful, or morally depraved. Rather, it is productive, fundamental, and es-
sential to family life.186 Obergefell used the word “immutable” to describe not 
only sexual orientation, but also the “profound” features of the institution of 
 
180. Boucai, supra note 114, at 472. 
181. Id. 
182. Halley, supra note 8, at 520-21 (“Explaining why rules burdening conduct impinge on ele-
ments of life central to personhood would require not a psychiatric or psychological theory 
of sexuality but a political one.”). By explaining this objection, I do not mean to imply that I 
agree that social policy should encourage heterosexuality. Rather, I mean to demonstrate 
that other arguments are doing the persuasive work. 
183. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (emphasis added). 
184. Realizing this, the APA Brief cited in Obergefell combined the argument that sexual orienta-
tion is immutable with the argument that homosexuality is normal, all under the heading: 
“Sexual Orientation Is a Normal Expression of Human Sexuality, Is Generally Not Chosen, 
and Is Highly Resistant to Change.” APA Brief, supra note 2, at 7-9. That section of the APA 
Brief emphasized that homosexuality “implies no impairment in judgment, stability, relia-
bility, or general social or vocational capabilities,” id. at 8 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
POSITION STATEMENT: HOMOSEXUALITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1973), reprinted in 131 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 497 (1974)), and “pose[s] no inherent obstacle to leading a happy, 
healthy, and productive life,” id.  
185. Id. 
186. The portion of the APA Brief cited by the Court also included a section with the heading: 
“Gay Men and Lesbians Form Stable, Committed Relationships That Are Equivalent to 
Heterosexual Relationships in Essential Respects.” Id. at 11.  
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marriage, which the Court held would not be disrupted by the inclusion of 
same-sex couples.187 
The new immutability does not protect all intimate liberties; it is limited to 
certain forms of happy domesticity that are akin to traditional, heterosexual 
marriages.188 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the Connect-
icut Supreme Court cited in support of the new immutability, Paris Adult Thea-
tre I v. Slaton and Lawrence v. Texas, protect a traditional form of private, con-
sensual, adult sexuality.189 Slaton was a case about hardcore pornography.190 
That case endorsed a traditional view of sexual morality as “central to family 
life,”191 and as a virtue that had to be protected from “the tide of commercial-
ized obscenity” even in the absence of empirical proof that commercial obsceni-
ty caused any harm.192 If Slaton protects a certain form of romanticized sexuali-
ty from the threat of the market, Lawrence protects it from the threat of the 
state. Critical to the success of this argument has been gay rights advocacy fo-
cused on convincing courts and the public that same-sex relationships might 
resemble an idealized form of traditional marriage as an “enduring” bond with 
“transcendent dimensions.”193 This reasoning may protect everyone’s right to 
enter into “transcendent” relationships, but it does not require that straight- 
and cross-sex relationships receive equal treatment. Thus, the right to intimate 
 
187. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (“Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it 
for themselves because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities. 
And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this 
profound commitment.”). 
188. See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1399, 1400 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence v. Texas “relies on a narrow version of liberty that 
is both geographized and domesticated—not a robust conception of sexual freedom or liber-
ty”). 
189. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 437-38 (Conn. 2008) (discussing Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 
(2003)). 
190. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 52. 
191. The full quotation from Slaton reads:  
The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords an ample 
basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human exist-
ence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human 
personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex. 
Id. at 63. 
192. Id. at 57. 
193. Franke, supra note 188, at 1408-09 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 567). 
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liberty alone may not bar a state from penalizing crimes like statutory rape 
more harshly when they involve same-sex sexual conduct.194 
The concept of liberty or choice in the new immutability does not explain 
why a trait is within the sphere of morally blameless choices. Other arguments 
must fill that void. In both the old and new forms, the argument from immu-
tability rests on generalized notions of individual responsibility, merit, incen-
tives, and just desert. Thus, even in its revised form, the new immutability re-
sponds only partially to the objections to the old. The new immutability 
remains based on an inchoate sense of egalitarianism that rests on a problemat-
ic definition of responsibility, with harsh, intrusive, and potentially stigmatiz-
ing consequences. These considerations are masked behind the superficially 
appealing invocation of the need to protect traits “fundamental to a person’s 
identity,” now repeated as a mantra by courts.195 
B. Excluding Inessential and Stigmatized Traits 
The old immutability protected those with traits considered pre-
determined; it left out those deemed accountable for the traits that form the 
grounds for discrimination against them. The new immutability protects a 
subset of the accountable: those for whom a particular, chosen characteristic is 
essential to who they are as individuals and a matter of pride rather than shame 
or regret. This formula omits inessential yet chosen conditions, such as stigma-
tized conditions, that might otherwise be the focus of antidiscrimination pro-
tection.  
 
194. Franke, id. at 1412, offers the example of State v. Limon, in which a Kansas appellate court 
upheld the conviction of a male eighteen-year-old for “criminal sodomy” with a male four-
teen-year-old under a statute that “criminalized heterosexual sodomy less severely than ho-
mosexual sodomy.” 83 P.3d 229, 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
The court reasoned that due process protection for “private consensual sexual practices” un-
der Lawrence did not extend to minors. Id. at 234. Its decision was reversed on equal protec-
tion grounds. Limon, 122 P.3d at 24; see also Anna K. Christensen, Comment, Equality with 
Exceptions? Recovering Lawrence’s Central Holding, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1337, 1341-42 (2014) 
(discussing enforcement of rules remaining on the books post-Lawrence that penalize same-
sex or nonprocreative sexual conduct more harshly than other forms of sexual conduct). 
195. See, e.g., Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1013 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin 
v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[R]egardless whether sexual orientation is immu-
table, it is fundamental to a person’s identity, which is sufficient to meet this factor.” (cita-
tion omitted)); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d sub nom. 
De Leon v. Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[S]exual orientation is so fundamental to a 
person’s identity that one ought not be forced to choose between one’s sexual orientation 
and one’s rights as an individual—even if one could make a choice.”); supra notes 3-4 and 
accompanying text. 
 against immutability 
39 
 
The various formulations of the new immutability assume that the trait to 
be protected is essential to its bearer’s identity, such that if it were to change, 
she would no longer be the same person. Courts describe such traits as “inte-
gral,”196 “core,”197 or “fundamental to one’s identity.”198 As one court put it, 
“[T]o discriminate against individuals who accept their given sexual orienta-
tion and refuse to alter that orientation to conform to societal norms does sig-
nificant violence to a central and defining character of those individuals.”199 
Dissenting in Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986, Justice Blackmun wrote that 
“[h]omosexual orientation may well form part of the very fiber of an individu-
al’s personality.”200 Janet Halley described this definition of gay identity as “‘a 
personhood definition,’ in which the class of homosexuals is defined by a form 
of personality shared by its members.”201  
This concept of personhood, as a set of core, stable traits, is both historical-
ly and culturally contingent.202 In the context of sexual orientation, for exam-
ple, scholars have argued the personhood definition is by no means universal. 
Rather, it relies on a contested Freudian narrative of self-discovery through 
revelation of repressed sexuality.203 As Michel Foucault famously argued, this 
narrative is particularly Western and arose in a specific historical moment.204 It 
was nineteenth-century medicine that first gave rise to the idea of homosexual-
 
196. Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
197. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer 
v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2596 (2015). 
198. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 
F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 
1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)). 
199. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992). 
200. 478 U.S. 186, 202 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
201. Janet E. Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POL-
ITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 82, 91 (Michael Warner ed., 1993). 
202. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 797 (1989) (“The concept of 
personal identity—that sense of a unitary, atomic self that we all tend to consider ourselves 
to ‘have’—is complex and difficult. It has an almost theological or metaphysical aspect, as if 
one’s ‘identity’ were a kind of hypostatic quantity underlying the multiplicity of his vastly 
different relations in the world and the mutability of his nature over time.”). 
203. Id. at 770-74. 
204. Id. at 771-74 (discussing 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUC-
TION (1980)). 
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ity as a type of identity distinct from heterosexuality.205 In its contemporary 
manifestations, the personhood idea of homosexuality 
entirely fails to represent those pro-gay constituencies that deny the 
centrality of a particularized homosexual orientation to their psychic 
makeup, whether because they identify as bisexual, because they seek to 
de-emphasize the gender parameters of sexuality, because they are ex-
perimental about sexuality, or because they experience sexuality not as 
serious self-expressiveness but as play, drag, and ironic self-
reflexivity.206 
Sonia Katyal has detailed how the concept of “gay personhood” is both his-
torically and culturally contingent, “[f]or at the heart of the fabled closet lies a 
predominantly Western assumption that a gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity is a 
major determinant in the lives of all individuals.”207 Katyal has described alter-
native cultural understandings that do not link sexual preferences with identity 
or that place sexual orientation in the background, with class, occupation, gen-
der, or race as foreground determinants of sexuality.208 
This concept of personhood also relies on a romanticized story of self-
discovery and public disclosure through which the authentic self is actualized. 
In early cases formulating the new immutability, some courts cited a 1985 Har-
vard Law Review Note209 that argued for consideration of whether a trait plays 
an “important role” in “personhood” defined as “self-perception, group affilia-
tion, and identification by others.”210 As evidence that sexual orientation is a 
crucial component of personhood, the Note looked to “personal testimonies in 
gay literature and . . . the well-known phenomenon of ‘coming out,’ or publicly 
acknowledging one’s gay identity,” as well as the existence of “gay communi-
ties” in the form of “bars, bookstores, newspapers, political lobbies, legal rights 
 
205. Id. at 777 (citing 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(1980)); Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Search-
ing for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1088 (1988)). 
206. Halley, supra note 8, at 520. 
207. Sonia K. Katyal, Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of Lawrence, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1429, 1442 (2006). 
208. Id. at 1445-48; see also Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 99-100 
(2002) (“[S]ome cultures view homosexuality as an activity, not an identity; others view it 
as a necessary phase in a quest for full-fledged adulthood; and still others equate it with 
transgenderism.” (citations omitted)). 
209. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concur-
ring); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991). 
210. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (1985). 
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committees, and gay neighborhoods.”211 The legal success of sexual orienta-
tion’s personhood argument was possible only as a result of a gay rights 
movement that emphasized pride and “coming out” as counters to shame, se-
crecy, and self-loathing.212  
This template for legal change is unlikely to succeed, however, for two 
types of traits that are traditionally covered by antidiscrimination law: those 
that individuals would prefer to disclaim as constitutive of their authentic 
selves, and those traits that individuals would prefer to change due to shame or 
stigma. For many multiracial individuals, for example, racial identity might be 
experienced as manipulable and changing over time,213 or unimportant to one’s 
fundamental sense of self.214 Many forms of disability, too, might fall through 
the cracks of the revised immutability, as conditions subject to control and yet 
seldom celebrated as features of identity. Sexually-transmitted diseases are an 
example. During debate over the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 
1989, Senator Jesse Helms objected that the Act would not allow an employer 
to “set up any moral standards for his business by asking someone if he is HIV 
positive, even though 85 percent of those people are engaged in activities that 
most Americans find abhorrent.”215 Senator Ted Kennedy took a different tack, 
submitting a statement from the National Commission on AIDS that called for 
“understanding” and “compassion.”216 Compassion won the day.217 The inter-
nalized stigma was a reason for protection. 
 
211. Id. at 1304-05. 
212. For the strong version of the argument that public views shaped legal decisions on gay 
rights, see Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 132-33 (2013), which states: “With regard to Windsor, the critical de-
velopment has been the coming-out phenomenon, which over a period of decades has led to 
extraordinary changes in attitudes and practices regarding sexual orientation.” For the 
weaker one, see Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 76-77 (2013), 
which states: “Evolving public opinion enabled this Term’s marriage decisions, but conflict 
over law importantly contributed to the public’s changing views.” 
213. See, e.g., Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity with Equal Pro-
tection, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1263-67 (2014) (discussing research on the multiplicity and 
fluidity of multiracial identity). 
214. Id. at 1269 (discussing research on the lack of salience of racial identity for many multiracial 
individuals). 
215. 135 CONG. REC. 19,870 (1989) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
216. Id. at 19,867 (statement of Sen. Kennedy (quoting statement by Louis Sullivan, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services)). 
217. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (discussing evidence of congressional intent 
that the ADA cover asymptomatic HIV); Ruth Colker, The ADA’s Journey Through Congress, 
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2004) (arguing that the legislative history demonstrates “a 
unanimous understanding” among those who voted for the ADA “that Congress intended 
HIV to be covered”). 
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These gaps in the revised immutability’s coverage subvert some of antidis-
crimination’s most commonly accepted premises. The argument that an identi-
ty characteristic deserves protection because it is essential or important is in 
tension with one of the basic impulses underlying antidiscrimination law: that 
individuals should be judged according to their qualifications rather than ex-
traneous identity traits such as race, sex, and disability.218 On this theory, such 
traits are forbidden grounds for discrimination not because they are important, 
but because they are not. 
Moreover, leaving out many stigmatized traits undermines antidiscrimina-
tion law’s goal of eradicating disparaging forms of subordination.219 Antidis-
crimination law targets stigmatizing practices that undermine an individual’s 
sense of self-worth. Martin Luther King, Jr. famously wrote of the “degenerat-
ing sense of ‘nobodiness’” imposed by racial subordination.220 Stigmatized in-
dividuals may believe it futile to invest in their own futures, creating a self-
fulfilling prophecy in which discrimination discourages those who find them-
selves defined by the stigmatized trait from pursuing education or employment 
opportunities. That effect of discrimination is later cast as the cause of the 
group’s lack of advancement.221 Thus, the revised immutability leaves out those 
who most acutely feel the sting of stigmatizing bias: those who have internal-
ized a stigma and feel shame and responsibility for their conditions. 
 
218. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (2000) (discussing the “simple but powerful” logic of “American an-
tidiscrimination law” that “renders forbidden characteristics invisible” and requires that 
employers ask only about an individual’s ability to perform a job). 
219. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 
445 (2000) (discussing an approach to determining what characteristics are covered by the 
ADA that asks what “actual, past, and perceived impairments . . . subject people to systemat-
ic disadvantages in society” and are “stigmatized”); Karst, supra note 101, at 248 (arguing 
that the equal protection clause protects a principle of “equal citizenship” and “the chief 
harm against which the principle guards is degradation or the imposition of stigma”); supra 
notes 94-103 and accompanying text (discussing scholarship on protections for dignity and 
antihumiliation as the aims of equality law). 
220. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 92 (Beacon 
Press 2010) (1964). I use this quotation to evoke the harm of stigma, a paradigmatic type of 
harm that civil rights laws intend to address. Although racial identity may on occasion be 
manipulable, I do not intend to suggest that race does not usually meet the test of the old 
immutability.  
221. See Bagenstos, supra note 219, at 464. 
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C. Reinforcing Stereotypes 
Arguments that certain traits are fundamental to personality quite easily 
slide into the assumption that those traits are unchanging and correlate with a 
set of behaviors. Thus, these arguments reinforce stereotyping of identities, 
another of the foundational harms that discrimination law is designed to ad-
dress. 
The personhood argument, as a rhetorical strategy, complements and sup-
ports the assumption that certain conduct necessarily follows from status.222 
“By conceiving of the conduct that it purports to protect as ‘essential to the in-
dividual’s identity,’ personhood inadvertently reintroduces . . . the very prem-
ise of the invidious uses of state power it seeks to overcome.”223 In this way, the 
new immutability is not far from cases predating Lawrence v. Texas that under-
stood homosexuality as a result of deviant sexual acts that formed the founda-
tion of a person’s character.224 In those cases, individuals might have been clas-
sified as gay because, for example, they identified as such225 or acknowledged 
involvement in a gay organization.226 On the basis of that classification, courts 
assumed these individuals had engaged in then-illegal sodomy and had the 
propensity to do so in the future, even without proof of any past sodomy.227 
With this understanding of sexual orientation as “essential, foundational, and 
inescapable,” courts denied equal protection.228 Arguments based on the new 
immutability are thus inextricably tied to a set of assumptions about the stabil-
ity of personality types and propensity for certain behavior. The assumption 
that personalities can be “typed” and that individuals will conform to their 
types is the definition of stereotyping. 
Yet antidiscrimination law condemns stereotyping.229 A stereotype, in anti-
discrimination law, is “any imperfect proxy” or “overbroad generalization.”230 
 
222. Halley, supra note 201, at 92. 
223. Rubenfeld, supra note 202, at 782 (making this argument with respect to the right to priva-
cy). 
224. Halley, supra note 201, at 93-94. 
225. Id. at 94 (discussing Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
226. Id. at 93 (discussing High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 
1366 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 985 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
227. See id. at 93-94. 
228. Id. at 94. 
229. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“As for 
the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could eval-
uate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group . . . .”); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Dis-
crimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 86 (2010) (interpreting the “foundational sex-based 
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Importantly, the problem of stereotyping is distinct from the problem of stig-
ma and subordination. Mary Anne Case provides a hypothetical to explain: 
Imagine, for example, a society with two castes, not upper and lower, 
not Brahmin and untouchable, but priest and warrior. The two castes 
are equal in status, but radically different in role. Those born into the 
priest caste are limited to the role of priest even if they would rather 
fight than pray, and vice versa.231 
Such a caste system, while not subordinating, would implicate the Consti-
tution’s guarantee of equal liberty.232 However, the injury of stereotyping, if 
conceptualized as a constraint on an individual’s opportunities, is not limited 
to rigid roles assigned at birth, during childhood, or at some other stage of rel-
ative innocence.233 Suspect stereotypes may attach at myriad stages of life, such 
as stereotypes about what it means to be a “mother” or “father,”234 “disa-
bled,”235 or “old.”236 
 
equal protection cases of the 1970s” as imposing “constitutional limits on the state’s power 
to enforce sex-role stereotypes”). 
230. Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination 
Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2000) (discussing the defi-
nition of stereotyping for purposes of sex discrimination law). 
231. Id. at 1476 (footnote omitted). 
232. Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
233. Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 7 (arguing that “if we care about giving people the freedom to 
shape their own lives—so that the contours of their lives are to a greater extent self-chosen 
rather than dictated by limited opportunities—we ought to care not only about their oppor-
tunities measured ex ante from birth, but also about the ranges of opportunities open to 
them at other points along the way, including for those who have, for one reason or another, 
failed to jump through important hoops at particular ages”). 
234. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (discussing evidence 
that Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 because many states pro-
vided maternity but not paternity leave, in violation of the equal protection clause, for rea-
sons “not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women,” but rather 
based upon “the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s 
work”). 
235. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002) (explaining that the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 “seeks to diminish or to eliminate the stereotypical 
thought processes, the thoughtless actions, and the hostile reactions that far too often bar 
those with disabilities from participating fully in the Nation’s life, including the work-
place”). 
236. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (“Congress’ promulgation of 
the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] was prompted by its concern that old-
er workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing 
stereotypes”—for example, that “productivity and competence decline with old age”). 
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Suspect stereotypes include even generalizations that are accurate to some 
degree.237 Statistically sound generalizations about identity groups—for exam-
ple, that most women prefer cooperative to competitive environments—may be 
suspect for a number of reasons.238 Because some identity-based generaliza-
tions, including many of those based on sex, are “used for purposes going far 
beyond the predictive capacity of the generalization,” they “can be said to be, in 
general, suspect.”239 Sex-based generalizations are this suspect sort of stereo-
type, having historically been wielded as questionable proxies for various com-
petencies from strength to intelligence.240 Additionally, generalizations may be 
self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, women’s preferences for cooperation 
and men’s for competition may result from systemic stereotypes or patterns of 
discrimination rewarding conformity with the stereotype, with the resulting 
conformity later held up as evidence of the “truth” of the generalization.241 
Equality law endeavors to address this type of harm, while arguments prem-
ised on the new immutability reinforce it. 
D. Creating Line-Drawing Problems 
Apart from these normative objections, the new immutability raises a 
number of tactical or strategic concerns for social movements seeking to extend 
antidiscrimination protection. The first is a line-drawing problem. The ex-
panded concept of immutability does not have any limiting principle. While 
the old immutability seemed to be restricted to involuntary traits, there are no 
readily apparent parameters to limit which chosen traits are essential to per-
 
237. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (holding that “generalizations 
about ‘the way women are,’ estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justi-
fy denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average 
description”). 
238. See id. at 541-45 (rejecting this generalization); see also City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power 
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 forbids employers from requiring female employees to make larger contributions to 
their pension funds than male employees, even though the pricing is based on statistics 
showing that women, as a class, live longer than men).  
239. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 150 (2003). 
240. See id. at 149-51. 
241. See id. at 139-41; see also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 
235, 260 (1971) (mentioning how race-based generalizations may be the result of past dis-
crimination); cf. Tuulia M. Ortner & Monika Sieverding, Where Are the Gender Differences? 
Male Priming Boosts Spacial Skills in Women, 59 SEX ROLES 274, 274 (2008) (finding a “pro-
nounced gender difference” emerging in spacial reasoning capacity when subjects were 
primed with female gender stereotypes—but not when primed with male gender stereo-
types). 
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sonhood. This difficulty is likely to create judicial and public resistance to ar-
guments premised on the new immutability. 
Line-drawing problems are often articulated as hypothetical consequences 
of proposed theories, through the metaphors of floodgates and slippery 
slopes.242 Line-drawing concerns have purchase in public debates243 and in 
courtrooms.244 This is particularly true in equal protection cases, in which 
“[e]very new characteristic the courts recognize as warranting greater protec-
tion threatens to open the floodgates to a new wave of groups asking for pro-
tection based on that characteristic.”245 For example, the Supreme Court has 
refused to extend suspect class treatment to “the mentally retarded,” for lack of 
a “principled way” to distinguish this group from “the aging, the disabled, the 
mentally ill, and the infirm.”246 Even where statutes specify protected classifica-
tions, texts cannot provide answers to every potential question of application, 
and courts must use common law reasoning to decide which traits fall within 
the ambit of a statute’s protection. Common law reasoning requires the identi-
fication of principles that do not produce results that jurists consider counter-
intuitive, opposed to statutory purpose, or otherwise absurd.247  
The new immutability does not help in this effort. Jed Rubenfeld has re-
plied to personhood arguments by asking, “Where is our self-definition not at 
stake? Virtually every action a person takes could arguably be said to be an el-
ement of his self-definition.”248 The claim that the right to privacy should pro-
tect decisions crucial to personhood might be qualified with an exception for 
decisions that cause harm to others.249 But “[t]he minute someone starts de-
 
242. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 89, at 310 & n.54 (arguing that “a protected class defined so 
broadly as to include the moderately overweight, the short, and the unattractive would be 
legally unworkable and would bring the entire idea of the protected class into disrepute,” 
and expressing concern regarding “a flood of litigation”). 
243. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and 
Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66 (2013). 
244. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 79 (1996) (ar-
guing that “ambitious interpretations of equal protection present a practical dilemma: How 
does the Court cabin the growing number of groups or identities claiming protection?”). 
245. Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1780 (1996). 
246. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985).  
247. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE WESTERN 
RES. L. REV. 581, 590-93 (1989-90) (discussing the need for limiting principles that explain 
why legal rules will not result in “a parade of horribles,” or, in other words, “untoward re-
sults”). 
248. Rubenfeld, supra note 202, at 754-55. 
249. See id. at 756-60, 756 n.106 (discussing Mill’s well-known “harm principle,” “that, where ‘a 
person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself . . . there should be per-
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fending her actions against a storm of protest with the claim that she is only 
affecting herself, we may be certain that the opposite is true.”250 Few actions 
affect only the actor, and those that generate litigation are always those where 
another person perceives her own interests to be at stake.251 Rights to new 
forms of personhood threaten social interests in saving traditional norms from 
disruption by iconoclasts.252 The question then becomes one of balancing rela-
tive rights, rather than recognizing absolute rights to personhood.253 
E. Limiting Rights to Privacy and Recognition 
The new immutability also creates a risk that rights based on the doctrine 
will be less robust than those based on other antidiscrimination theories. This 
is due to two dynamics. First, arguments based on the new immutability gen-
erally employ privacy-like reasoning: an individual has the right to make cer-
tain fundamental decisions without interference from government or employ-
ers. Privacy rights are traditionally understood as negative liberties, not 
positive rights that require transformative change. Second, rights premised on 
the new immutability may be understood as claims to cultural recognition of 
identities, which can work at cross purposes, politically, with claims to resource 
redistribution. As a result of these dynamics, rights grounded on the new im-
mutability alone may prohibit only overt discrimination. These rights may not 
garner the full panoply of protections under employment discrimination stat-
utes, which require employers to make structural changes to create more inclu-
sive workplaces.  
Rights based on the new immutability may be limited because the new 
immutability draws its notion of personhood from privacy doctrine.254 Privacy 
rights are generally understood as defending individual choices against outside 
influences.255 The concept of the individual evoked here is “an autonomous 
core—an essential self identifiable after the residue of influence has been sub-
 
fect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences’” (quoting JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 142 (G. Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 1985) (1859))). 
250. Id. at 758. 
251. See id.  
252. See id. at 759. 
253. See id. at 760. 
254. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.  
255. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906-07 (2013) (dis-
cussing the prevailing view of U.S. privacy policy). 
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tracted.”256 Rights to privacy thus protect an individual’s autonomous core 
from intrusions by the state, society, or the market. They do not envision the 
autonomous self as formed through the interaction of the individual with out-
side forces (or at least, not in any beneficial way). Thus, they do not see any 
positive role for the law, society, or the market in changing existing arrange-
ments so as to create the conditions under which individuals might better 
achieve autonomy in self-determination.257 To give an example: privacy rights 
to abortion limit the ability of the state to ban that procedure, but do not re-
quire that the state make it accessible.258 By contrast, employment discrimina-
tion statutes often require affirmative changes to the structure of the workplace 
to combat bias: these statutes challenge employer practices that subtly perpetu-
ate hierarchies259 by outlawing certain practices with a disparate impact on mi-
nority groups,260 requiring changes to job requirements or accommodations 
for certain employees,261 and allowing affirmative action as a remedy.262 
The new immutability is also hindered by its emphasis on cultural respect 
for outsider identities over redistribution of resources to the marginalized. It 
identifies the problem of discrimination as the lack of respect for an individu-
 
256. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERY-
DAY PRACTICE 113 (2012). As a descriptive matter, this view of the self is highly controversial: 
“The self has no autonomous, precultural core, nor could it, because we are born and remain 
situated within social and cultural contexts.” Cohen, supra note 255, at 1908. 
257. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) 
(“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative 
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or 
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”). 
258. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (holding that the right to privacy with 
respect to abortion does not limit the state’s ability to restrict public funds for abortions that 
are not necessary to save a mother’s life). 
259. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2006) (assessing how certain aspects of employment discrimination 
law can prompt structural changes to the workplace, while acknowledging their limits).  
260. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2516-18 (2015) (explaining why Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 have been interpreted to include disparate impact claims). 
261. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (requiring that employers “mak[e] reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified indi-
vidual with a disability . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship”).  
262. Id. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (“If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in . . . 
an unlawful employment practice . . . , the court may . . . order such affirmative action as 
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of 
employees, with or without back pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate.”). 
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al’s “sense of self”263 or choices as to “self-determination.”264 The harm of dis-
crimination is thus characterized in psychological or cultural terms, rather than 
economic or material ones. Political theorist Nancy Fraser distinguishes be-
tween the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution.265 Struggles 
for recognition seek to achieve social revaluation of disrespected identities, 
while efforts to achieve redistribution seek more equitable allotment of material 
resources.266 Fraser argues that claims for recognition often displace claims for 
redistribution.267 Advocates of recognition often ignore redistribution, over-
looking the links between the two, seeing inequality as “free-floating” through 
“demeaning representations” rather than “socially grounded” in “institutional-
ized significations and norms.”268 For example, they may not see how “hetero-
sexist norms which delegitimate homosexuality” were connected to a social-
welfare system that denied resources to gay men and lesbians by prohibiting 
them from marrying.269  
The success of the gay rights movement might partly be explained by its 
emphasis on the recognition of a private right to gay identity, rather than the 
redistributive effects of expanding the right to marriage.270 Thus, in United 
States v. Windsor, the Court mentioned not only the financial benefits but also 
the financial obligations that same-sex marriage would entail, such as receiving 
less federal financial aid for a child’s education due to a same-sex spouse’s in-
come.271 The emphasis on the costs of marriage suggests that marriage does not 
 
263. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
265. Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition?: Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Postsocialist’ Age, 
212 NEW LEFT REV. 68, 70-73 (1995). Fraser’s distinction between recognition and redistri-
bution maps onto the distinction between the cultural and the material. Id. She posits a sep-
arate distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies, which maps onto the 
distinction between corrective and structural reforms. Id. at 82 (defining affirmative reme-
dies as those that “correct[] inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing 
the underlying framework that generates them” and transformative remedies as those that 
“correct[] inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative frame-
work”). 
266. Id. at 73. 
267. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 3 NEW LEFT REV. 107, 110 (2000). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. See Fraser, supra note 265, at 77 (describing the gay rights movement as “quintessentially a 
matter of recognition”). 
271. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (holding that a federal statute defining marriage to exclude 
same-sex couples was unconstitutional). In Windsor, a same-sex spouse argued that she 
qualified for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax, in an amount totaling 
$363,053. Id. at 2683. Yet arguments regarding same-sex marriage have not focused on costs 
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always entail financial benefits for families, and thus denies that recognition of 
same-sex marriage necessarily redistributes resources to same-sex couples. The 
harm of marriage inequality is thought of primarily as misrecognition rather 
than unfair distribution of resources.272 Conceiving the problem thus means 
that redistribution is rarely seen as a remedy to heterosexism. It may also ex-
plain why disparate impact claims and affirmative action remedies are often ex-
cluded from legislative proposals to forbid sexual orientation discrimination in 
employment.273 Other movements following this recognition model are likely 
to run up against the same limits. 
F. Inviting Conflict 
Grounding a right on the new immutability may invite conflict from those 
whose moral opposition to the trait in question is also immutable. For instance, 
in the sexual orientation context, “[t]he intolerant heterosexual can claim, on 
personhood’s own logic, that critical to his identity is not only his own hetero-
sexuality but also his decision to live in a homogeneously heterosexual com-
munity.”274 When a right is based on personhood, such conflicts are inevitable 
and create indeterminate legal results.275 
Religious constituencies seeking protection for “immutable” convictions 
(e.g., the immorality of same-sex relationships) may find support from the 
new immutability. Some states that allow same-sex marriage also have “mar-
riage conscience protection” provisions, giving those with religious objections 
to same-sex marriage the right to discriminate in employment, housing, and 
other domains.276 Douglas NeJaime argues that the basis for these exemptions 
 
to the public fisc. Cf. Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1278-80 
(2014) (discussing the financial costs of recognition of same-sex marriage for couples).  
272. Obergefell gestured at the “material benefits” of marital status, such as preferential tax, inher-
itance, property law, and insurance treatment, but emphasized that the harm was “more 
than just material burdens” in that “exclusion from [marriage] has the effect of teaching that 
gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2601-02 (2015). 
273. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(f)-(g) (2013) 
(as passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013). 
274. Rubenfeld, supra note 202, at 765.  
275. Id. at 766. 
276. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and 
the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1185-87 (2012). 
Twenty states have such laws, and twelve states introduced similar legislation in the run-up 
to the Obergefell decision. Monica Davey & Laurie Goodstein, Religion Laws Quickly Fall into 
Retreat in Indiana and Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015 
/04/03/us/rights-laws-quickly-fall-into-retreat.html [http://perma.cc/54SH-BSGK]. Nota-
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is a “movement/countermovement” dynamic in which the Christian Right and 
LGBT advocates both claim minority group status.277 Each side casts the other 
as the oppressor, “seeking to use the force of the state to stamp out belief sys-
tems with which they disagree.”278 In the words of one religious liberty scholar: 
“Religious minorities and sexual minorities . . . make essentially parallel and 
mutually reinforcing claims against the larger society.”279  
This understanding is also reflected in legislative proposals to add sexual 
orientation to the list of prohibited bases for employment discrimination. Alt-
hough religious employers generally must abide by laws forbidding discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, sex, national origin, age, and disability,280 they may 
discriminate on the basis of religion.281 The 2013 draft Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA) would have put sexual orientation in the same 
class as religion, extending broad discretion to religious employers to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sexual orientation.282 As a result, several LGBT-rights or-
ganizations withdrew their support for ENDA, arguing that its religious ex-
emption “essentially says that anti-LGBT discrimination is different—more 
 
bly, Indiana passed a religious freedom law in March 2015, but under pressure from busi-
ness interests, lawmakers immediately amended the law to specify that it would not allow 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Id. 
277. Douglas NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences Based 
on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303, 305 n.2, 313 (2009). 
278. NeJaime, supra note 276, at 1182. This quotation comes from NeJaime’s description of the 
arguments of certain Christian Right advocates, but the same could be said of LGBT rights 
advocacy that opposes belief systems such as sexism, heterosexism, and homophobia.  
279. Id. at 1227 n.245 (quoting Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 189 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008)).  
280. There is an exception for those employees defined as “ministers,” which allows, for example, 
the Catholic Church to refuse to hire women as priests. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Luther-
an Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705-06 (2012) (holding that the first amendment 
precludes the application of employment discrimination laws to “ministers”). 
281. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012) (“This subchapter [Equal Employment Opportunities] shall 
not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected 
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of 
its activities.”). 
282. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013). See generally 
Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibi-
tion on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of EN-
DA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1375-76 (2014) (discussing the breadth of the draft ENDA’s reli-
gious exemption). 
 the yale law journal 	   125 :2   20 15  
52 
 
acceptable and legitimate—than discrimination against individuals based on 
their race or sex.”283 
NeJaime argues that this problem occurs because same-sex relationships 
are inappropriately understood as conduct, rather than status. Thus, gay rights 
are cast as liberties, rather than questions of equality.284 But the revised immu-
tability does not provide a workaround for gay rights advocates. Rather, it 
supports the case for religious exemptions. One advocate of religious exemp-
tions acknowledges that “for both same-sex couples and religious objectors 
‘conduct is fundamental to their identity.’”285 The issue is framed as two mi-
norities battling over conflicting fundamental choices: the convictions of con-
science of religious minorities versus the committed intimate associations of 
same-sex couples. When the values at stake sound in the same register, ac-
commodation seems more reasonable.286 If the right to same-sex marriage were 
conceptualized on a different order—for example, like the right to interracial 
marriage—the case for religious exemptions would lose traction.287 
Thus, the new immutability is of limited persuasive value. Moreover, to the 
extent that legislatures and courts accept traits as immutable aspects of person-
hood, they may afford lesser protection to those traits than other attributes 
covered by antidiscrimination law. 
 
283. Joint Statement on Withdrawal of Support for ENDA and Call for Equal Workplace Protections for 
LGBT People, LAMBDA LEGAL: BLOG (July 8, 2014), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog 
/20140708_joint-statement-withdrawal-support-enda [http://perma.cc/Z3CW-XWSS]. 
284. NeJaime, supra note 276, at 1226-29. 
285. Id. at 1229 (quoting Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims 
Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 212 (2010)). 
286. See, e.g., Mark L. Rienzi, Substantive Due Process as a Two-Way Street: How the Court Can 
Reconcile Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 19 (2015) 
(“When the Court recognizes a right because it is deeply personal and important, govern-
ments are not free to force unwilling parties to participate in or support the exercise of that 
right.”); Robin Fretwell Wilson & Anthony Michael Kreis, Embracing Compromise: Marriage 
Equality and Religious Liberty in the Political Process, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 485, 492 (2014) 
(“The same fundamental values of personal liberty that support an individual’s right to live 
according to his or her sexual identity also support an individual’s right to live according to 
his or her religious convictions.”). 
287. Even one advocate of religious exemptions seems to admit as much. See NeJaime, supra note 
276, at 1229 (discussing Thomas Berg’s admission that “[g]iven equality’s absolute nature, it 
is hard to see how it can allow for any exemptions” (quoting Berg, supra note 285, at 212)); 
cf. James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal Treatment of 
Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 103 
(2015) (noting “the dearth of equal protection analysis in the modern debate over discrimi-
nation against same-sex couples” as compared to interracial marriage). 
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i i i .  applying the revised immutability  to new  contexts 
This Part will apply the revised immutability to current controversies in 
discrimination contexts at the borders of existing legal protections, including 
employment discrimination on the basis of characteristics that the old immuta-
bility is thought to omit: weight, pregnancy, and criminal records. It argues 
that, due to the objections raised in the previous Part, the new immutability 
fails to capture the wrong of these forms of discrimination and may be coun-
terproductive as a strategy for advancing protection. Weight is unlikely to meet 
the test of the new immutability because many do not regard it as important 
and it is often the source of stigma. Additionally, courts resist the argument 
that weight is fundamental to personality because the same could be said of 
most aspects of appearance. The argument that pregnancy is a choice that is in-
tegral to identity risks perpetuating stereotypes about women’s roles, has lim-
ited persuasive force due to the difficulty of explaining why pregnancy is a 
more important choice than other life pursuits, may result in limited rights to 
privacy rather than support, and invites conflicts with religious and business 
interests. The new immutability does not offer any obvious arguments against 
the use of criminal background checks to screen out job applicants, and may 
even promote discrimination against ex-offenders by suggesting that criminal 
conduct is a fundamental personality trait. 
A. Weight 
According to survey data, weight is one of the most prevalent bases for dis-
crimination; weight discrimination occurs in interpersonal, employment, 
healthcare, and educational settings.288 Yet weight is a category at the borders 
 
288. See, e.g., R.M. Puhl et al., Perceptions of Weight Discrimination: Prevalence and Comparison to 
Race and Gender Discrimination in America, 32 INT’L J. OBESITY 992, 998 (2008) (concluding, 
based on a national sample of adults, that “[w]eight/height discrimination is the third most 
common type of discrimination among women, and the fourth most prevalent form of dis-
crimination reported by all adults,” and the risk of this type of discrimination “increases sig-
nificantly with higher obesity”); see also Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, When It 
Comes To Pay, Do the Thin Win? The Effect of Weight on Pay for Men and Women, 96 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 95, 95, 103, 107 (2011) (discussing research detailing the prevalence of em-
ployer stereotypes that depict obese workers as “lazy and lacking in self-discipline” and how 
those stereotypes disproportionately affect women, and concluding, based on a longitudinal 
study of 7,661 individuals, “that for men, increases in weight have positive linear effects on 
pay but at diminished returns at above-average levels of weight,” while “[f]or women, in-
creases in weight have negative linear effects on pay, but the negative effects are stronger at 
below-average than at above-average weight levels”). 
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of antidiscrimination protection.289 Typical objections to protecting against 
weight discrimination echo concerns underlying the old immutability: that 
those who are accountable for their own status should not be protected,290 and 
that discrimination might send “pedagogical” signals of disapproval of excess 
weight.291 Tellingly, one opponent of weight discrimination legislation object-
ed to prohibiting discrimination “based merely on ‘weight’—as if weight were 
immutable and worthy of protected status on par with an individual’s race or 
sex.”292  
 
289. In the United States, only one state and five localities explicitly prohibit “weight” discrimi-
nation. See S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE § 3301 (2015); SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE 
§ 9.83 (2015); URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-39 (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 37.2102 (2014); BINGHAMTON, N.Y., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 45-2 (2010); MADISON, WIS., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 39.03 (2015). The District of Columbia prohibits discrimination 
based on “personal appearance” more generally. See D.C. CODE § 2-1401 (2015). 
290. Roberta R. Friedman & Rebecca M. Puhl, Weight Bias: A Social Justice Issue, YALE RUDD 
CTR. FOR FOOD POL’Y & OBESITY 8 (2012), http://www.uconnruddcenter.org/files/Pdfs 
/Rudd_Policy_Brief_Weight_Bias.pdf [http://perma.cc/TPP3-DWRT] (describing typical 
objections to be that “overweight and obese people don’t need legal protection,” because 
“[i]f they want to avoid discrimination, they should simply lose weight” and that “[i]f you 
fight weight stigma, you’ll actually discourage people from trying to lose weight”). Other 
arguments against legal protection question the prevalence and harmfulness of weight dis-
crimination, are concerned about the potential costs of litigation to business, and query 
whether alternative strategies, such as education, would better address the problem. Id. 
Some scholars argue explicitly that discrimination on the basis of obesity is justified due to 
the characteristic’s mutability. See M. Neil Browne et al., Obesity as a Protected Category: The 
Complexity of Personal Responsibility for Physical Attributes, 14 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 1, 10 
(2010) (“[R]esponsibility is complex, but ultimately, individual choice plays the most prom-
inent role in obesity. Therefore, it is distinguishable from disabilities protected under law 
and should not be accorded the same protections.”). 
291. Cf. Halley, supra note 8, at 521 (discussing this “pedagogical” argument in favor of anti-gay 
discrimination). In the context of obesity, discrimination does not seem to be working as an 
effective pedagogical technique. See, e.g., Angelina R. Sutin & Antonio Terracciano, Perceived 
Weight Discrimination and Obesity, PLoS ONE (July 24, 2013), http://journals.plos.org 
/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0070048 [http://perma.cc/GPG6-TT9R] (report-
ing the results of a nationally representative longitudinal study showing participants who 
reported weight discrimination were 2.5 times more likely to become obese upon follow-
up); cf. TRACI MANN, SECRETS FROM THE EATING LAB: THE SCIENCE OF WEIGHT LOSS, THE 
MYTH OF WILLPOWER, AND WHY YOU SHOULD NEVER DIET AGAIN 165 (2015) (discussing 
studies suggesting that stigma causes weight gain by undermining self-confidence, leading 
to “a physiological stress response,” and making people feel “embarrassed to exercise in 
public”). 
292. Gary Feldman & Judith Ashton, Jumping the Gun on Weight Discrimination, BOS. GLOBE 
(June 2, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007 
/06/02/jumping_the_gun_on_weight_discrimination [http://perma.cc/GB3F-X9AU]; see 
also ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT’S WRONG WITH FAT? 85-89 (2013) (discussing “several empiri-
cal studies” and “systematic news media analyses” demonstrating that “a personal responsi-
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Similar concerns have prompted courts to interpret existing antidiscrimina-
tion statutes narrowly to exclude weight discrimination. The ADA, which pro-
hibits discrimination based on disability, is a potential source of legal redress 
for weight discrimination.293 The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties.”294 But even if a condition is not substantially limiting, a person may qual-
ify as “disabled” under the statute if she is “regarded as having such as impair-
ment.”295 In 2008, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), which clarifies that to be “regarded as” 
having a disability under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove only that she was 
perceived as having a “physical or mental impairment” that is not “transitory 
and minor.”296 Impairments are defined broadly to include “[a]ny physiologi-
cal disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting 
one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; 
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; re-
productive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endo-
crine . . . .”297  
 
bility frame dominates news coverage of obesity” in the United States); Adam Benforado et 
al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1708-11 (2004) (identify-
ing and criticizing the ideology of “dispositionalism” that posits that consumers’ choices are 
the causal origins of obesity); Kelly D. Brownell et al., Personal Responsibility and Obesity: A 
Constructive Approach to a Controversial Issue, 29 HEALTH AFF. 379, 379 (2010) (“Two of the 
most important words in the national discourse about obesity are ‘personal responsibil-
ity.’”); INST. MED. NAT’L ACADEMIES, ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN OBESITY PREVENTION: 
SOLVING THE WEIGHT OF THE NATION 99-101 (Dan Glickman et al. eds., 2012) (discussing 
the common belief “that obesity results primarily from a failure of personal responsibility to 
control food intake”). 
293. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). Weight restrictions have also been challenged as sex or age 
discrimination, but these theories require plaintiffs to show that an employer’s policy was 
not evenhanded as to sex or age. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
294. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). 
295. Id. § 12102(1)(C). The statute also prohibits discrimination on the basis of “a record of such 
an impairment.” Id. § 12102(1)(B).  
296. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 
3553, 3555. Transitory is defined as six months or less. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). This provi-
sion was a reaction to a 1999 Supreme Court precedent holding that to prove she was “re-
garded as” disabled, a plaintiff had to prove that her employer regarded her as having an 
impairment that substantially limited her in a major life activity. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 499-501 (1999). A plaintiff no longer must prove that an employer re-
garded her as substantially limited. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).  
297. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(i) (2015). Congress authorized the EEOC to promulgate these regula-
tions. 42 U.S.C. § 12205(a).  
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The issue of whether obesity counts as an “impairment” was disputed both 
before and after the ADAAA. The EEOC has offered the guidance that impair-
ments do not “include physical characteristics such as . . . weight . . . that are 
within ‘normal’ range and are not the result of a physiological disorder.”298 In 
litigation, the EEOC has taken the position that obesity is an impairment when 
either (1) the plaintiff’s weight falls outside the “‘normal range” or (2) the 
plaintiff has proof that her weight has a physiological basis.299 Some courts, 
however, have held that regardless of how far a plaintiff’s weight deviates from 
the norm, it is not a disability unless it has an underlying “physiological 
cause.”300  
The “physiological cause” requirement is best explained by the logic of the 
old immutability. The intuition is that weight discrimination is unfair only if a 
plaintiff’s weight is a function of her biology and a result of chance, not 
 
298. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (2015) (emphasis added). Prior to revisions in March 
2011, the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance on the definition of disability instructed that “ex-
cept in rare circumstances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment.” Id. app. § 
1630.2(j). Its pre-ADAAA compliance manual stated that “[b]eing overweight, in and of it-
self, is not generally an impairment . . . . On the other hand, severe obesity, which has been 
defined as body weight more than 100% over the norm, is clearly an impairment.” U.S. 
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES § 902.2(c)(5) (1995) (foot-
note omitted). Although courts and commentators continue to cite this provision, the EEOC 
has indicated that this manual has been superseded by the ADAAA. Section 902 Definition of 
the Term Disability, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (July 25, 2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html [http://perma.cc/EC7E-5SAW].  
299. EEOC v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 693-94 (E.D. La. 2011) (adopting 
the EEOC’s definition). 
300. See, e.g., EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that “to constitute an ADA impairment, a person’s obesity, even morbid obesity, must be 
the result of a physiological condition”); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (holding that “obesity, except in special cases where the obesity relates to a physi-
ological disorder, is not a ‘physical impairment’ within the meaning of the statutes”); Sibilla 
v. Follett Corp., No. CV 10–1457(AKT), 2012 WL 1077655, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) 
(holding that Francis’s “reasoning remains applicable even after the passage of the 
ADAAA”); Merker v. Miami-Dade Cty., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (stating 
that courts have “uniformly held that obesity, absent some physiological cause, does not 
qualify as a disability under the ADA”); Ivey v. District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 607, 613 
(D.C. 2008) (dismissing the plaintiff’s ADA claim because the plaintiff lacked “testimony” 
that her morbid obesity was “caused by a physiological condition”). But see Res. for Human 
Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 693; BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 231 (Mont. 2012) (in-
terpreting a Montana statute consistently with the ADAAA and concluding that “[o]besity 
that is not the symptom of a physiological disorder or condition may constitute a ‘physical 
or mental impairment’ within the meaning of Montana Code . . . if the individual’s weight is 
outside ‘normal range’ and affects ‘one or more body systems’”). 
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choice.301 While science increasingly suggests “hormonal factors, metabolism, 
and genetics are all factors that predetermine one’s weight and impede at-
tempts to lose it,”302 the causal force of such factors in any particular individu-
al’s obesity can be difficult to prove.303 Perhaps sensing a problem with the 
harshness, intrusiveness, and stigmatizing nature of a rule requiring a plaintiff 
to provide expert medical testimony showing she is not to blame for her 
weight, judges do not always state the premise of the physiological cause re-
quirement explicitly. Rather, they grope for other arguments to explain their 
results. In EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, the Sixth Circuit held that the line be-
tween true impairments and all other “‘abnormal’ . . . physical characteristics” 
had to be drawn by a physiological basis requirement.304 The court hypothe-
sized that covering obesity without a physiological cause would lead down the 
slippery slope to providing coverage of, “for example, someone extremely tall 
or grossly short.”305 But the court did not explain how the physiology require-
ment draws a meaningful line. Height is indisputably a function of physiology, 
and the ADA often applies in such contexts.306   
Some courts go so far as to hold that obesity is not “regarded as” an im-
pairment absent evidence the employer believed the plaintiff’s weight was 
 
301. Camille A. Monahan et al., Establishing a Physical Impairment of Weight Under the 
ADA/ADAAA: Problems of Bias in the Legal System, 29 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 537, 554 (2014) 
(arguing that the physiological cause requirement “enacts the ideology of blame by seeking 
to hold severely obese individuals accountable for the disability that is assumed to be within 
their control”). 
302. Yofi Tirosh, The Right To Be Fat, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 264, 285 & n.73 (2012) 
(footnote omitted) (collecting studies); see also MANN, supra note 291, at 15-45 (describing 
research showing that diets fail due to genetic factors, psychological forces, and environ-
mental circumstances, while aptitude for self-control plays only a small role).  
303. See, e.g., Wagner’s Pharmacy, Inc. v. Pennington, No. 2013-SC-000541-DG, 2015 WL 
2266374, at *1, *5 (Ky. May 14, 2015) (concluding that expert testimony about “the cause of 
morbid obesity in general—not specific to the plaintiff” was insufficient to establish a plain-
tiff’s disability under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, where a doctor testified that “morbid 
obesity like [the plaintiff’s] is caused by a cluster of often unknown physiological abnormali-
ties”); Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality for Disability 
Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 964 (2012) (discussing the barriers to providing expert testimony 
as to weight’s physiological causes, including cost and the fact that “doctors simply do not 
know the cause of most people’s weight”). 
304. 463 F.3d at 443. 
305. Id. 
306. For instance, in 2011, Starbucks paid $75,000 to settle an EEOC enforcement action alleging 
it had unreasonably denied accommodation to a barista with dwarfism. Press Release, 
EEOC, Starbucks To Pay $75,000 To Settle EEOC Disability Discrimination Suit  
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/8-18-11.cfm [http://perma.cc 
/3X7S-X5EX]. 
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caused by a physiological condition.307 In Spiegel v. Schulmann, Spiegel, a for-
mer karate instructor, sued his employer, Schulmann, alleging discrimination 
on the basis of weight.308 The district court held that, as per Spiegel’s com-
plaint, his weight was not regarded as an impairment by his employer: 
Schulmann explained to Spiegel at considerable length his views about 
overweight people. Defendant Schulmann told him that the fact that he 
was fat demonstrated that he had no self-esteem and was a weak per-
son. As such, Schulmann thought Spiegel could not be a proper role 
model for others. It was clear that it was not Schulmann’s view that 
Spiegel was physically unable to teach karate, at least at the beginner 
level. Rather, it was simply his view that fat people are essentially un-
disciplined and weak, and therefore cannot be in a role in which others 
are supposed to look up to and respect them.309 
The court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege that the employer “be-
lieved that Spiegel’s weight condition was the symptom of a physiological dis-
order.”310 Thus, an employer’s stereotyped views about the causes and corre-
lates of obesity inoculated his discrimination from legal attack.311 
What would weight discrimination look like if considered under the rubric 
of the new immutability rather than the old? The new immutability may ease 
the requirement that a trait be unchangeable, and ask instead whether the 
change would be very difficult or traumatic.312 Legislatures, the public, and 
 
307. See, e.g., Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082, 1089-90 (S.D. 
Iowa 1997) (“If the matter depends on [the employer’s] perception, evidence which consists 
only of a belief that a physical characteristic presents an undesirable image or appearance 
does not support an inference that [the employer] regarded [the plaintiff’s] weight problem 
as connected to a physiological disorder or condition.”); Ivey v. District of Columbia, 949 
A.2d 607, 613 (D.C. 2008) (dismissing a claim that an employer regarded a morbidly obese 
employee as disabled because the evidence only demonstrated that the employee’s weight 
“impaired [her employer’s] ability to get along with her,” not that the employer regarded 
her as unable to do her job). 
308. No. 03-CV-5088 (SLT)(RLM), 2006 WL 3483922, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2006), aff’d in 
part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010). 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at *14.  
311. Cf. Marc V. Roehling et al., Investigating the Validity of Stereotypes About Overweight Employ-
ees: The Relationship Between Body Weight and Normal Personality Traits, 33 GRP. & ORG. 
MGMT. 392, 392, 419 (2008) (concluding, based on two studies of 3,496 adults, that “body 
weight is not a practically significant predictor of the personality traits conscientiousness 
and extraversion in a broad sample of working-age adults, and, therefore, it should not be 
used as a predictor of personality in employment decisions”). 
312. See supra notes 120-123, 169-170 and accompanying text. 
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judges are more likely to conclude that obesity meets this requirement.313 But it 
is less likely weight would be considered “highly resistant to change” for work-
ers penalized for exceeding weight requirements by small amounts,314 such as 
flight attendants315 or NFL cheerleaders.316  
A trait’s resistance to change alone does not make it immutable in the new 
sense.317 In addition, the trait must be central to personality, or its expression a 
protected liberty. In a provocatively titled article, Yofi Tirosh calls this The 
Right To Be Fat, and argues that “American law’s current constitutional com-
mitments to liberty, autonomy, and human dignity entail that it legally recog-
nize the right to be of any body size.”318 This argument also has an antipater-
nalistic bent—that even if being overweight is a poor choice, it is one reserved 
for each person to make, without interference from the government and em-
ployers.319 
Yet obesity is a condition that is regarded as both inessential and stigma-
tized, falling through the cracks of the revised immutability.320 Body weight 
seems an unlikely candidate for inclusion in a list of traits thought central, fun-
 
313. However, there may be some resistance to the idea of weight loss as traumatic, which con-
flicts with the before-and-after narrative of weight loss as empowering that saturates Ameri-
can culture. This is not to say weight loss is always experienced as empowering. See, e.g., 
Alexis Conason et al., Substance Use Following Bariatric Weight Loss Surgery, 148 JAMA SUR-
GERY 145 (2013) (providing evidence of increased frequency of substance abuse, particularly 
alcohol, following weight loss surgery). 
314. According to one study, pay declines more sharply with increases in weight for women at 
below-average weights than for those at above-average weights. Judge & Cable, supra note 
288, at 102. The explanation may be that employers “celebrate” “very thin” female employ-
ees who have met idealized standards, but “as women reach average weight, they have al-
ready ‘fallen from grace’ according to media images and social expectations.” Id. at 96. 
315. See infra note 331 and accompanying text (discussing litigation by flight attendants). 
316. See Julia Lurie & Nina Liss-Schultz, Jiggle Tests, Dunk Tanks, and Unpaid Labor:  
How NFL Teams Degrade Their Cheerleaders, MOTHER JONES (May 22, 2014), http://www 
.motherjones.com/media/2014/05/nfl-cheerleader-lawsuits-sexism [http://perma.cc/4CSA 
-4SM2]. 
317. But see supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text. 
318. Tirosh, supra note 302, at 334. 
319. Id. at 315 (“Even readers who are convinced that being fat without making efforts to lose 
weight is a bad lifestyle choice should endorse the right to be fat. They should view it as the 
right to make one’s own mistakes in one’s own way.”). I note that the food industry also 
employs antipaternalism, freedom, and choice arguments with respect to obesity in an effort 
to resist regulation. See SAGUY, supra note 292, at 75 (discussing advertisements by the advo-
cacy group Center for Consumer Freedom). 
320. See supra Part II.B. 
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damental, or integral to identity.321 Those seeking to lose weight are particular-
ly unlikely to advocate for this characterization.322 As Tirosh describes in eth-
nographic detail, “[m]ost people perceiving themselves as fat experience the 
center of gravity of their identity in their imagined, post-transformation fu-
ture.”323 They feel that excess weight is blocking them from realizing their true 
selves, not that weight is constitutive of their authentic identities. To say that 
weight is fundamental to personhood would strike many as deeply offensive, 
reinforcing stereotypes that weight entails certain personality traits. Many ad-
vocates of “fat acceptance” are committed to a paradigm that considers weight 
as a characteristic that is, and should be, irrelevant to individual identity.324 
Some of these advocates expressly seek to deemphasize the preoccupation with 
weight, arguing size is a poor measure of personality, health, and beauty.325  
The concepts of personhood and liberty are unlikely to persuade in this 
context because they lack limiting principles. Courts see expansion of discrimi-
nation law to cover obesity as eroding employer prerogatives to discriminate on 
the basis of all other bodily traits and practices that are meaningful to individu-
als, such as muscle tone, smoking, alcohol and drug use, piercings, tattoos, 
dress, and grooming.326 Tudyman v. United Airlines is one example.327 The 
 
321. Sociologist Abigail Saguy conducted a series of experiments measuring subjects’ views on 
obesity after reading news articles promoting various perspectives, including one attributing 
the obesity epidemic to lack of personal responsibility and one containing a “message of fat 
rights and the idea that one can be healthy at every size.” SAGUY, supra note 292, at 136-39. 
In one experiment, exposure to the positive message about fat did not reduce approval for 
weight discrimination relative to a control group. Id. at 139. Saguy concludes that her collec-
tive results “suggest news reports on the ‘obesity epidemic’ intensify antifat stigma but that 
it is more difficult—in a society so saturated with antifat messages—to lessen antifat preju-
dice or promote size diversity as a positive value.” Id. at 139. 
322. According to a 2014 Gallup poll, fifty-one percent of Americans would like to lose weight. 
Personal Weight Situation, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/7264/personal-weight 
-situation.aspx [http://perma.cc/MSN6-YJJG]. 
323. Tirosh, supra note 302, at 301. 
324. Anna Kirkland, Think of the Hippopotamus: Rights Consciousness in the Fat Acceptance Move-
ment, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 397, 401-02 (2008) (analyzing interviews with members and 
leaders of the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance, and concluding that many 
were “deeply invested in [a] vision of just treatment in which the body and its abilities are 
dissociated completely” and weight is considered “irrelevant”). 
325. See, e.g., HEALTH AT EVERY SIZE, http://www.haescommunity.org [http://perma.cc/4S7Q 
-RTWG]. 
326. In particular, the analogy between obesity and smoking is often made by public health re-
searchers to justify discriminatory treatment. SAGUY, supra note 292, at 73. 
327. 608 F. Supp. 739, 741 (C.D. Cal. 1984). This case was decided under the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), the ADA’s predecessor. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 740 (dis-
cussing the Rehabilitation Act).  
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plaintiff, an “avid body build[er],” was denied a job as a flight attendant be-
cause he was fifteen pounds over the airline’s maximum weight for flight at-
tendants of his height and sex, due to his “low percentage of body fat and high 
percentage of muscle.”328 Under United’s policy, an employee who exceeded 
the weight maximum would be given an opportunity to lose weight or would 
be terminated.329 The policy allowed the airline’s medical staff to make excep-
tions, but they declined to make one for William Tudyman, “as his condition 
was voluntary and self-imposed.”330 The Tudyman court found that Congress 
had no intention of covering this sort of condition as an impairment: “What 
plaintiff is really suing for is his right to be both a body builder and a flight at-
tendant, a right that [the statute] was not intended to protect.”331  
In another case, Powell v. Gentiva Health Services, Inc., the plaintiff, who 
worked selling hospice services, argued that she had been terminated because 
her employer regarded her as obese.332 As evidence, Powell pointed to a com-
ment by her supervisor during a performance review that Powell’s “dress and 
appropriateness was not up to par, and that she wasn’t even going to discuss 
the weight issue at this time.”333 Assuming the supervisor “viewed Powell’s ap-
pearance as a whole (clothing, accessories, weight) as negatively affecting her 
sales performance,” the court held that the statement was nevertheless insuffi-
cient to prove the supervisor “perceived Powell’s weight to constitute a physical 
impairment.”334 The court offered the following analogy to illustrate its point: 
[S]uppose plaintiff wore her hair in a neon green mohawk. Such an un-
conventional hairstyle choice might be viewed as unprofessional, and 
might well impede her efforts to sell hospice services . . . but it obvious-
ly is not a physical impairment. The same goes for weight. An over-
weight sales representative may have difficulty making sales if the pro-
 
328. Id. at 740-41. 
329. Id. at 741. 
330. Id. 
331. Id. at 746. Another court, interpreting New York State’s disability discrimination law, held 
that flight attendants could not challenge Delta Air Lines’s weight requirement unless they 
could show they were “medically incapable of meeting [it] due to some cognizable medical 
condition.” Delta Air Lines v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 689 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 
1997); cf. State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 
696, 698 (N.Y. 1985) (holding plaintiff was disabled under New York state law on account 
of her “clinical diagnos[is]” of obesity notwithstanding that the cause “was probably due to 
bad dietary habits”).  
332. No. 13–0007–WS–C., 2014 WL 554155, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2014). 
333. Id. at *3. 
334. Id. at *7. 
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spective customer perceives her appearance to be unprofessional, but 
that does not render her weight a “physical or mental impairment” 
within any rational definition of the phrase.335 
Employment discrimination law seeks to balance employer prerogatives against 
the rights of employees to avoid invidious discrimination. Without more, ar-
guments based in claims to “personhood” and “liberty” seem to open the 
floodgates to eliminate too much employer discretion. 
In sum, harsh, intrusive, and stigmatizing judgments about individual re-
sponsibility for weight operate in the background of judicial opinions and pub-
lic discussions regarding obesity discrimination. But the new immutability 
does not provide the conceptual resources to overcome these judgments. Ra-
ther, it leaves out weight as an inessential and stigmatized condition. Moreo-
ver, the argument that weight is fundamental to personality is likely to find re-
sistance because the same argument can be made of appearance in general. 
B. Pregnancy  
Immutability arguments also limit antidiscrimination protection for preg-
nancy. In a 1976 decision, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished pregnancy discrimination from prohibited sex discrimination, based 
in part on the argument that pregnancy is a choice.336 Gilbert was a Title VII 
challenge to an employer’s exclusion of benefits for pregnancy-related disabili-
ties from its disability insurance plan.337 The Court did not equate this exclu-
sion with sex discrimination, because “[w]hile the [group of pregnant women] 
is exclusively female, [the group of nonpregnant persons] includes members of 
both sexes.”338 The Court further explained: 
[A] distinction which on its face is not sex related [such as a pregnancy-
based distinction] might nonetheless violate the Equal Protection 
Clause if it were in fact a subterfuge to accomplish a forbidden discrim-
 
335. Id. 
336. 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
337. Id. at 127-28. 
338. Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974)). This reasoning is “in-
famous” not only because “[t]he Court ignored the fact that the capacity to gestate distin-
guishes the sexes physically,” but also because “[j]udgments about women’s capacity to bear 
children play a key role in social definitions of gender roles and thus in the social logic of 
‘discrimination based on gender as such.’” Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical 
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 268-
69 (1992).  
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ination. But we have here no question of excluding a disease or disabil-
ity comparable in all other respects to covered diseases or disabilities 
and yet confined to the members of one race or sex. Pregnancy is, of 
course, confined to women, but it is in other ways significantly differ-
ent from the typical covered disease or disability. The District Court 
found that it is not a “disease” at all, and is often a voluntarily under-
taken and desired condition.339 
Thus, because pregnancy is “voluntarily undertaken and desired,” it is not im-
mutable in the old sense and may properly be excluded from an employer’s 
health plan.340 The law seldom construes pregnancy as an injury resulting from 
misfortune, the exception being in cases of sexual assault.341 This reasoning 
rests on the normative judgment that “pregnancy’s character as a choice legiti-
mate[s] the attribution of the costs of reproduction to the private family.”342  
In response to Gilbert, Congress amended Title VII with the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978.343 The PDA provides: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or relat-
ed medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employ-
 
339. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136. The dissent objected that “the characterization of pregnancy as ‘vol-
untary’ is not a persuasive factor, for . . . ‘other than for childbirth disability, [General Elec-
tric] had never construed its plan as eliminating all so-called ‘voluntary’ disabilities,’ includ-
ing sport injuries, attempted suicides, venereal disease, disabilities incurred in the 
commission of a crime or during a fight, and elective cosmetic surgery.” Id. at 151 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 665 (1975)). 
340. An insurance program might argue that because pregnancy is foreseeable, it is not the sort 
of risk that an insurance scheme should cover. But, as Deborah Dinner has argued, foresee-
ability “could not do all the logical work” of justifying the distinction between pregnancy 
and other illnesses, because sickness and injury are a foreseeable part of everyone’s life cycle. 
Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the Making of Sex Discrimi-
nation Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 486 (2014). 
341. Bridges, supra note 160, at 490-91 (“[S]exual assault [statutes that provide that a rapist who 
causes his victim to become pregnant commits an aggravated offense] are somewhat excep-
tional because it is rare for the law to embrace and reflect subversive understandings of 
pregnancy.”). 
342. Dinner, supra note 340, at 486. 
343. See generally Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 
(1983) (“When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its disap-
proval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision.”). 
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ment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar 
in their ability or inability to work . . . .344 
Courts have limited the reach of the PDA by reasoning that pregnancy is 
not immutable because it is impermanent, and therefore discrimination based 
on a planned or past pregnancy may not be prohibited. One court has noted, in 
an oft-cited passage: 
Pregnancy . . . differs from most other protected personal attributes in 
that it is not immutable. While some effects of pregnancy linger beyond 
the act of giving birth, at some point the female employee is no longer 
“affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” for 
purposes of the PDA.345 
Using this rationale, courts distinguish between prohibited pregnancy discrim-
ination and permissible discrimination based on parental status.346 Along these 
lines, some courts interpreting the PDA have refused to include in the protect-
ed class women who plan to become pregnant.347 Others hold that employer-
provided health insurance plans need not include fertility treatments.348  
 
344. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).  
345. Solomen v. Redwood Advisory Co., 183 F. Supp. 2d 748, 753-55 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (dismissing 
a pregnancy claim at summary judgment based on plaintiff’s inability to “establish that she 
was affected by the pregnancy at or near the time of her termination”). But see Laro v. New 
Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he potential for pregnancy is one immutable 
characteristic which distinguishes men from women and consequently has definite real life 
consequences.”); Ponton v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D. Va. 
1986) (referring to pregnancy as “an immutable sex characteristic” without explanation). 
346. Solomen, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 753 (discussing Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 
(8th Cir. 1997) and Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
347. Panizzi v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 C 846, 2007 WL 4233755, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
19, 2007) (refusing to cover women “planning to become pregnant”); Barnowe v. Kaiser 
Found. Health Plan of the Nw., No. CV 03–1672–BR, 2005 WL 1113855, at *4 (D. Or. May 
4, 2005) (excluding a plaintiff “planning on” pregnancy). But see Ingarra v. Ross Educ., 
LLC, 13-CV-10882, 2014 WL 688185, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2014) (holding that discrim-
ination based on the “desire to become pregnant and bear children” is sex discrimination be-
cause “[c]hildbearing capacity only relates to women”). 
348. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 347 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that refusal to 
cover “surgical impregnation procedures” was not a violation of Title VII or the PDA be-
cause “[a]lthough the surgical procedures are performed only on women, the need for the 
procedures may be traced to male, female, or couple infertility with equal frequency”); 
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that re-
fusal to cover fertility treatment does not violate the PDA because “[p]regnancy and child-
birth, which occur after conception, are strikingly different from infertility, which prevents 
conception”). But see, e.g., Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that terminating an employee for taking time off to undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF) vio-
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Lurking behind these decisions may be the unstated assumption that cer-
tain reproductive choices are voluntary decisions deserving of moral judgment. 
The Eighth Circuit has held that employers may refuse to cover contraception, 
so long as it is not covered for men (condoms) and women (birth control pills), 
reasoning that contraceptive services are different in kind from other forms of 
preventative healthcare.349 The court took this difference for granted, declining 
to explain any rationale for the distinction.350 The thinking may be the unstat-
ed assumption that women who choose to engage in nonprocreative sex should 
not ask the workplace to fund that pursuit. 
Immutability arguments also undergird the idea that the workplace has no 
duty to accommodate the incidents of pregnancy. Despite Congress’s repudia-
tion of Gilbert, lower courts continue to reason that “pregnancy is a voluntary 
condition and women bear the burdens of that choice if becoming a mother is 
not compatible with the rigors of the workplace.”351 Courts have interpreted the 
PDA to bar discrimination on the basis of stereotypes or generalizations about 
pregnant workers,352 but not to require that employers provide pregnant work-
ers with accommodations—such as excusing tardiness resulting from morning 
sickness—absent proof that nonpregnant employees received the same accom-
modations.353 
 
lates the PDA because “[e]mployees terminated for taking time off to undergo IVF—just like 
those terminated for taking time off to give birth or receive other pregnancy-related care—
will always be women”). 
349. In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007). The Eighth 
Circuit was the only court of appeals to consider this question before the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act mandated contraceptive coverage by employer-sponsored health in-
surance plans. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2012); Group Health Plans and Health In-
surance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
350. In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices Litig., 479 F.3d at 944 (refusing to address whether the 
distinction is that pregnancy is not a “disease” or to explain any other distinction between 
contraception and other forms of preventative healthcare). A dissent argued that because the 
health risks of unplanned pregnancy befall only women, the right comparison was between 
forms of preventative health care provided to men and women. Id. at 948-49 (Bye, J., dis-
senting). 
351. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 85 (2013) (surveying recent PDA case law). 
352. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 768 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that absent 
“sufficient specific evidence (apart from general assumptions about pregnancy) that [the 
pregnant plaintiff] would require special treatment,” the employer could not terminate that 
plaintiff “simply because it ‘anticipated’ that she would be unable to fulfill its job expecta-
tions”). 
353. See, e.g., Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994). By contrast to the 
federal rule, fifteen states, the District of Columbia, and four cities require pregnancy ac-
commodations. Reasonable Accommodations for Pregnant Workers: State and  
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The ADA, unlike the PDA, expressly requires reasonable accommodation of 
disabilities,354 defined as impairments that substantially limit a major life ac-
tivity.355 Consistent with Gilbert’s classification of pregnancy as a voluntary 
condition rather than an impairment, no court has ever held that pregnancy, as 
such, is a disability under the ADA.356 The EEOC has interpreted the term 
“disability” to include pregnancy-related impairments that substantially limit a 
major life activity, such as gestational diabetes.357 But courts have consistently 
denied coverage to women experiencing more “typical” pregnancy-related con-
ditions, such as the inability to lift heavy objects,358 fatigue,359 or nausea.360 
 
Local Laws, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES (July 2015), http://www.national 
partnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/pregnancy-discrimination/reasonable-a 
ccommodations-for-pregnant-workers-state-laws.pdf [http://perma.cc/S5AP-RFFH]. Some 
private employers also require accommodation. See Lydia DePillis, Under Pressure, Wal-Mart 
Upgrades Its Policy for Helping Pregnant Workers, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 5, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/05/under-pressure-walmart 
-upgrades-its-policy-for-helping-pregnant-workers [http://perma.cc/47HB-NLWR]. 
354. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
355. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.  
356. E.g., McCarty v. City of Eagan, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1027 (D. Minn. 2014); see also Conley v. 
United Parcel Serv., 88 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Conditions, such as pregnan-
cy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are not impairments . . . .”). 
357. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (2011) (“[C]onditions, such as pregnancy, that are not 
the result of a physiological disorder are also not impairments. However, a pregnancy-
related impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is a disability . . . .”); id. app. 
§ 1604.10(b) (“Disabilities caused by or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the same as disabilities 
caused or contributed to by other medical conditions . . . .”); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OP-
PORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RE-
LATED ISSUES, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.003 (2014), http://www.eeoc.gov/laws 
/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm [http://perma.cc/4MZ9-QQ3V] (giving the example of 
gestational diabetes). 
A “pregnancy-related impairment” may also count as a condition “regarded as” a disa-
bility, so long as it is not “transitory and minor.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (2011); 
see Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., No. 1:12-cv-0817-RLY-MJD, 2013 WL 
121838, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013) (holding that pregnancy complications lasting ten 
months constituted an impairment under the “more lenient ADAAA”). “Transitory” means 
“with an actual expected duration of 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2012). 
However, reasonable accommodation is not required for impairments that are only “regard-
ed as” disabilities. Id. § 12201(h). 
358. See, e.g., Leahy v. Gap, Inc., No. 07–CV–2008, 2008 WL 2946007, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 
2008) (holding that an “inability to perform heavy lifting, climbing ladders and other stren-
uous movements” associated with pregnancy was not a disability). 
359. See, e.g., Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002), aff’d, 340 
F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that “periodic nausea, vomiting, dizziness, severe head-
aches, and fatigue” are not disabilities because they are “part and parcel of a normal preg-
nancy”). 
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Since the ADA’s 2008 amendments, which overrode judicial interpretations of 
that statute as requiring that impairments be permanent or long term,361 courts 
have recognized more pregnancy-related conditions as disabilities.362 Nonethe-
less, the EEOC continues to maintain that pregnancy itself is not a disability, 
and the amendments did not expressly repudiate judicial interpretations of dis-
ability as excluding the “normal” incidents of pregnancy.363  
In interpreting the PDA’s requirement that pregnant workers “shall be 
treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability to work,”364 courts draw on notions of 
mutability as individual responsibility. In Young v. United Parcel Service, the 
Supreme Court held that a fact finder might infer pregnancy discrimination if 
an employer denied accommodations (such as exemptions from heavy-lifting 
requirements) to pregnant workers while granting those accommodations to 
nonpregnant workers with similar limitations.365 The Court set forth a modi-
fied version of the McDonnell Douglas test366 for such cases rather than any per 
se rule.367 
 
360. Id. 
361. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2014) (providing that even “[t]he effects of an impairment last-
ing or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting”); see also 
Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (rejecting 
the argument that limitations on heavy lifting necessitated by plaintiff’s “high risk pregnan-
cy” were not impairments under the ADAAA because the pregnancy was temporary).  
362. See Joan C. Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA 
Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 123-35 (2013) (surveying post-ADAAA cases). 
363. See supra note 357 and accompanying text. Thus, while courts may interpret the ADAAA’s 
revised definition of impairment to include “significant pregnancy-related complications,” 
Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 WL 3043021, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012), 
they may continue to exclude those complications deemed “routine,” Lang v. Wal-Mart 
Stores E., L.P., No. 13-CV-349-LM, 2015 WL 898026, at *4 (D.N.H. Mar. 3, 2015) (holding 
that a plaintiff was not disabled because she had “not presented evidence that the lifting re-
strictions suggested by her doctor were the result of a disorder or an unusual or abnormal 
circumstance, rather than a routine suggestion to avoid strenuous physical labor during 
pregnancy”). 
364. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.  
365. 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353-54 (2015). 
366. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (setting forth a burden-
shifting framework for cases alleging disparate treatment based on race in hiring).  
367. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353-54 (holding that, at the final stage of the inquiry, a plaintiff may 
survive summary judgment “by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies 
impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s ‘legitimate, non-
discriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when 
considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrim-
ination”). The opinion does not define “a significant burden,” but it states that one way a 
plaintiff may demonstrate a significant burden is with “evidence that the employer accom-
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Prior to the Young decision, some courts imposed an implicit requirement 
in such cases: that pregnant plaintiffs demonstrate that they were just as de-
serving of workplace support as those nonpregnant workers who received ac-
commodations. This requirement was evident in the distinction courts drew 
between, for example, pregnant workers and workers who received accommo-
dations for on-the-job injuries. Several circuits held that an employer who pro-
vides accommodations for on-the-job, but not off-the-job, injuries need not 
accommodate pregnancy under the PDA.368 The language of the PDA asks only 
whether workers are “similar in their ability to work” without reference to the 
origins of their incapacities.369 But these courts saw on-the-job injuries as of a 
different kind than pregnancy. The workplace is thought to be, on some level, 
accountable for on-the-job injuries, while pregnancy is seen as a personal 
choice, wholly external to employment.370 
 
modates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large 
percentage of pregnant workers.” Id. The opinion also fails to clarify what sort of employer 
reasons would be “sufficiently strong to justify the burden,” except to say those reasons 
“normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient” to 
accommodate pregnant workers. Id. The majority left open the question of the meaning of 
“intentional discrimination” under the PDA, although it did not adopt the view implied by 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent, that a plaintiff must show something such as “animus or hostili-
ty” and not mere “indifference” to pregnant women. Id. at 1366-67 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). 
368. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1338 
(2015); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves v. 
Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 
F.3d 1309, 1311-1313 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th 
Cir. 1998); cf. EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 
2000) (holding that pregnant employees must be treated the same as those with off-the-job 
injuries). But see Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a plaintiff had established a prima facie case under the PDA by showing that her em-
ployer offered accommodations to employees with on-the-job injuries, but not pregnant 
employees).  
369. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and 
the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 1022 (2013). (“The 
statute requires that employers’ treatment of pregnant employees be compared to their 
treatment of all employees ‘similar in their ability to work or not work,’ not all employees 
similar in the cause of their ability to work or not work.”).  
370. Although this assumption has gone unstated in many judicial opinions, Deborah Widiss has 
noted that “[e]mployers might argue that other areas of employment law distinguish be-
tween work and non-work injuries or that employers naturally bear greater responsibility 
for accommodating workplace injuries.” Id. at 1032. In his concurrence in Young, Justice 
Alito concluded that UPS had a “neutral” reason for providing accommodations for on-the-
job injuries, because otherwise, those employees might have been eligible for worker’s com-
pensation benefits. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1360 (Alito, J., concurring). If the premise of this ar-
gument is that worker’s compensation benefits are more expensive than accommodations, it 
is in tension with the majority’s holding that costs and inconvenience do not justify signifi-
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For example, consider the facts in Young. In that case, the plaintiff Peggy 
Young worked as a driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS) in a position that 
required her to lift packages weighing up to seventy pounds.371 When she be-
came pregnant, her doctor informed her that she could not lift more than 
twenty pounds for the first twenty weeks of her pregnancy and no more than 
ten pounds for the remainder.372 UPS denied Young’s request for an accom-
modation to do light-duty work, even though UPS offered temporary accom-
modations to certain other workers, including those with on-the-job injuries, 
those with ADA “disabilities,” and those whose driver’s certificate had been re-
voked by the Department of Transportation (DOT).373 But UPS argued that it 
did not accommodate all nonpregnant workers with disabilities.374 For exam-
ple, UPS would not have accommodated a worker who suffered minor injuries 
“while picking up his infant child” or during “off-the-job work as a volunteer 
firefighter.”375 In this circumstance, formalistic reasoning failed to provide an 
answer to the question of whether pregnant workers had to be treated like the 
group of nonpregnant workers who were accommodated or if they could be 
treated like the group who were not.376 
The Fourth Circuit assumed, without explanation, that pregnancy was dif-
ferent in kind from on-the-job injuries, disabilities under the ADA, or loss of 
DOT certification, and appropriately grouped with limitations stemming from 
childcare or volunteer work. The explanation may relate to judgments about 
pregnancy as mutable. In its recitation of the facts, the Fourth Circuit saw fit to 
point out that Young underwent three rounds of IVF before becoming preg-
nant in 2006, as if to emphasize that her pregnancy was not a chance occur-
rence,377 and that her employer had the beneficence to grant her leave for these 
 
cant burdens on pregnant workers. See id. at 1354 (majority opinion). Justice Alito’s premise 
is more likely that a policy resulting from worker’s compensation rules is not one “because 
of” pregnancy. The majority opinion does not reach any determinate holding on this issue. 
See supra note 367 and accompanying text. 
371. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344. 
372. Id.  
373. Id. at 1347.  
374. Id.  
375. Id. (quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
376. See id. at 1350 (describing the dilemma). Rather than resolving this dilemma, which might 
have required the Court to clarify the types of attitudes that might amount to “intentional 
discrimination” under the PDA, the Court established a complicated burden-shifting 
framework that may prompt judges to leave this question to the jury. See supra note 367 and 
accompanying text.  
377. In the context of IVF, pregnancy is not just understood as a personal choice, but a choice 
that may also be subjected to harsh and intrusive judgments. Women seeking treatment for 
infertility can be stereotyped as “emotional or desperate” and therefore incapable of making 
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procedures.378 The Fourth Circuit also noted, as “backdrop,” that the light-
duty accommodations provided for other workers were part of the applicable 
Collective Bargaining Agreement.379 The Fourth Circuit expressed the concern 
that nonpregnant workers would have to bear the costs of their coworkers’ 
pregnancies, as though accommodation would upset the workplace bargain.380 
Implicit here is a moral prioritization of contractual entitlements over pregnan-
cy accommodations.381 Although the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s opinion, it did not clarify what types of reasons might be legitimate to 
distinguish between workers disabled by pregnancy and workers disabled by 
other conditions; it only precluded arguments based on the cost and inconven-
ience of accommodating pregnant workers.382  
What if pregnancy were viewed through the lens of the new immutability 
as a protected choice or liberty, one essential to self-determination? The choice 
to become pregnant, on this theory, would be protected because becoming a 
parent is central to a person’s conception of her identity, like a person’s sexual 
orientation.383 Unlike obesity, which is almost invariably constructed negative-
 
reasonable judgments about whether a procedure is worth the cost. Jody Lyneé Madeira, 
Woman Scorned?: Resurrecting Infertile Women’s Decision-Making Autonomy, 71 MD. L. REV. 
339, 343 (2012). They may also be faulted for “waiting too long” to have children. See Carrie 
Friese et al., Rethinking the Biological Clock: Eleventh Hour Moms, Miracle Moms and Meanings 
of Age-Related Infertility, 63 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1550, 1551 (2006). 
378. See Young, 707 F.3d at 440. In its opinion reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
left out the fact of Young’s IVF, framing Young’s story simply as one in which, “after suffer-
ing several miscarriages, she became pregnant.” Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.  
379. Young, 707 F.3d at 439-40.  
380. Id. at 448 (following other circuits’ opinions in refusing to interpret the PDA to require ac-
commodation of pregnant employees, which could come “perhaps even at the expense of 
other, nonpregnant employees”).  
381. The premise may also be a sort of process-based argument that women ought to have bar-
gained for pregnancy accommodations.  
382. See supra note 367 and accompanying text. The Court suggested that employers would be 
permitted to accommodate, for example, workers “who drive (and are injured) in extrahaz-
ardous conditions” without having to accommodate pregnant workers as well. Young, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1350; see also id. at 1358 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing hypothetical workplace 
heroic efforts). It was this concern—about preserving the employer’s prerogative to reward 
valued risk-taking without also having to accommodate pregnancy—that prevented the 
Court from adopting Young’s interpretation of the PDA. Id. at 1350 (majority opinion). The 
distinction between injuries sustained through pregnancy and extrahazardous work might 
be the on-the-job, off-the-job one. See supra note 370 and accompanying text. But the choice 
of hypothetical scenarios, even though phrased in sex-neutral terms, suggests an implicit 
moral prioritization of traditionally masculine heroics (like firefighting) over feminine trav-
ails (like pregnancy).  
383. See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1541 (arguing that the new immutability might compel protec-
tion of parental status). 
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ly in contemporary U.S. law and culture, pregnancy is almost invariably con-
structed as “a wonderful, life-affirming, overwhelmingly good event in the life 
of the woman.”384 In law, culture, and media, pregnancy may be recognized as 
“physically taxing, occasionally painful, and frequently burdensome,” but “the 
experience of pregnancy remains, at the end of the day, a good thing.”385 Even 
pro-choice advocates describe abortion as “always a tragic situation,” necessary 
only “because a woman’s pregnancy may occur during a time when she is inca-
pable of taking pleasure in its inherently wondrous nature.”386 Pregnancy as 
protected choice would seem, then, to be a firm basis on which to ground a 
right against discrimination. Moreover, most people would agree that, alt-
hough it is possible for a woman to terminate her pregnancy, it would be ab-
horrent to ask her to do so.387 Equal protection doctrine has long recognized 
the right to reproduction as a fundamental liberty.388  
 
384. Bridges, supra note 160, at 461; cf. Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social 
Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal 
Theory, 84 KY. L.J. 1197, 1225 (1996) (“Our society does not think it is just fine for people to 
remain single and childless deliberately or for married people to remain childless deliberate-
ly. Infertility is constructed as a nearly unbearable tragedy; deliberate childlessness is con-
structed as nearly unimaginable selfishness.”); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Es-
say on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (2001) (coining the term 
“repronormativity” to describe “the complex ways in which reproduction is incentivized and 
subsidized in ways that may bear upon the life choices women face”).  
Although this positive construction of pregnancy may be hegemonic in the sense Khiara 
Bridges describes, it is not universal. See, e.g., Bridges, supra note 160, at 503 (discussing the 
construction of pregnancy for an unmarried woman under eighteen as “far from a positive 
understanding,” in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)); Shari Motro, The 
Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 917, 927 (2010) (“The derogatory term ‘knocked up’ 
captures the many indignities to which unmarried pregnant women are subjected.”). More-
over, these positive views of pregnancy may be historically specific. See KELLY OLIVER, 
KNOCK ME UP, KNOCK ME DOWN: IMAGES OF PREGNANCY IN HOLLYWOOD FILMS 1-2 (2012) 
(arguing, based on a study of popular American films, that “[p]regnancy and pregnant bod-
ies have gone from shameful and hidden to sexy and spectacular” during the late twentieth 
century); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9 (1974) (discussing a 
mandatory pregnancy leave policy for schoolteachers enacted in 1952 in part “to insulate 
schoolchildren from the sight of conspicuously pregnant women”). Bridges notes that with 
respect to poor women, welfare law constructs pregnancy as an injury to the body politic 
while at the same time denying public funds for abortion. Bridges, supra note 160, at 501-07. 
385. Bridges, supra note 160, at 462 (emphasis omitted).  
386. Id. at 465 (quoting Senator Barack Obama, Final Presidential Debate (Oct. 15, 2008), 
http://debates.org/index.php?page=october-15-2008-debate-transcript [http://perma.cc/V 
N3G-4SQD]). 
387. Even assuming a woman did not want to become a parent, she may oppose abortion for rea-
sons of conscience or religion, or she may not have access to an abortion provider. For these 
sorts of reasons, in the 1970s, many pro-life advocates joined feminists in support of the 
PDA. Dinner, supra note 340, at 501 (quoting one pro-life PDA advocate as arguing that de-
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Yet this view reinforces stereotypes.389 The trouble with personhood argu-
ments for pregnancy is that they are “nothing other than a corollary to the in-
sistence that motherhood, or at least the desire to be a mother, is the funda-
mental, inescapable, and natural backdrop of womanhood against which every 
woman is defined.”390 Such a framing may perpetuate sexist ideologies by im-
agining the plot of a woman’s life story as centering around her decision to 
have, or not to have, children. “[T]he idea that a woman is defining her identity 
by determining not to have a child is the very premise of those institutionalized 
sexual roles through which the subordination of women has for so long been 
maintained.”391 
The new immutability is also of limited value here because it is likely to be 
characterized as supporting only negative rights against direct interference.392 
The law may recognize pregnancy’s value for the pregnant woman, but refuse 
to require the public, employers, or other workers to “sacrifice” to accommo-
date her pregnancy. The new immutability’s claim for recognition casts preg-
nancy as special, while the claim for redistribution argues that pregnancy is not 
meaningfully different from other potentially disabling conditions. More spe-
cifically, the new immutability is about protecting the individual from the 
trauma of being asked to change a trait fundamental to her identity and the re-
sult of her private choice. By staking protection on a characterization of preg-
nancy as a private choice with benefits for the individual woman, the new im-
mutability may lend support to arguments that women alone should bear the 
costs of pregnancy—the very arguments that employers used to lobby against 
the PDA.393  
 
nial of “‘economic equality’ to pregnant workers . . . made a woman’s ‘decision to abort’ not 
‘the product of free choice but of economic coercion’” (citing Discrimination on the Basis of 
Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Human 
Res., 95th Cong. 301, 436-37 (1977) (statement of Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Special Coun-
sel, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc.)).  
388. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating a state statute authorizing steri-
lization as a criminal punishment on the ground that “[m]arriage and procreation are fun-
damental to the very existence and survival of the race”).  
389. See supra Part II.C. 
390. Rubenfeld, supra note 202, at 782. 
391. Id. 
392. See supra Part II.E. 
393. As legal historian Dinner has documented, in the 1970s, in opposition to the PDA, 
“[b]usiness trade associations and state officials argued that because the legalization of birth 
control and abortion had rendered pregnancy a private choice, the costs of reproduction 
should remain a private responsibility.” Dinner, supra note 340, at 480. In response, feminist 
advocacy for the PDA in the 1970s “drew upon a socialist feminist tradition that emphasized 
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This logic goes hand-in-hand with a certain judgmental view of sexual mo-
rality.394 As Shari Motro has written, “[m]any people believe that sexual free-
dom comes with responsibility for the consequences. A woman who engages in 
sexual relations assumes the risk that she might conceive.”395 A woman’s “uni-
lateral decisionmaking power” over whether to have an abortion is counterbal-
anced by her unilateral responsibility for the costs of pregnancy.396 Feminist 
and anti-racist legal scholars have long described how public assistance pro-
grams demonize women who are unable to earn enough income or find a male 
breadwinner to support their children, for example, by capping welfare pay-
ments to women who conceive while receiving public assistance.397  
Even assuming that the argument that reproductive rights are negative lib-
erties could be surmounted, another limitation of the new immutability in the 
pregnancy context is the line-drawing problem.398 Not just the state of being 
pregnant, but the very choice to have children could be thought central to the 
development of one’s personality and family life, a fundamental exercise of lib-
erty, and a decision no one should be asked by the workplace to change. This 
logic requires that employer-sponsored health plans cover contraception399 and 
fertility treatments.400 Courts are resistant to extending discrimination law that 
far. In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, a case holding that the PDA did 
not require coverage of IVF, the court saw no evidence of sex discrimination, 
overlooking an admission by the company’s vice president that the reason the 
 
the economic value of reproductive labor” and “[t]he belief that childbearing had general 
societal value and not merely personal value.” Id. at 504. 
394. See supra Part II.A. 
395. Motro, supra note 384, at 933.  
396. Id. at 933-34; cf. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abor-
tion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1409 (2009) (“[T]he individual right to terminate a pregnan-
cy created by Roe v. Wade might have the effect . . . of legitimating the profoundly inade-
quate social welfare net and hence the excessive economic burdens placed on poor women 
and men who decide to parent.”). 
397. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 106-18 (1995); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE 
BLACK BODY 209-17 (1997); ANNA MARIE SMITH, WELFARE REFORM AND SEXUAL REGULA-
TION 147-58 (2007). 
398. See supra Part II.D. 
399. See supra notes 349-350 and accompanying text. 
400. See David Orentlicher, Discrimination out of Dismissiveness: The Example of Infertility, 85 IND. 
L.J. 143, 154-56 (2010) (discussing the psychological trauma caused by infertility). Only fif-
teen states require insurance coverage for infertility. Insurance Coverage in Your State, RE-
SOLVE, http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/insurance_coverage/state-coverage 
.html [http://perma.cc/29DZ-96LK]. Circuit courts are split on whether the ADA or PDA 
requires coverage of fertility treatments. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.  
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company excluded coverage was “because too many women of child-bearing 
age were employed by IMMC and infertility treatments result in too many 
multiple births, thereby creating a financial burden on the Plan.”401 Employers 
also express concern about disruptions caused in the workplace by women hav-
ing too many children.402  
Moreover, the new immutability does not draw a principled line between 
childbearing and childrearing for both men and women,403 nor between caring 
for children and other types of care, or even other valuable life pursuits workers 
might engage in, off the job, besides childrearing.404 Any number of off-the-
job life pursuits may very well be central to a person’s identity such that the in-
dividual considers them immutable features of her personality and would expe-
rience trauma if forced to give them up. At oral argument in Young v. United 
Parcel Service, Justice Alito asked whether UPS would allow an accommodation 
“if a UPS driver fell off his all-terrain vehicle . . . on the weekend and was una-
ble to lift.”405 The implicit comparison behind this question is between limita-
tions brought on by pregnancy and those caused by recreational pursuits. The 
Fourth Circuit provided more sympathetic examples: the “employee who in-
jured his back while picking up his infant child” and the “employee whose lift-
 
401. 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit did not view this statement as direct 
evidence of sex discrimination, because the bar on fertility treatments applied “equally to all 
individuals, male or female.” Id. But even a facially neutral policy is impermissible if enacted 
for a discriminatory reason. See, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 912 
(1989). 
402. Kyle C. Velte, So You Want to Have a Second Child? Second Child Bias and the Justification-
Suppression Model of Prejudice in Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 909 
(2013). 
403. See, e.g., Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004) (refusing to 
hold that Title VII protects a plaintiff on account of her status as a “woman with childcare 
difficulties”). Although Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on parental status, 
some state statutes do. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.200 (West 2015) 
(“parenthood”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(9) (West 2015) (“familial responsibil-
ities”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (West 2012) (“family responsibilities”). The Family 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) only requires that employers provide very limited accommoda-
tion of parenting in the form of unpaid leave of twelve weeks for the birth or adoption of a 
child or for a child’s “serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012); see al-
so Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 
IND. L.J. 1219, 1233-35 (2011) (discussing limitations of the FMLA). 
404. See Clarke, supra note 403, at 1236-37, 1278-79.  
405. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2898 (2015) 
(No. 12-1226). Justice Alito asked, “[I]s there really a dispute that if a UPS driver fell off his 
all-terrain vehicle during—on the weekend and was unable to lift that that person would not 
be given light duty?” Id. Counsel for UPS responded that the accommodation would not 
have been authorized. Id. 
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ing limitation arose from her off-the-job work as a volunteer firefighter.”406 
We might distinguish some life pursuits as leisure and others as socially valua-
ble caregiving, but we would have to look outside the logic of immutability to 
do so.407 
Additionally, religious exemptions gain traction when the right to contra-
ception is framed as a protected choice.408 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
the Supreme Court concluded that closely held corporations were not required 
to comply with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s mandate to 
provide health insurance coverage for certain forms of contraception thought 
to cause abortion, because those forms of contraception violate the sincerely-
held religious beliefs of those corporations’ owners.409 Under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), a sort of strict scrutiny applies to 
government actions that substantially burden the exercise of religious free-
dom.410 The action must be justified by a compelling interest and use the least 
restrictive means of fulfilling that interest.411 In examining the compelling in-
terest behind the contraceptive mandate, the majority opinion focused on “the 
constitutional right to obtain contraceptives,” and how this right might be im-
paired if women were required to share the costs of those contraceptives.412 The 
Court “grudgingly” assumed this to be a compelling interest, without so hold-
ing.413 But the Court concluded that the government had not found the least-
restrictive means for enforcing this interest, because the government itself 
 
406. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2898 
(2015). These hypothetical employees might be covered today under the amended ADA. See 
supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
407. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autono-
my, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 21 n.15 (1999) (arguing that, 
in contrast to other life choices, children are “society-preserving”). 
408. See supra Part II.F. 
409. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2015). 
410. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012). 
411. Id. § 2000bb-1(b) (providing that the “[g]overnment may substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) 
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest”). 
412. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 
(1965)). The Court noted that the government had also argued the contraceptive mandate 
was required for reasons of public health and gender equality, but it found these concerns 
without sufficient “focus[].” Id. at 2779. The compelling government interest, according to 
the Court, must be the “marginal interest in enforcing the contraceptive mandate in these 
cases,” specifically, how the objecting corporation’s employees might be harmed. Id. 
413. See id. at 2800 n.23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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could create a program to fund the forms of contraception objected to by the 
women’s employers.414  
The dissent criticized the breadth of this holding, asking whether, for ex-
ample, a restaurant owner who “refused to serve black patrons based on his re-
ligious beliefs opposing racial integration” might opt out of antidiscrimination 
laws.415 The majority responded, “The Government has a compelling interest 
in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without re-
gard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to 
achieve that critical goal.”416 The distinction is difficult to understand unless 
one grasps the nature of the compelling interest that the Court has articulated 
in the Hobby Lobby case: a right to obtain contraceptives, rather than a right to 
gender equality.417 The government can supply contraceptives, but the gov-
ernment cannot remedy race discrimination in employment by paying off the 
victims. Race discrimination occupies a different plane of consideration.  
In sum, beliefs that pregnancy is voluntary and a result of morally fraught 
sexual conduct limit equality law’s reach in the pregnancy discrimination con-
text. But arguments based on the new immutability—that reproductive choices 
are fundamental to personhood—do not avoid these judgments. Rather, they 
risk perpetuating stereotypes about women’s roles, they have limited persua-
sive force due to the difficulty of differentiating the value of pregnancy from 
childrearing and other life pursuits, and even if successful, they are likely to re-
sult in limited rights and invite demands for exemptions by religious and busi-
ness groups. 
C. Criminal Records 
Arguments about mutability, defined as personal responsibility, undergird 
opposition to rules that would circumscribe employers’ ability to automatically 
decline job applicants with criminal records. A wide range of employers con-
 
414. Id. at 2780-81 (majority opinion). Alternatively, the Court speculated that insurers could 
make separate payments, as they may for certain non-profit religious employers, without 
reaching a holding on whether this would comply with the RFRA. Id. at 2782. 
415. Id. at 2802-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
416. Id. at 2783 (majority opinion). 
417. The majority opinion assumes that the compelling government interest is “in guaranteeing 
cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods” rather than gender equality 
writ large. Id. at 2779-80. However, while Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion, in 
his separate concurrence he recognized the government’s “compelling interest in the health 
of female employees.” Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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duct background checks on job applicants to screen for criminal histories.418 An 
industry of commercial vendors collects criminal records in databases and pro-
vides employers with computerized reports on job applicants.419 The practice 
makes it difficult for many people to find employment. By one estimate, one in 
four American adults has some sort of criminal record.420 And African Ameri-
cans and Hispanics are more likely to have been arrested or incarcerated by 
substantial margins.421 Whether higher rates of crime among minorities could 
explain these disparities is disputed; consider, for example, that whites and 
minorities engage in similar rates of drug possession and sales, yet minorities 
are far more likely to be convicted of drug offenses.422 Discrimination against 
ex-offenders in the workplace is compounded by racial discrimination. Sociol-
ogist Devah Pager has conducted well-known audit studies in which white and 
 
418. See Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, 65 Million “Need Not Apply”: The 
Case for Reforming Criminal Background Checks for Employment, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 13-18, 
30 n.60 (Mar. 2011), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/65_Million_Need_Not 
_Apply.pdf [http://perma.cc/7UAK-KPZE] (discussing the results of a survey of job posting 
ads in the commonly used online forum Craigslist); Background Checking: Conducting Crimi-
nal Background Checks, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. 5 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www 
.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/BackgroundCheckCriminalChecks.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/4MKV-YKY7] (surveying 347 randomly selected human resources profes-
sionals who are members of the Society for Human Resource Management and finding 
ninety-three percent reported screening at least some job applicants for criminal records). 
419. Report of the National Task Force on the Commercial Sale of Criminal Justice Record Information, 
SEARCH 7 (2005), http://www.search.org/files/pdf/rntfcscjri.pdf [http://perma.cc/WNJ8 
-NS2D] (describing the background check business as consisting of “a few large industry 
players” and “hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of regional and local companies”). 
420. Rodriguez & Emsellem, supra note 418, at 3, 27 n.2. Individuals with criminal records may 
include not just those who were incarcerated, but also those who were convicted but not in-
carcerated, and even those who were arrested but not convicted for reasons such as factual 
innocence. Id. at 7. 
421. Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT. 5 tbl.5 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/A27F-P5SP] (reporting that 1.4% of white adults, 8.9% of black adults, and 4.3% 
of Hispanic adults have been incarcerated in state or federal prisons); EEOC ARREST AND 
CONVICTION RECORDS GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 9 (reporting, based on FBI and Census 
Bureau statistics, that twenty-eight percent of arrests in 2010 were of African Americans, 
while African Americans make up only fourteen percent of the U.S. population, and that, 
while arrest data for Hispanics is difficult to find, “[i]n 2008, Hispanics were arrested for 
federal drug charges at a rate of approximately three times their proportion of the general 
population” according to the DEA). 
422. EEOC ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 9, 37 n.68. See gener-
ally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (claiming that practices of mass incarceration in the United States 
have constructed a new racial caste system); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND 
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (arguing that the U.S. criminal 
justice system relies on race and class inequalities). 
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black testers applied for jobs with identical resumes, varying only in that some-
times the testers were given criminal histories.423 In one study, the white appli-
cants received half as many callbacks when saddled with a criminal history, 
while the black applicants received only one third as many callbacks when sad-
dled with a criminal history.424 
Automatic exclusion of job applicants with criminal records arguably vio-
lates Title VII’s prohibition on race discrimination. Title VII forbids not only 
intentional discrimination but also employment practices that are “fair in form, 
but discriminatory in operation” on the theory of disparate impact discrimina-
tion.425 To prove a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plain-
tiff generally presents statistics showing that a particular employment practice 
has an adverse impact on the basis of a protected trait.426 In its 2012 guidance 
on the question, the EEOC took the position that national data suffices to 
demonstrate that employer exclusions based on criminal records have a dispar-
ate impact based on race.427 An employer, however, may defend against a 
charge of disparate impact discrimination by showing that the practice is “job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”428 
 
423. Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and 
White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 198 (2009); 
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 947 (2003).  
424. Pager, supra note 423, at 957-58 (describing an audit study of Milwaukee employers in which 
the percentage of callbacks received by applicants was: thirty-four percent for the white ap-
plicant with no criminal record, seventeen percent for the white applicant with a criminal 
record, fourteen percent for the black applicant with no criminal record, and five percent for 
the black applicant with a criminal record); cf. Pager et al., supra note 423, at 199, 200 fig.1 
(discussing an audit study of New York City employers in which the percentage of callbacks 
received by applicants was: thirty-one percent for the white applicant with no criminal rec-
ord, twenty-two percent for the white applicant with a criminal record, twenty-five percent 
for the black applicant with no criminal record, and ten percent for the black applicant with 
a criminal record).  
425. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
426. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k) (2012). If the components of an employer’s “decisionmaking 
process are not capable of separation for analysis,” the plaintiff can argue that the deci-
sionmaking process as a whole caused a disparate impact, rather than a specific employment 
practice. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(i). 
427. EEOC ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1. But see EEOC v. 
Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 798 (D. Md. 2013) (refusing to accept national statistics be-
cause they were not “representative of the relevant applicant pool” and because they reflect-
ed arrest and incarceration rates when the employer’s hiring criteria did not consider arrests 
or incarceration). 
428. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). A plaintiff can rebut this defense by showing that 
the employer refused to adopt an alternative employment practice that would have fulfilled 
its business purpose while avoiding the disparate impact. Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C); 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
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The EEOC has advised that exclusions based on arrests alone are not eligible 
for this defense because “[t]he fact of an arrest does not establish that criminal 
conduct has occurred.”429 While a conviction does establish criminal conduct, 
the EEOC maintains that “[i]n certain circumstances . . . there may be reasons 
for an employer not to rely on the conviction record alone.”430 An employer’s 
policy may be justified if it includes, for example, some sort of individualized 
assessment, considering “at least the nature of the crime, the time elapsed, and 
the nature of the job.”431 Apart from Title VII, eighteen states have enacted leg-
islation known as “ban the box” which prohibits certain employers from asking 
about criminal records on job applications, although employers are not pre-
cluded from considering criminal history at later stages in the hiring process.432 
Employers screen applicants for a variety of utilitarian reasons. For exam-
ple, they screen to prevent theft and fraud in the workplace, ensure the safety 
of other workers or customers, or avoid liability for negligent hiring.433 But this 
type of employer risk management runs counter to the public policy goal of re-
ducing recidivism by encouraging ex-offenders to find employment.434 Setting 
 
429. EEOC ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1. 
430. Id. 
431. Id. at 2 (citing Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977)). The EEOC 
has clarified that an individualized assessment is not required in all cases. Id. at 2, 14. An 
employer may screen out applicants with criminal records if it has data to “link specific 
criminal conduct, and its dangers, with the risks inherent in the duties of a particular posi-
tion.” Id. at 14. That data must meet the agency’s standards for validity studies. Id. at 14, 42 
n.111 (discussing standards for validity studies under 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (2011)). Additional-
ly, employers who must comply with federal rules or licensing requirements that prohibit 
the hiring of employees with certain criminal records are not liable. EEOC ARREST AND 
CONVICTION RECORDS GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 20-23 (giving examples such as bank 
employees and jobs requiring security clearances). 
432. Ban the Box, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 1, 3 (July 1, 2015), http://www.nelp.org/page 
/-/SCLP/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/PR7N-3C 
PM]. Other states have gone further, barring consideration of criminal history except under 
specified circumstances related to job requirements, business needs, or safety concerns. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(a) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710(f) (2014); N.Y. CORRECT. 
LAW § 752(1) (McKinney 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9125(b) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 111.335 
(2014). 
433. Lucas Loafman & Andrew Little, Race, Employment, and Crime: The Shifting Landscape of 
Disparate Impact Discrimination Based on Criminal Convictions, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 291 
(2014). 
434. A number of studies have concluded that, under certain circumstances, employment oppor-
tunities may decrease recidivism. See, e.g., Christopher Uggen & Sarah K.S. Shannon, Pro-
ductive Addicts and Harm Reduction: How Work Reduces Crime—but Not Drug Use, 61 SOC. 
PROBS. 105, 106 (2014) (discussing the theoretical and empirical support for the view that 
work decreases crime among adults); Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life 
Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 
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aside the normative question of whether employers should bear the costs of 
public policy goals, there are empirical questions about the level of risk that ex-
offenders pose to employers. Support for the specific claim that all those with 
criminal records are more likely to commit workplace misconduct is lacking.435 
Criminal history reports are likely to be inaccurate, especially those from com-
mercial vendors.436 Many include incorrect information, such as convictions 
that have been expunged by court order.437 And some employers are screening 
out applicants with any type of criminal history, regardless of the severity or 
nature of the offense,438 whether the arrest led to a conviction,439 or how long 
ago it occurred.440 Criminologists generally agree most people who commit 
crimes eventually desist, and some research suggests that the likelihood that 
certain individuals who have not re-offended for a number of years will com-
mit crimes may be close to that of those without criminal records.441 Other fac-
 
529, 542 (2000) (concluding that offenders over the age of twenty-six who are provided with 
“even marginal employment opportunities are less likely to reoffend than those not provided 
such opportunities”). 
435. One set of researchers reviewed the literature and found only one study examining the like-
lihood that those with criminal records will commit workplace crimes. That study, which 
examined a sample of 960 New Zealanders, found that those with juvenile criminal records 
between the ages of thirteen and sixteen were no more likely to engage in “a wide range of 
counterproductive work behaviors” and were somewhat less likely to engage in fighting or 
stealing at work by age twenty-six. Stacy A. Hickox & Mark V. Roehling, Negative Creden-
tials: Fair and Effective Consideration of Criminal Records, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 207 (2013) 
(discussing the findings in Brent W. Roberts et al., Predicting the Counterproductive Employee 
in a Child-to-Adult Prospective Study, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1427, 1427-30, 1434 (2007)). 
436. Shawn Bushway et al., Private Providers of Criminal History Records: Do You Get What You 
Pay For?, in BARRIERS TO REENTRY?: THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN 
POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 174, 189 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007) (finding a high rate 
of false negatives in criminal history reports from both a private vendor and an FBI data-
base). 
437. SEARCH, supra note 419, at 83. 
438. Rodriguez & Emsellem, supra note 418, at 15. 
439. Id. at 13-14. 
440. Id. at 16-17. 
441. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 350 (2009) (measuring “the number of 
years that those who have a prior arrest need to stay clean to be considered ‘close enough’ to 
those who have never been arrested” and concluding that the answer depends on the age of 
the offender and the type of crime previously committed); Megan C. Kurlychek et al., En-
during Risk? Old Criminal Records and Predictions of Future Criminal Involvement, 53 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 64, 70 (2007) (concluding that the risk of recidivism diminishes over time using a 
data set of 670 males born in 1942 in Racine, Wisconsin); Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Scarlet 
Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 483, 483 (2006) [hereinafter Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters] (reporting similar 
results from a data set based on a cohort born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1958). 
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tors, such as youth, may correlate with crime, yet employers do not argue that 
the correlation is a basis for screening out younger workers.442 
Immutability’s logic is exerting influence here. A criminal record may be 
immutable in the sense of being virtually impossible to change, considering the 
difficulty of expungement.443 But a criminal record may be mutable in the 
sense that the decision to commit a crime was within an individual’s control 
and responsibility. Opponents of the EEOC’s enforcement policy have made 
clear that ex-offenders are morally responsible for their lack of employment 
opportunities. One theme of opposition to the EEOC’s enforcement guidance 
is that it represents “the illegitimate expansion of Title VII protection to former 
criminals.”444 A Heritage Foundation report argued, “[i]t is not racial discrimi-
nation that deprives felons, black or white, of their ability to obtain employ-
ment ‘but their own decision to commit an act for which they assume the risks 
of detection and punishment.’”445 A letter from nine states’ Attorneys General 
objected to the EEOC’s guidance by arguing that “[y]our real target appears to 
be the perceived unfairness of judging an individual—of any race—solely by his 
or her past criminal behavior.”446 An early district court opinion put it more 
 
442. Noah Zatz, Presentation at the Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment & Labor Law, 
from Redemption to Original Sin: Reframing the Relative Risks of Hiring People with 
Criminal Convictions (Sept. 11, 2015). One study found, for example, that eighteen-year-old 
men who had never been arrested had rates of arrest very close to those of past offenders at 
age twenty-four. Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters, supra note 441, at 494.  
443. Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1191, 1219 (2006) (discussing how, along with the difficulties of convincing private 
vendors to change criminal records in their databases, “only a fraction of states allow for 
some form of clearing of post-conviction records, and even those few states impose signifi-
cant administrative and evidentiary hurdles to legally available remedies”). 
444. Letter from Patrick Morrisey, Att’y Gen. of W. Va., et al., to Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, 
U.S. EEOC, et al. 3 (July 24, 2013), http://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/EEOC-Letter 
-Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZF96-FJJX]; see also Hans A. von Spakovsky, The  
Dangerous Impact of Barring Criminal Background Checks: Congress Needs To Overrule  
the EEOC’s New Employment “Guidelines,” HERITAGE FOUND. (May 31,  
2012), http://www.heritage.org/home/research/reports/2012/05/the-dangerous-impact-of 
-barring-criminal-background-checks [http://perma.cc/PPU7-G948] (“The April Guidance 
issued by the EEOC is based on a faulty premise: that convicted felons are a protected class 
under federal law.”). 
445. von Spakovsky, supra note 444 (quoting Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1341 (S.D. 
Fla. 2002)).  
446. Letter from Patrick Morrisey et al., to Jacqueline A. Berrien et al., supra note 444, at 4. In 
support of this argument, the Attorneys General pointed to examples in the EEOC guidance 
directing employers to consider various factors in addition to criminal convictions, such as 
whether the applicant has reformed. Id. But whether an employer considers factors sur-
rounding a conviction goes to the question of whether a background check policy is justified 
for business reasons, such as preventing on-the-job crime.  
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bluntly: “If Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because they 
have been convicted of theft then, they should stop stealing.”447 
Opposition to the EEOC policy is also rooted in the endorsement of em-
ployers’ moral judgments about ex-offenders. These judgments are phrased in 
terms of ex-offenders’ inherent lack of trustworthiness as a class. In one district 
court case, even though the employer’s business reasons for conducting back-
ground checks were not at issue, the judge found it necessary to begin his opin-
ion with a lengthy explanation of the “obvious,” “rational,” and “legitimate” 
reasons for conducting criminal history and credit background checks, to avoid 
hiring those who “appear to be untrustworthy and unreliable.”448 Similarly, in 
their letter to the EEOC opposing its enforcement guidance, the states’ Attor-
neys General wrote that “[a] criminal background may . . . be indicative of a 
lack of dependability, reliability, or trustworthiness.”449 
The new immutability—with its emphasis on psychological understandings 
of personality, its attempts to avoid the trauma of being asked to change a fun-
damental trait, and its exaltation of self-determination—does not suggest any 
obvious arguments for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of criminal rec-
ords. The new immutability does not counter the moral judgments condemn-
ing ex-offenders.450 It is difficult even to find an example of an ex-offender 
staking a political claim that criminal records are fundamental to personality.451 
Amy Myrick has offered a sociological account of the depersonalization that in-
dividuals often experience when inquiring about expungement or sealing of 
criminal records.452 Rather than viewing their criminal records as fundamental 
to their personalities, those confronting their records “felt reduced to pieces of 
personal information that did not represent a holistic identity, even a deviant 
 
447. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
448. EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 785 (D. Md. 2013) (dismissing an action alleging 
that an employer’s practice of considering criminal history and credit records had a disparate 
impact on African American and Hispanic job applicants on the ground that the EEOC 
failed to provide competent expert testimony regarding statistical disparities). 
449. Letter from Patrick Morrisey et al., to Jacqueline A. Berrien et al., supra note 444, at 3 (citing 
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. at 753). 
450. See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 282 (2015) (arguing that discrimina-
tion based on criminal records is different than discrimination based on religion, because, 
“in the case of religion, a person should not have to make a choice on account of other peo-
ple’s prejudices” but in the case of criminal records, “[p]ublic policy strongly condemns 
criminal conduct”). 
451. This is a variation of the argument that the revised immutability fails to cover traits that are 
inessential or stigmatized. See supra Part II.B. 
452. Amy Myrick, Facing Your Criminal Record: Expungement and the Collateral Problem of Wrong-
fully Represented Self, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 73, 74 (2013). 
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one.”453 Myrick’s clients offered accounts of their own identities that “were an-
tithetical to the records’ way of representing, or misrepresenting” them.454 
These accounts have two recurrent features: emphasis on “personal changes 
over time” and assertion of “social identities of parent, worker, and property 
owner” rather than criminal.455 Somewhat like those overweight individuals 
who see their true, essential selves as thin, ex-offenders may see their true, es-
sential selves as law-abiding.456 
In this context, the new immutability reinforces stereotypes.457 If anything, 
the new immutability may introduce a type of “criminal essentialism” that 
lends support to employer arguments for excluding those with criminal rec-
ords.458 Many psychologists assume that personality is continuous and relia-
ble—in other words, immutable—and offenders are not likely to desist from 
criminal behavior.459 Advocates of background checks might concede that the 
underlying identity, that of a “criminal,” is fundamental—if not in the old 
sense of being impossible to change because it is determined by social, eco-
nomic, and genetic factors, then in the new sense of being highly impervious to 
change, requiring the traumatic experience of remorse and repentance for one’s 
crimes, and giving up the life of a criminal.460 Such views lend support to em-
ployer arguments that ex-offenders are untrustworthy and that blanket hiring 
bans are sound practices. These arguments are bolstered by the assumption 
that criminality is immutable as a fundamental aspect of personality. 
The new immutability may gain more traction if the question were re-
framed as protecting not the identity of the criminal but rather the identity of 
the ex-offender who has desisted from crime.461 Advocates of “ban the box” 
policies and other protections for ex-offenders use narratives of redemption 
and the rhetoric of second chances to promote their cause. Consider the follow-
ing example from a report by the National Employment Law Project: 
 
453. Id. at 93. 
454. Id. at 95. 
455. Id. at 94. 
456. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
457. See supra Part II.C. 
458. Cf. SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR LIVES 
5 (2001) (discussing “criminal essentialism”). 
459. See, e.g., Hans Toch, Foreword to MARUNA, supra note 458, at xvi. 
460. MARUNA, supra note 458, at 86 (discussing individuals for whom the idea of “going straight” 
may be inconceivable, akin to being “stripped of one’s identity”). 
461. See, e.g., id. at 97 (discussing redemption narratives in which “making good is part of a 
higher mission, fulfilling a role that had been inherent in the person’s true self”). 
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Like many, Darrell Langdon struggled with addiction in his youth. 
Now 52 and having raised two sons as a single father, Darrell, through 
his strength of character, has been sober for over twenty years. Alt-
hough he has moved forward in life through hard-won rehabilitation, 
his 25-year-old felony conviction for possession of cocaine remains.462 
This vignette appeals to a notion of fundamental character, a true self that is 
emerging through the hard work of rehabilitation and proven over twenty-five 
years of sobriety, a life redeemed through the socially valuable work of child-
rearing. 
But this is too much of a stretch for the new immutability, which is about 
characteristics so fundamental no one should be asked to change them. Instead, 
the argument from the new immutability is that even if he could have his con-
viction expunged, Langdon should not have to, because his conviction was a 
formative and important part of his life’s journey toward redemption. The 
problem with this claim, however, is that it casts criminal conduct as necessary 
rather than regrettable, a claim unlikely to have political purchase, and one that 
does not fit with the narrative of crime as an unfortunate aberration from an 
individual’s fundamentally good character. The new immutability would un-
derstand crime as constitutive of character. 
As a strategic matter, arguments based on the new immutability also fall 
flat with respect to criminal records for other reasons. In contrast to the preg-
nancy and obesity examples, where the concern is that protection would lead 
down a slippery slope, ex-offenders are already at the bottom of the slope, the 
reductio ad absurdum of expansive concepts of the protected class. It seemed 
obvious to Judge Norris, when he expounded on immutability, that “discrimi-
nation exists against some groups because the animus is warranted—no one 
could seriously argue that burglars form a suspect class.”463 
Thus, the revised immutability is only likely to strengthen resistance to le-
gal rules that might require employers to perform more careful criminal back-
ground checks. 
 
*** 
 
As this Part has demonstrated, courts impose implicit immutability re-
quirements not supported by statutory text when interpreting employment 
discrimination law. Immutability concerns also feature in public opinion and 
political debates over executive enforcement of employment discrimination law 
 
462. Rodriguez & Emsellem, supra note 418, at 12.  
463. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
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and expansion of state and local laws to cover new forms of discrimination. 
While discrimination on the basis of weight, pregnancy, and criminal records is 
often considered job-related, arguments about job qualifications are infused 
with moralizing judgments about persons in the abstract. These moralizing 
judgments are problematic for all the reasons described by critics of luck egali-
tarianism. They rest on untenable assumptions about chance and choice, like 
the idea that pregnancy alone, among all potentially disabling conditions, is 
within an individual’s control and therefore need not be accommodated by the 
workplace. They are harsh, like the argument that ex-offenders should be au-
tomatically and permanently denied entry to the job market. They are intru-
sive, like demands that workers conform to ideal norms regarding body size. 
Employers may believe they are creating incentives for better behavior (weight 
loss, personal responsibility for procreation, law-abiding conduct). But sham-
ing and blaming can backfire, causing social dysfunction as their targets cope 
with the assignment of spoiled identities.  
Rather than providing an easy rebuttal, the revised version of immutability 
first obscures these moralizing judgments and then raises new barriers to pro-
tection. The idea that weight, pregnancy, or a criminal record might be an es-
sential aspect of personhood, to be romanticized and protected, fails to reso-
nate because many experience these conditions as negative, neutral, or 
immaterial to personality. Rather than countering stereotypes, the new immu-
tability reinforces them by suggesting that such traits are essential aspects of 
personality. The new immutability may even lend credence to arguments that 
traits like obesity, pregnancy, and ex-offender status are good predictors of fu-
ture behavior. Courts have difficulty imagining what distinguishes these traits 
from all other choices that individuals may consider fundamental. To the ex-
tent it might be accepted, the new immutability rationale provides a lower tier 
of protection than that afforded to classifications such as race and sex. In this 
lower tier, it becomes more difficult to argue that civil rights obligations might 
override employer cost concerns or conflicting “immutable” convictions such as 
religious objections. 
iv .  beyond immutability  
This Part considers alternatives to revising the theory of immutability for 
those interested in expanding employment discrimination law to new forms of 
bias. It examines two potential approaches: (1) universalizing a rule that em-
ployers only require qualifications that are both job-related and reasonable, and 
(2) incremental expansion of targeted antidiscrimination protection through 
legislative, judicial, or employer prohibitions on additional forms of systemic 
bias. It argues that universal approaches, while theoretically appealing, may not 
be politically possible in any form that would effectively address inequality. 
 the yale law journal 	   125 :2   20 15  
86 
 
Thus, it suggests efforts toward incremental expansion of antidiscrimination 
categories based on analogies between old forms of bias and new that do not 
rely on stretching the concept of immutability. In particular, it argues for con-
sideration of whether biases create systemic limits on equal opportunity.464 
A. Universalizing a Reasonable Relationship Requirement? 
An often-suggested solution to the problem of identifying suspect classifi-
cations is to universalize antidiscrimination protections.465 Workers in the 
United States are not universally protected against unfair treatment. The de-
fault position in the United States is at-will employment, meaning employers 
may hire, promote, demote, compensate, or fire employees without cause.466 
Likewise, employers are not generally required to accommodate the needs of 
workers on such matters as job duties, scheduling, or the physical work-
space.467 Employment discrimination law, among other regulatory regimes, 
provides exceptions to these defaults, forbidding adverse treatment on the ba-
 
464. A focus on systemic forms of inequality raises the question of whether the problem can be 
addressed in a single sphere, such as employment, or whether it requires more far-reaching 
interventions into, for example, housing markets, politics, education, criminal justice, and 
even family and social networks. See generally DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: 
HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014) (discussing how racial inequal-
ity operates as a set of reinforcing feedback loops across a number of domains). I do not ar-
gue that systemic inequality can be addressed solely through employment regulation, but 
rather that employment discrimination law could be part of the solution. Despite its many 
limitations and drawbacks, employment discrimination law has achieved dramatic change in 
the American workplace. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 11, at 4 (discussing the “significant 
body of empirical research on intergroup interaction” that supports the claim that the work-
place integration brought about by Title VII reduces racial biases); Joni Hersch & Jennifer 
Bennett Shinall, Fifty Years Later: The Legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34 J. POL. ANALY-
SIS & MGMT. 424, 425 (2015) (concluding that the Civil Rights Act “was largely successful in 
improving opportunities for underserved groups” and that “[b]y banning discrimination in 
employment and providing discrimination victims an outlet through which they could air 
grievances against their employers, the Act changed the face of employment”); Vicki 
Schultz, Taking Sex Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10-14) 
(on file with author) (describing the uneven but important achievements of Title VII for sex 
equality).  
465. Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1429, 1438 (2014) (“Some might argue that we need no such principles: instead law 
ought to require ‘equal opportunity,’ perhaps in the form of meritocratic treatment, across 
the board.”). 
466. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1655, 1657-58 (1996) (discussing the traditional “at-will rule” of employment that “grew out 
of broad notions of employer property rights and freedom of contract”).  
467. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law and Vol-
untary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2010). 
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sis of enumerated traits such as race and sex,468 and requiring accommodations 
for workers with disabilities or religious commitments.469 Employment dis-
crimination law contains defenses, for example, when an employer can show 
that a trait such as sex is a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of that particular business” (BFOQ),470 when a 
policy with a disparate impact is “job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity,”471 or when an accommodation would pose 
an “undue hardship.”472  
Targeted approaches isolate certain identity traits as bases for legal inter-
ventions into employer decision making. Instead, we might imagine a universal 
model of workplace protection, in which employers would need to show cause 
for all personnel decisions. For example, the District of Columbia’s Human 
Rights Act was enacted “to secure an end . . . to discrimination for any reason 
other than that of individual merit.”473 Similarly, some proposed legal reforms 
would require employers to have a reasonable basis for rejecting any request for 
worker accommodation.474 These approaches would not single out particular 
groups, traits, or biases for scrutiny; rather, they would evaluate employment 
decisions based on their reasonableness in terms of business needs. Such ap-
proaches may be normatively superior to targeted expansion of discrimination 
law, but come with significant strategic disadvantages for those concerned 
about inequality. 
As a normative matter, universal policies may be superior to focused inter-
ventions in that they guarantee important rights to liberty, dignity, and job se-
curity, raising the baseline of protection for all workers.475 Universal policies 
 
468. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
469. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (religion); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (disability).  
470. Id. § 2000e–2(e)(1). Under Title VII, however, race is never a BFOQ. Id. 
471. Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
472. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
473. D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2012). 
474. Cf. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 53-54 (2009) (discussing a “universalist version” of disability accommodation 
that “would demand that employers design physical and institutional structures (including 
work schedules and work tasks) in a way that reasonably takes account of the largest possi-
ble range of physical and mental abilities” and “provide[s] reasonable flexibility to all poten-
tial employees whose physical or mental abilities still are not taken into account”); Michael 
Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 693 (2014) (arguing 
for “extending an ADA-like reasonable-accommodation mandate to all work-capable mem-
bers of the general population for whom the provision of reasonable accommodation is nec-
essary to give meaningful access to enable their ability to work”). 
475. See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 192 
(2006) (discussing Supreme Court opinions that frame rights not as questions of equality 
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would eliminate the difficult hurdle of proving discriminatory intent, the cause 
of death for many employment discrimination cases.476 And they would in-
clude all forms of discrimination not justified by job requirements or employer 
necessity, including much discrimination on the basis of weight, pregnancy, 
and criminal records. Universal approaches to workplace protection may have 
political traction in that they expand the potential constituency for change from 
minority groups to all workers, avoid the characterization of employment op-
portunities as zero-sum, evade the problem of fatigue with identity politics, 
and eliminate the fraught task of defining the beneficiary class.477 
Yet there are reasons to be concerned that universal protections may not 
eliminate discrimination as well as targeted approaches. In other work, I have 
called these problems “dilution” and “assimilation.”478 Dilution occurs when a 
right must be narrowed to be extended to more claimants, or when the expan-
sion of rights strains the resources of enforcers, reducing protection for those 
who need it most.479 For example, the proposed Model Employment Termina-
tion Act, which would prohibit discharge of employees without “good cause,” 
would apply only to terminations, not hiring or other aspects of employment; 
would limit employees to streamlined arbitral procedures rather than litiga-
tion; and would offer workers fewer remedies than employment discrimination 
law.480 Legislative proposals to expand accommodations beyond protected 
traits may limit a worker’s right to that of requesting the accommodation and 
receiving consideration from the employer, without imposing a duty on the 
employer to accept reasonable requests.481 The assessment is that compromise 
 
for minorities, “but as . . . rights that, like a rising tide, will lift the boat of every person in 
America”); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting 
Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2844-47 (2014) (discussing arguments in favor of 
universalism). 
476. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2012) (discussing psychological research 
suggesting that the reason discrimination plaintiffs fare poorly in court is that “in all but the 
most compelling factual circumstances, most people believe that some measure of merit—
such as effort or ability—is a more likely explanation for why minorities fail”). 
477. See Clarke, supra note 403, at 1242-45 (describing these advantages of universal policies in 
the context of sex discrimination).  
478. Id. at 1245-49. 
479. Id. at 1247-49. 
480. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and 
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 424-27 (2002) (discussing the MODEL EMP’T TERMI-
NATION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999)).  
481. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 467, at 1108-12 (discussing the then-pending Working 
Families Flexibility Act, H.R. 1274, 111th Cong. (2009)). But see Stein et al., supra note 474, 
at 737 (arguing that employers should be required to provide accommodations whenever 
necessary for a worker to perform essential job functions). 
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is required to ensure judicial and political will for such broad disruptions of 
employer prerogatives.482  
The assimilation problem is that universal solutions often have goals other 
than the disruption of biases and inequality.483 Equality, as a goal, is thought to 
be folded into other goals, such as providing universal job stability or protect-
ing the liberties of all workers against employer intrusion. But in the enforce-
ment and application of universal rules, equality norms may be obscured and 
subverted. Imposing a rationality or reasonableness requirement for certain 
personnel decisions is unlikely to weed out discriminatory practices because, in 
many cases, discrimination may be cost effective.484 Discrimination may allow 
employers to use statistically sound generalizations as efficient sorting mecha-
nisms;485 to maintain a homogenous workforce that can be managed more effi-
ciently;486 to cater to the preferences of clients, customers, or co-workers for 
certain types of employees;487 and to avoid the risk that minority employees 
will bring litigation over workplace conditions such as harassment, denial of 
promotion, or termination.488 Moreover, most proposals would only protect 
employees from unfair termination, rather than requiring fairness in hiring or 
in the terms and conditions of employment.489 Some analysis of the European 
experience suggests that without a commitment to antidiscrimination in hir-
 
482. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 467, at 1092 (explaining that advocates have not pursued 
universal accommodation mandates due to employers’ cost concerns); Theodore J. St. An-
toine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 WASH. L. REV. 361, 370 
(1994) (discussing the philosophy of compromise behind the Model Employment Termina-
tion Act); cf. Bagenstos, supra note 219, at 483-84 (arguing that the increased “number of 
potential lawsuits” and inefficiencies, risks of error, and expenses of federal litigation miti-
gate against “a universal rule of individualized accommodation”).  
483. Bagenstos, supra note 475, at 2862 (“Since universalists argue that their preferred policies 
will solve problems that are broader than and different from those solved by targeted poli-
cies, it should be no surprise that universalist solutions will not always do as well at solving 
the problems for which targeted policies are designed.”). 
484. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disa-
bility) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 849-52 (2003) (offering examples of how employment 
law prohibits rational, cost-effective discrimination). 
485. See supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text.  
486. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Markets and Discrimination, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 700 (2007). 
487. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 686-
87 (2001). 
488. Cf. id. at 690-92 (arguing that antidiscrimination laws create costs for employers by expos-
ing them to liability). 
489. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 480, at 424, 427-30. 
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ing, job protection for incumbent employees locks members of subordinated 
groups out of opportunities.490 
Simply requiring that employers evaluate potential employees based on 
“merit” would not call into question discrimination based on weight, pregnan-
cy, or criminal records, insofar as employers and judges implicitly and explicit-
ly consider these factors demonstrative of character, commitment, and integri-
ty. Adding the requirement that discrimination be “job-related” would better 
address these biases, as an employer may find it difficult to convince a court 
that weight, for example, has any relationship to a sedentary back-office job. 
However, employer arguments gain plausibility if that office is in an image-
conscious industry, or if the job is a highly visible one that requires that the 
employee inspire confidence.491 In employment discrimination law, courts re-
ject the argument that employers must engage in sex discrimination to cater to 
customer preferences for men or women in certain jobs, reasoning that em-
ployers are merely acting as conduits for societal discrimination.492 Employ-
ment discrimination law requires scrutiny of sexist stereotypes by explicitly 
forbidding discrimination based on sex. A simple job-relatedness rule, by con-
trast, would not forbid an employer from catering to such prejudices. If the law 
does not delineate certain widespread biases as subject to scrutiny, it may not 
prompt critical examination of those biases.493  
A law that imposes some sort of universal requirement, while also delineat-
ing prohibited bases for discrimination and not watering down remedies or re-
sources, may be the most normatively desirable policy outcome for those con-
cerned about employee rights generally as well as equal opportunity. Yet there 
are reasons to doubt whether such an approach is a viable strategy. Despite the 
strategic appeal of universal solutions in the abstract, there is little political 
support at present for a revolution in at-will employment.494 Joseph Fishkin 
has described such proposals as “non-starter[s]” because they “run[] rough-
 
490. See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 75-76 (2007). 
491. See supra notes 307, 334-335 and accompanying text (giving examples of weight discrimina-
tion resulting from weight stigma and stereotypes related to the ineffectiveness of over-
weight workers). 
492. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 n.21 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (“[T]he 
purpose of Title VII to overcome stereotyped thinking about the job abilities of the sexes 
would be undermined if customer expectations, preferences, and prejudices were allowed to 
determine the validity of sex discrimination in employment.”). 
493. Clarke, supra note 403, at 1247. 
494. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 474, at 54 (concluding, in the context of disability rights law, that 
the case for universalism “would be well worth making, but its prospects are very doubtful 
politically”). 
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shod over our law’s commitment to leaving employers substantial discretion 
over whom to hire, promote, and fire.”495 Recent history suggests changes to 
workplace regulation are more likely to be incremental than revolutionary, oc-
curring through the expansion of existing categories by courts and the addition 
of new ones by legislatures, at subnational as well as national levels, and by 
private employers as well as governments.496 
B. Targeting Systemic Biases 
This Part proposes incremental expansion of employment discrimination 
law with the goal of targeting systemic forms of bias, rather than the goal of 
protecting immutable traits. This project has both legal and political dimen-
sions. Legally, it could entail judicial recognition that systemic biases—such as 
those based on weight, pregnancy, and criminal records—fall within the cate-
gories of disability, sex, and race discrimination. Politically, it could entail the 
enactment of new rules by legislative bodies or employers that would prohibit 
certain forms of discrimination on the basis of additional enumerated biases. 
Rather than revising the concept of immutability, advocates might expose the 
moralizing nature of judgments about “mutable” traits that are the bases of 
systemic forms of inequality. This Part will begin by describing a systemic bias 
approach and discussing its merits relative to universal protections or argu-
ments from immutability. It will then apply this approach to discriminatory 
practices based on weight, pregnancy, and criminal records. 
By systemic biases, I refer to discriminatory practices that are both struc-
tural and pervasive.497 Structural approaches to employment discrimination are 
concerned with whether institutional practices contribute to unequal oppor-
tunity, rather than the guilt or innocence of particular types of victims or per-
petrators. Structural accounts of discrimination locate the causes and conse-
quences of inequality in social and institutional practices, arrangements, and 
 
495. Fishkin, supra note 465, at 1438. 
496. See Nancy Levit, Changing Workforce Demographics and the Future of the Protected Class Ap-
proach, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 463, 483 (2012) (discussing the trajectory of recent expan-
sions of workplace law). But see BAGENSTOS, supra note 474, at 143 (assessing the success of 
means-tested welfare versus social security and concluding that “[l]ooking at the history of 
the American welfare state in general, there seems to be a great deal of evidence to support 
the notion that broad social insurance programs fare better politically than do more targeted 
interventions”). 
497. Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 164 (making a similar argument with respect to how “perva-
sive” and “strict” a limitation on equal opportunity is). 
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systems.498 They change the focus from individuals and their choices to how 
workplace structures “contribut[e] to the production or expression of bias.”499 
The structural approach’s focus on the workplace itself as the cause of inequali-
ty creates an argument for legal intrusion into the prerogatives of employers.500 
By contrast, immutability arguments look to whether the victims of discrimi-
nation, considered as a class or group, deserve protection.501 Because they are 
understood as based on bad or costly “choices” (gluttony, sex, criminal behav-
ior), certain traits receive limited or no protection. Victims of these forms of 
discrimination have lost their innocence, unlike those who did not choose their 
race or sex, and so the analogy to race or sex fails. The problem with analogical 
arguments that compare groups in this manner is that they “promote[] the 
idea that the traits of subordinated groups, rather than the dynamics of subor-
 
498. See, e.g., FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 1; Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynam-
ics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
91, 142-43 (2003); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpreta-
tions of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1824-25 (1990); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Dis-
crimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 485-90 (2001). This approach 
has also been termed the “new structuralism.” See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 221-22 (8th ed. 2013); Schultz, supra, at 1825.  
In addition to diagnosing the problem as structural, many of these theorists argue for 
new structural cures. See Bagenstos, supra note 259, at 17-20 (summarizing reforms pro-
posed by scholars to create employer accountability for workplace structures that contribute 
to bias); Ford, supra note 8, at 1384 (arguing that “the law should replace the conceptually 
elusive goal of eliminating discrimination with the more concrete goal of requiring employ-
ers, government officials, and other powerful actors to meet a duty of care to avoid unneces-
sarily perpetuating social segregation or hierarchy”). Debates over the merits of these new 
doctrinal frameworks are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 
259, at 20-40 (discussing “reasons for skepticism” about the efficacy of certain proposals). 
This Article’s argument is against limiting existing employment discrimination frameworks 
to immutable traits, even if those existing frameworks may sometimes be thwarted by a ju-
diciary lacking the competence or inclination to enforce them. See id. at 20-26 (describing 
the limits of existing doctrinal frameworks).  
499. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 498, at 488.  
500. See Schultz, supra note 498, at 1841-43. 
501. Not all proponents of structural solutions agree that the question of what traits to protect 
should be determined without respect to immutability. For example, Richard Thompson 
Ford argues, on pragmatic grounds, that the balance between an employer’s prerogatives 
and an employee’s interests “may tip to favor the employer when the employee can avoid the 
adversity by altering her behavior.” Ford, supra note 8, at 1419. This Part argues that the 
question should be reframed as whether the employer’s practice of discriminating on the ba-
sis of a “mutable” trait perpetuates systemic bias, not whether the law should protect an 
employee’s interest in engaging in a course of behavior.  
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dination, are the normatively important thing to notice.”502 Thus, a structural 
frame would put this Article’s question not as which classes should be protect-
ed, but which forms of bias the law should disrupt. 
Pervasive forms of bias connect to larger social systems of hierarchy and 
segregation and contribute to broader problems of inequality.503 The focus on 
pervasive biases differentiates a targeted approach from a universal one and 
provides a limiting principle.504 Unlike isolated instances of workplace unfair-
ness, pervasive biases substantially limit the opportunities of affected individu-
als.505 For example, “victims of sex discrimination will encounter it in work-
place after workplace,”506 while a man who is fired because, for example, “he 
reminded the employer of the employer’s hated stepfather” is unlikely to ever 
encounter this same unreasonable prejudice again.507 But the difference is not 
just that a victim of sex discrimination has diminished prospects for finding 
another job: the problem is also that sex discrimination reinforces larger pat-
terns of superficial prejudice, stereotyping, and stigmatization.508  
 
502. Janet E. Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY?: NEW WORK ON THE 
POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 40, 51 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000).  
503. This discussion refers to pervasive biases in the present tense, but it is not intended to pre-
clude consideration of the past or future. More precisely, the question is whether a form of 
bias has the potential to become systemic. This might be determined based on its history. 
Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 470 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Whenever evolving principles of equality, root-
ed in the Equal Protection Clause, require that certain classifications be viewed as potentially 
discriminatory, and when history reveals systemic unequal treatment, more searching judi-
cial inquiry than minimum rationality becomes relevant.”). It might also be predicted based 
on changing norms or technologies. See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 601-11 
(2011) (discussing how rules against genetic discrimination are justified to avoid a hypothet-
ical future in which “a genetic underclass” faces social subjugation). 
504. I do not endeavor to describe the line separating pervasive and idiosyncratic biases with any-
thing approaching mathematical precision, because the difference will necessarily depend on 
context. No two forms of bias are identical, and no single group’s experience of discrimina-
tion should set the benchmark for future protection. It might therefore be objected that the 
criterion of “pervasiveness” creates the same line-drawing problems as the new immutabil-
ity. See supra Part II.D. Yet a pervasiveness standard is less amenable to “floodgates” argu-
ments because, while every aspect of personality might be said to be central, fewer biases 
might be said to be widespread. 
505. See supra note 497 and accompanying text. 
506. Ford, supra note 8, at 1385; see also, e.g., FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 167-68; Bagenstos, supra 
note 219, at 479. 
507. Mark Kelman, (Why) Does Gender Equity in College Athletics Entail Gender Equality?, 7 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 63, 91 (1997).  
508. Cf. id. (“It is not simply the case that we care less, in designing a legal regime, about the per-
son denied a job for the illegitimate reason that he reminded the employer of the employer’s 
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Whether a bias is pervasive in the sense of being widespread might be 
demonstrated through quantitative measures.509 But qualitative measures are 
also important; for example, patterns of bias might be pervasive because they 
are self-reinforcing: discouraging those affected from pursuing opportunities 
and limiting the options available to them, or distorting judgments about those 
identified as group members.510 Or these forms of inequality might be complex 
in that they spill across more than one domain of social life, such as in em-
ployment, education, housing, the family, or politics.511 The focus on pervasive 
biases accords with the aim of disrupting wholesale patterns of discrimination 
that assign group-based statuses to individuals so as to limit their range of op-
portunities.512  
This systemic bias approach is both provisional and open-ended. It is pro-
visional because it is not the aim of this Article to provide a unified theory of 
protected traits. Rather, this Part aims only to sketch out a potential alternative 
 
hated stepfather because we believe that person will get another job. It is also the case that 
the decision not to hire in such a case does not confirm traditional status-based social hierar-
chies, express the social power of one group over another or contribute to ambivalent self-
loathing.”).  
509. Quantitative measures might include, for example, data on pay disparities or occupational 
segregation, see, e.g., Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act: Assessing the Past, Taking Stock of the 
Future, NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE 6-7 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default 
/files/equalpay/equal_pay_task_force_progress_report_june_2013_new.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/W8WA-HP8A] (describing the persistence of pay gaps between men and women and 
occupational segregation based on sex), or measures of explicit and implicit attitudes and 
stereotypes, see, e.g., Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 427, 433-34 tbl.1 (2007) (summarizing data on implicit and explicit attitudes to-
ward and stereotypes regarding various identity traits). Arguments to explain these dispari-
ties are also required, as numbers alone will not do the work to persuade judges who “often 
believe that such patterns reflect real differences in qualifications or voluntary choices of in-
dividual workers.” Bagenstos, supra note 259, at 39.  
510. See supra notes 221, 241 and accompanying text.  
511. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Politics and the Complex Inequalities of Gender, in PLURALISM, 
JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY 120, 125 (David Miller & Michael Walzer eds., 1995) (discussing Mi-
chael Walzer’s concept of “‘complex equality,’ which requires that inequalities in any one 
sphere do not spread to others,” and applying this concept to women’s inequality in the 
family, which spreads into other social and political spheres). 
512. See Vicki Schultz, Antidiscrimination Law as Disruption: The Emergence of a New Ap-
proach to Understanding and Addressing Discrimination 3 (Mar. 2014) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with author) (describing an approach to antidiscrimination that sees the 
law’s aim as disrupting institutional practices that “(1) pigeonhol[e] individuals into pre-
conceived notions of the groups to which they belong; (2) assign[] preconceived notions of 
what it means to be members of those groups; and (3) structur[e] rewards or interactions in 
ways that tend to reproduce or confirm those presumed group-based differences in the par-
ticular setting”). 
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to the revised immutability that might be more normatively attractive and po-
litically feasible.  
This approach is open-ended in that, beyond asking about whether system-
ic biases attach to particular traits, it does not take sides in debates about the 
forms of bias that equality law should prohibit. As previously discussed, 
equality law already recognizes that biases may be prohibited because, for ex-
ample, they are generally superficial (judging on a basis that is not, or need 
not, be required for the job),513 stigmatizing (demeaning or subordinating 
based on identity),514 or stereotyping (making assumptions about roles and 
competences based on group status).515 This Article does not attempt to resolve 
debates among these theories; rather, it has argued that the revised immutabil-
ity subverts the goals of eliminating each of these forms of bias,516 and thus 
employment discrimination law requires a more inclusive theory of discrimina-
tion.  
Some might argue that immutability could be stretched to encompass sys-
temic biases. Susan Schmeiser, in her analysis of the new immutability, ap-
plauds those courts she sees as asking not whether a trait is immutable, but 
whether discrimination on the basis of that trait has been immutable.517 She ar-
gues for a “reading of immutability . . . that turns not on the significance of in-
dividual self-definition or the question of volition, but rather on the persistence 
of ‘social and legal ostracism’ as the relevant aspect of group definition.”518 For 
example, Schmeiser discusses an Oregon state appellate decision holding that 
immutability is not about “the common, class-defining characteristics, but in-
stead the fact that such characteristics are historically regarded as defining dis-
tinct, socially-recognized groups that have been the subject of adverse social or 
political stereotyping or prejudice.”519 Such a definition of immutability, how-
 
513. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
514. See supra notes 219-221 and accompanying text. 
515. See supra notes 229-241 and accompanying text.  
516. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C. 
517. See Schmeiser, supra note 7, at 1518.  
518. Id. (quoting Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 436 (Conn. 2008)); cf. Sam-
uel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 650 (2001) (arguing 
that an immutable trait should be defined as one with “terms, assumptions, and normative 
social requirements so deeply ingrained into the members of the society, that it is experi-
enced at the individual level as immutable” and that discrimination based on such traits 
should be suspect because it signals “broader social disadvantaging of a disfavored group”). 
519. Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). In Tanner, the 
court held that a policy denying insurance benefits to same-sex couples violated the Oregon 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal privileges. Id. at 448. This definition of immutability is 
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ever, has not had wide uptake.520 Moreover, just as it is problematic to argue 
that human traits are immutable, so it is problematic to argue that biases are 
immutable. This line of argument may be self-defeating by suggesting that 
equality law is futile: if discriminatory assignments of identity and practices of 
segregation and subordination are immutable, the law cannot disrupt them.  
To argue that employment discrimination law should forbid more forms of 
systemic bias is not to say an employer can never discriminate on these bases. 
Rather, to discriminate on the basis of a forbidden trait, an employer must 
demonstrate a business reason sufficient to meet a statutory standard or other 
exception.521 Absent such a defense, moralizing judgments that an employee 
was to blame for her own deficiency should not excuse employer actions that 
perpetuate systemic problems of social inequality. Employment discrimination 
law seeks to balance employer prerogatives against the aim of eradicating in-
vidious forms of bias. The law is justified in intervening in employer judg-
ments with more force where those judgments cause social problems.522 The 
focus on pervasive biases limits a systemic approach to those forms of bias that 
severely curtail opportunities, cut across social domains, or are self-
perpetuating for those defined by certain traits. These forms of workplace un-
fairness create larger problems of inequality and make a stronger case for inter-
vention in employer prerogatives.  
It is true that more expansive antidiscrimination laws may trade off with 
the rigor of enforcement or the extent of remedies.523 Some might argue that 
 
unusual, as courts have generally considered a history of discrimination to be a separate and 
distinct factor, apart from immutability. See supra text accompanying note 44.  
520. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing court opinions defining immutable traits 
as having to do with fundamental characteristics rather than social practices).  
521. See supra notes 469-472 and accompanying text. Valid affirmative action plans are also ex-
ceptions to liability. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) 
(upholding an affirmative action plan against a Title VII challenge). 
522. See Bagenstos, supra note 484, at 857-59.  
523. Whether the expansion of antidiscrimination law to cover new forms of discrimination di-
lutes those resources and remedies available for more pressing problems is an empirical 
question. See Clarke, supra note 403, at 1248-49. Dilution may be minimal. Based on her 
study of state and local appearance discrimination ordinances, Deborah Rhode has argued 
that these legal rules have the potential to spark social change while generating little in the 
way of enforcement burdens or political backlash. DEBORAH RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE 
INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 113 (2010) (arguing for the expansion of legal 
prohibitions on appearance discrimination and noting that jurisdictions that have expanded 
such prohibitions have not been overwhelmed with litigation).  
  I argue that universal expansion of employment protections is likely to dilute remedies 
based on prominent proposals for universal rules, which contain diluted means for enforce-
ment or remedies. See supra notes 480-482 and accompanying text. Proposals to add catego-
ries such as “weight” to the enumerated lists of prohibited bases for discrimination, or to in-
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immutability should serve as a proxy for measuring whether a group deserves 
priority in terms of antidiscrimination protection. Yet, as this Article has ar-
gued, the moral judgments underlying considerations of immutability are 
problematic. Rather than asking impossible questions about the relative moral 
desert of various groups, equality politics might focus on the harms to society 
when the labor market subdivides workers into rigid groupings based on su-
perficial, stigmatizing, or stereotypical categories. Systemic problems of ine-
quality have a stronger claim on limited enforcement resources and remedies. 
Moreover, stratification based on “immutable” characteristics like race may be 
impossible to address without attention to widespread discrimination on the 
basis of “mutable” characteristics, such as ex-offender status.  
By contrast to the universal approach, an incremental approach to expand-
ing antidiscrimination law may be more politically feasible. American civil 
rights law has often expanded by establishing analogies to and overlaps with 
discrimination based on race, sex, disability, and increasingly, sexual orienta-
tion.524 Analogies “can inspire empathy and understanding of harms previously 
unrecognized, and they may be desirable, if not necessary, in an adjudicative 
system based upon fidelity to precedent.”525 To suggest the power of careful 
analogical arguments is not to insist on the equivalence or ranking of oppres-
 
terpret existing categories to include more forms of discrimination, are not as often accom-
panied by such large compromises. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (discussing 
existing weight discrimination prohibitions); supra note 344 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the PDA’s amendment of the category of “sex” discrimination to include “pregnan-
cy”); supra note 427 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC’s proposal to include 
criminal background checks under the familiar rubric of disparate impact law). 
524. See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Note, “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in 
Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1046 (2001) (discussing the “political and 
legal currency” of analogies between protected groups in civil rights advocacy). Analogies to 
race may be inescapable. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 2 (2011) (“The African American quest for civil rights has be-
come so deeply ingrained in American consciousness that it is the yardstick against which all 
other reform movements are measured.”); Halley, supra note 502, at 46 (“‘Like race’ argu-
ments are so intrinsically woven into American discourses of equal justice that they can nev-
er be entirely foregone. Indeed, analogies are probably an inescapable mode of human in-
quiry and are certainly so deeply ingrained in the logics of American adjudication that any 
proposal to do without them altogether would be boldly utopian . . . .”). But see ANNA KIRK-
LAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 155 (2008) (arguing that 
“like-race” arguments are futile because no other form of discrimination is identical to race 
discrimination in all respects); Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1010, 1058 (2014) (discussing the flaws of “like race” arguments generally and 
arguing that “[i]nstead of playing the oppression Olympics, marriage equality advocates 
should focus on providing detailed, compelling accounts of antigay discrimination, which 
can stand on their own footing”). 
525. Mayeri, supra note 524, at 1046.  
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sions.526 Rather than arguing that the common thread is immutable traits, in 
any sense of the term “immutable,” advocates might argue that biases on the 
basis of traits such as weight, pregnancy, and criminal records perpetuate sys-
temic inequality, and that the arguments against protection are moralizing.  
Looking at the social dynamics behind weight discrimination reveals a kin-
ship with other forms of disability discrimination527 and substantial overlap 
with sex discrimination.528 Obesity is a stigmatized condition with systemic 
implications for employment opportunity,529 yet it often falls outside the defi-
nition of disability due to immutability concerns.530 One notable victory against 
weight discrimination is a 1993 First Circuit decision, Cook v. Rhode Island, De-
partment of Mental Health, Retardation & Hospitals.531 In that case, the court ad-
dressed immutability head-on and found it irrelevant. It rejected arguments 
that “morbid obesity” was not an impairment on account of being “caused, or 
at least exacerbated, by voluntary conduct.”532 This was because the statute 
contains no language suggesting that its protection is linked to how an 
individual became impaired, or whether an individual contributed to 
his or her impairment. On the contrary, the Act indisputably applies to 
numerous conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by voluntary 
conduct, such as alcoholism, AIDS, diabetes, cancer resulting from cig-
arette smoking, heart disease resulting from excesses of various types, 
and the like.533 
Rather than appealing to an alternate concept of immutability as a protected 
realm of liberty, the court highlighted the hypocrisy of treating weight differ-
 
526. Civil rights struggles might appropriate lessons from one another without engaging in facile 
comparisons. See Robinson, supra note 524, at 1058 (discussing “how one can demonstrate a 
link between civil rights struggles without suggesting that they are generic and identical or, 
even worse, ranking one above another”). 
527. Cf. supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
528. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the Legal Framework for Protect-
ing Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1) (on 
file with author) (arguing that “the obesity penalty for women is largely the result of em-
ployers keeping obese women (but not obese men) out of” jobs involving “public interac-
tion”). 
529. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity Control, 47 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 121, 164-68 (2013) (discussing evidence of the prevalence of stigmatization and ste-
reotypes surrounding obesity). 
530. See supra text accompanying notes 292-311. 
531. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993). 
532. Id. at 24. 
533. Id. 
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ently than other conditions brought on by voluntary conduct. It instead direct-
ly confronted the social stigma surrounding weight, ending with disapproval 
for “a society that all too often confuses ‘slim’ with ‘beautiful’ or ‘good.’”534 The 
European Court of Justice has addressed weight discrimination in a similar 
manner.535 
Likewise, failure to accommodate pregnancy and related conditions has 
systemic effects on the employment opportunities of women.536 “[T]he mater-
nal wall—the barriers to employment equality faced by mothers—begins with 
pregnancy.”537 Although the time during which a worker is pregnant is a rela-
tively short period in the span of her career, the effects of pregnancy discrimi-
nation have a long-lasting impact.538 This form of discrimination is self-
perpetuating: employers discriminate based on the stereotype that women will 
be less devoted to their jobs due to family responsibilities, resulting in fewer 
employment opportunities for women and creating incentives for women to 
devote themselves to family responsibilities rather than paid work.539  
 
534. Id. at 28. In a study of U.S. news media reporting on weight, Abigail Saguy found that arti-
cles were more likely to “blame individuals for being overweight or obese than for having 
anorexia or bulimia.” SAGUY, supra note 292, at 71. Saguy observes connections to race, class, 
sex, and age, explaining that “fatness is more common among the American poor and mi-
norities” while “anorexia and bulimia are diagnosed most often in middle-class white wom-
en and girls.” Id. Weight, class, and race may be linked because low-income and predomi-
nantly African-American neighborhoods are often “food deserts” without stores selling 
affordable, healthy foods, or because low-price stores target shoppers with junk food adver-
tising. See, e.g., Bonnie Ghosh-Dastidar et al., Distance to Store, Food Prices, and Obesity in 
Urban Food Deserts, 47 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 587, 587, 593 (2014) (studying 1,372 house-
holds in two low-income, majority African American neighborhoods, and finding that 
shopping at low-price food stores correlated with obesity and that low-price stores more ac-
tively marketed junk foods than high-priced stores). 
535. In a 2014 employment discrimination matter, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
held that obesity may fall within the definition of disability under the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, clarifying explicitly, “The concept of ‘dis-
ability’ . . . does not depend on the extent to which the person may or may not have contrib-
uted to the onset of his disability.” Case C-354/13, Fag og Arbejde v. Kommunernes 
Landsforening, 2014 E.C.R. 2106 ¶ 56 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf 
?text=&docid=160935 [http://perma.cc/9HZU-E3PA]. 
536. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Keynote Address: Want Gender Equality? Die Childless at Thirty, 27 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 3, 3 (2006) (discussing “[n]ew work by economists [that] docu-
ments the central role of motherhood in creating economic vulnerability for women” in the 
form of an increasing wage gap).  
537. Brake & Grossman, supra note 351, at 68. 
538. Id. at 69. 
539. Stephen J. Rose & Heidi I. Hartmann, Still a Man’s Labor Market: The Long-Term Earnings 
Gap, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. 33 (2004), http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs 
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With respect to pregnancy, arguments based on the intersections between 
reproduction and sex equality, rather than any sort of immutability, have had 
some success in courts. In International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Supreme 
Court struck down as unlawful sex discrimination an employer’s “fetal-
protection policy” that forbade fertile women, but not fertile men, from work-
ing in certain jobs involving hazardous lead exposure.540 What doomed the 
company’s policy was its distinction between men and women, not its distinc-
tion on the basis of “fertility alone.”541 Unlike rights to reproductive privacy or 
liberty, the interest in sex equality was strong enough to override employer ar-
guments that discrimination was necessary to avoid the risk of costly tort liabil-
ity.542  
Rather than allowing immutability arguments to remain submerged in sex 
discrimination contexts, courts might directly address them. In one district 
court case, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., an employer argued expressly that con-
traceptives are “voluntary” and “not truly a ‘healthcare issue.’”543 The district 
court called this immutability point out as “[a]n underlying theme” of the em-
ployer’s argument and rejected it, reasoning that “the availability of affordable 
and effective contraceptives is of great importance to the health of women and 
children because it can help to prevent a litany of physical, emotional, econom-
ic, and social consequences.”544 
Likewise, with respect to criminal records, a focus on the harshness of im-
mutability arguments, the racially disparate impact of screening practices, and 
the systemic effects of those practices has been persuasive with lawmakers. In 
analyzing the reasons that state legislatures enacted ban-the-box legislation, 
Fishkin describes how advocates directly confronted arguments regarding per-
sonal responsibility, exposing how these arguments are harsh and stigmatiz-
ing.545 For example, Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter emphasized that “peo-
ple who ‘have paid their debt to society’ deserve ‘an opportunity to work to 
 
/still-a-mans-labor-market-the-long-term-earnings-gap/at_download/file [http://perma.cc 
/RT9F-KF5M]. 
540. 499 U.S. 187, 190 (1991). 
541. Id. at 198. 
542. Id. at 210. The Court qualified this holding with the explanation that it was “not presented 
with . . . a case in which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the em-
ployer’s business.” Id. at 210-11. 
543. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  
544. Id. at 1272-73. 
545. Fishkin, supra note 465, at 1462. 
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provide for their families and should not be discriminated against before they 
even have a first interview.’”546 Immutability concerns clash with the goal of 
open[ing] up a wider range of life paths and opportunities not only to 
those who demonstrate particular merit, desert, or promise, but to eve-
ryone—including those who have done poorly and those who did not 
manage to do as much as one would hope with the opportunities that 
were available to them.547 
Fishkin also concluded that the disparate impact of criminal background checks 
on racial minorities played an integral role, by engaging anti-racist activists and 
organizations such as the NAACP to work for reforms.548 When the question is 
the moral desert or freedom of ex-offenders as a class, it is hard to make the 
case for imposing the additional costs of individualized assessments on em-
ployers. The case is much stronger if the problem is envisioned as systemic in-
equality: a potential future in which all employers automatically exclude every 
ex-offender, creating a large, permanent underclass of individuals with crimi-
nal records, disproportionately people of color, unable to find any employ-
ment.549 
conclusion 
The new immutability has been useful for courts seeking to overcome doc-
trinal hurdles to protection against sexual orientation discrimination. But anal-
ysis of its potential applications to employment discrimination contexts reveals 
that the revised immutability is deeply flawed as a way of rethinking equality 
law. The new immutability is focused on determining whether individuals 
have made choices that ought to be protected aspects of their “personhood,” 
rather than asking how workplace policies limit equal opportunity by perpetu-
ating systemic biases. Such biases may include the ideas that thin is always 
good, criminals are always bad, and pregnancy is always special. The promise 
 
546. Id. (quoting City of Phila., “Ban the Box” Ordinance Goes into Effect, WORDPRESS  
(Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.cityofphiladelphia.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/ban-the-box 
-ordinance-goes-into-effect [http://perma.cc/7E3Q-WTP4]). 
547. FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 23. Fishkin has coined the term “bottlenecks” to describe structur-
al impediments to equal opportunity, and argued that “ameliorat[ing] severe bottlenecks” 
should be one of the central purposes of antidiscrimination law. Fishkin, supra note 465, at 
1432. 
548. Fishkin, supra note 465, at 1462-63. Fishkin emphasizes, however, that the “race-based and 
race-neutral” analyses of this problem are “deeply complementary.” Id. at 1463. 
549. See id. at 1463. 
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of employment discrimination law is its ability to disrupt the stereotypes, 
stigmatizing practices, and superficial judgments that contribute to systems of 
inequality. This exercise will ultimately require more empathy and understand-
ing, not revisions of the theory of immutability. 
 
